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1 Introduction 
This thesis explores issues in human behavior and their implications for policy design. 
In four self-contained papers, I introduce new aspects in the analysis of cooperation and 
health provision, and I also investigate the strategic consequences of emotions 
(frustration and anger) in human interaction. These topics are investigated using 
laboratory experiments, a method that facilitates both variation in key institutional 
features to allow causal inference and analysis of sharp theoretical predictions in a clean 
environment. 
1.1 Background 
The standard assumption about economic agents is that they are exclusively self-
interested. This is a useful theoretical benchmark. We know, in reality, that real human 
beings are also motivated by a range of other factors, including reciprocity, trust, 
emotions, and the well-being of others. These factors may shape economic outcomes in 
profound ways. An important question is therefore when, how, and why this happens, 
and in particular how such behavior interacts with policy interventions in various 
situations (including cooperation and health, for instance). 
Cooperation is essential for the survival of our species and a fundamental aspect of 
human society (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2003; Gordon, 1954). Working together for a common good is an 
important part of our daily life. Examples include team efforts to deal with 
environmental issues, such as recycling and mitigation of climate change. It is therefore 
important to understand why and under what circumstances individuals cooperate. Two 
central aspects are the role of informal institutions and the design of formal institutions 
that can foster cooperation, on both a local and a global scale (Boyd et al., 2010; Fehr 
and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990). This is the 
topic for the first two papers of the thesis. 
One particularly important aspect in understanding human motivation is the influence of 
emotions and how they may shape economic outcomes (Elster, 1998; Loewenstein, 
2000). Frustration and anger may drive revenge, punishment, and negative reciprocity. 
This has important strategic consequences and is the topic of the third paper of the 
thesis. 
2 
 
Health is another area of significant importance to human life, happiness and society at 
large. Medical costs are rapidly increasing and this poses a challenge for health care 
systems around the world and raises important questions regarding how to organize the 
system (Cutler, 2002; Newhouse, 1996). Since policy makers must rely on the behavior 
of physicians in implementing the overall established goals for the health care sector, a 
crucial issue is to understand how physicians’ provision of health care responds to 
different types of reimbursement systems. This issue is investigated in the fourth paper 
of the thesis. 
The main method used in all four papers consists of lab experiments. In the words of 
Vernon Smith (1976): “The laboratory becomes a place where real people earn real 
money for making real decisions about abstract claims that are just as ‘real’ as a share of 
General Motors” (p. 275). It is a (simple) microeconomic system that can link theory 
and controlled observation, and one can test central aspects of different institutional 
mechanisms (Smith, 1982). Two aspects are essential for this thesis: 1) Sharp 
theoretical predictions about human behavior can be tested and 2) the causal impact of 
institutions and incentive systems can be investigated in detail (Falk and Heckman, 
2009). 
1.2 Summary of the thesis 
In Paper I, Public Goods and Minimum Provision Levels: Does the Institutional 
Formation Affect Cooperation? (with Peter Martinsson), we use a laboratory 
experiment to investigate how to overcome the problem of under-provision of public 
goods. Specifically, we examine the role of institutional formation on the 
implementation of a binding minimum contribution level in a linear public goods game. 
In the experiment, groups either face the minimum level exogenously imposed by a 
central authority or are allowed to decide for themselves by means of a group vote 
whether or not a minimum level should be implemented. We find a binding minimum 
contribution level to have a positive and substantial effect on cooperation. The main 
impact is on the extensive margin, meaning that it is possible to force free riders to 
increase their contribution without crowding out others’ voluntary contributions. This 
result is robust to the mode of implementation, which is interesting from an institutional 
design point of view since it indicates that there are no positive effects from democracy 
per se in the context of our experiment. Taken together, our results show that when the 
minimum level is enforceable, it is a simple policy that will increase provision of the 
public good. 
Paper II, Framing and Minimum Levels in Public Good Provision (with Peter 
Martinsson and Haileselassie Medhin), focuses on the design of institutions that foster 
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cooperation in the provision of local public goods, for example local environmental 
quality. Using a laboratory experiment in the field, we examine how the choice 
architecture of framing a social dilemma – give to or take from a public good – interacts 
with a policy intervention that enforces a minimum contribution level to the public 
good. We find that cooperation is significantly higher in the give frame than in the take 
frame in our standard public goods experiment. When a minimum contribution level is 
introduced, contributions are significantly higher in the take frame since contributions 
are crowded out in the give frame but crowded in in the take frame. Our results 
therefore stress the importance of choosing the frame when making policy 
recommendations. Moreover, the subjects in our experiments were farm household 
heads actively engaged in a number of public good-like decisions in real life, such as 
environmental rehabilitation and the maintenance of local infrastructure. Thus, this 
paper also contributes to extending the conventional analysis of cooperation to a non-
student and non-Western subject pool, which is especially important since societies 
across the world differ substantially in terms of social organization, trust, fairness 
norms, and also in the nature of day-to-day cooperation problems. 
Paper III, Frustration and Anger in Games: A First Empirical Test of the Theory 
(single authored), explores the strategic consequences of frustration and anger in human 
interaction. Angry individuals may become hostile in their dealings with others, and this 
emotional aspect could shape interaction and outcomes in, for example, situations 
involving negotiation and bargaining, contractual holdup, delegated decision making, 
conflict, and social dilemmas. Although it seems important to understand the sources of 
anger, as well as its consequences for strategic interaction, this topic has received 
relatively little attention in the development of behavioral theory. Battigalli, 
Dufwenberg, and Smith (2015) contribute to fill this gap in the literature by developing 
a formal framework where frustration and anger affect interaction and shape economic 
outcomes. In my paper, I design an experiment testing the predictions based on central 
concepts of their theory. The focus is on situations where other-responsibility is weak or 
nonexistent, and in this specific context I find only limited support for the theory: While 
unfulfilled expectations about material payoffs seem to generate negative emotions in 
subjects (which is in line with BDS’ conceptualization of frustration), behavior is 
generally not affected by these emotions to the extent predicted by the theory. 
Paper IV, Physician Behavior and Conditional Altruism: The Effects of Payment 
System and Uncertain Health Benefit (single authored), studies physician behavior 
using laboratory experiments. The focus is on the effect of the payment system (fee-for-
service vs. capitation) on physicians’ treatment decisions. More specifically, I 
investigate the altruistic behavior of physicians and whether this behavior is affected by 
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payment system and uncertainty in health outcome. The experiment shows that many 
physicians are altruistic toward their patients but also that the degree of altruism varies 
across patients with different medical needs, indicating that physicians condition their 
altruism on certain patient characteristics. Moreover, patients are overtreated in fee-for-
service payment systems to the same extent as they are undertreated in capitation 
systems, and this result extends into domains of risk and uncertainty in patient health. 
There are more selfish physicians but also more purely altruistic physicians under fee-
for-service than under capitation. Interestingly, even though the overall level of medical 
treatment differs substantially between capitation and fee-for-service payment, there is 
no significant difference in the distribution of physician types based on conditional 
altruism; the common categorization is that physician altruism is guided by severity of 
illness, both under capitation and fee-for-service. 
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Abstract  
We investigate the role of institutional formation on the implementation of a binding 
minimum contribution level in a linear public goods game. Groups either face the 
minimum level exogenously imposed by a central authority or are allowed to decide for 
themselves by means of a group vote whether or not a minimum level should be 
implemented. We find a binding minimum contribution level to have a positive and 
substantially significant effect on cooperation. The main impact is on the extensive 
margin, meaning that it is possible to force free riders to increase their contribution 
without crowding out others’ voluntary contributions. This result is robust to the mode 
of implementation and thus when the minimum level is enforceable, it is a simple policy 
that will increase provision of the public good.  
Keywords: Public goods, Minimum level, Voting, Experiment. 
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1. Introduction 
Free riding is a frequently discussed reason for creating institutions to increase 
contributions to public goods. To reduce the problem of under-provision of public 
goods, formal institutions are often established. Many of these institutions focus 
specifically on the free riders or those who contribute a small amount to the public good 
for example by allowing punishment (e.g., see overview in Chaudhuri, 2011).1 In real 
life, however, the most frequently used institution to combat free riders is to require 
some minimum contribution level. For example when it comes to the environment, 
there are certain standards for emissions from cars and for recycling at household level. 
Entrance fees to museums or national parks, and workload in teams, are other examples. 
The most common example is probably the financing of public goods such as health 
care and schools through taxation. The focus of this paper is whether a minimum level 
per se helps to increase contributions to a public good. Alternatively, these public goods 
could be provided in a regime without any minimum standards for cars or entrance fees, 
and rely solely on voluntary contributions. From an institutional design point of view, 
the question is whether a binding minimum level results in crowding out and whether 
the way the institution is implemented affects contribution levels. The objective of this 
paper is to investigate, by using a public goods experiment, the effect (i) of imposing a 
minimum contribution level for a public good and (ii) of the mode of implementation, 
i.e., whether the way the minimum level is introduced, either endogenously by majority 
voting or exogenously, affects contributions. 
Binding minimum contribution levels have been studied experimentally with mixed 
results in terms of how levels of contributions to public goods have been affected. For 
instance, Andreoni (1993) and Gronberg et al. (2012) find that minimum levels increase 
contributions in public goods games with concave payoff functions and Chan et al. 
(2002) find the same effect but furthermore that it wears off as the minimum level is 
increased. Conversely, Kocher et al. (2016) implement minimum levels in a linear 
public goods game, and for a low minimum level they find no effect on public good 
provision whereas for a higher minimum level they find an overall positive effect. 
Moreover, the effects are qualitatively similar when the minimum level is endogenously 
imposed by one randomly selected group member. Keser et al. (2014) investigate 
minimum levels in a linear public goods experiment with endowment heterogeneity and 
find that the minimum level increases public good provision if subjects with a higher 
                                                 
1 There are also experiments focusing on incentivizing people to give a high amount by allowing rewards 
(e.g., Sefton et al., 2007).  
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endowment face a higher minimum level.2 Furthermore, a recent set of interesting 
papers use minimum levels to study strategic aspects of international negotiations 
concerning global public goods provision (e.g., climate protection). For example, 
Dannenberg (2012) and Dannenberg et al. (2014) study coalition formation in light of 
subsequent introduction of a minimum contribution level within this coalition, and 
Kesternich et al. (2014a,b) and Gallier et al. (2014) implement minimum contribution 
levels in settings where subjects are heterogeneous with respect to their endowment or 
their marginal per capita return from the public good.3 Common among the latter set of 
papers is the feature that subjects simultaneously propose a minimum contribution level 
and the lowest level proposed is subsequently implemented. 
When a minimum level is introduced, subjects who contribute below this level need to 
increase their contributions at least to the imposed level. But how do subjects who 
contribute to the public good above the minimum level even in the absence of such a 
mechanism react when the minimum level is implemented? These subjects could be 
crowded out, meaning that they voluntary decrease their contribution to the public good, 
e.g., from 50% to 40% of their endowment, or they could be crowded in, meaning that 
they voluntary increase their contribution to the public good, e.g., from 50% to 60% of 
their endowment. One reason for the latter effect could be that subjects are conditional 
cooperators, i.e., they want to cooperate if others cooperate and vice versa (e.g., 
Fischbacher et al., 2001) and therefore they increase their public good contribution since 
free riders are forced to increase their contribution at least up to the imposed minimum 
level. Several factors could result in crowding out. The implemented minimum level 
could serve as a focal point regarding which contribution level is expected. This could 
affect people in two ways: either directly by making them choose to contribute the 
minimum level or indirectly by making them believe that other group members will see 
the minimum level as a focal point. Crowding out could also be due to a “hidden cost of 
control,” i.e., subjects do not like the control exerted upon them and therefore reduce 
their contribution. Falk and Kosfeld (2006) and Ziegelmeyer et al. (2012) implement 
principal-agent experiments where agents receive a fixed wage and can choose to 
engage in a production activity that is costly to the agent but beneficial to the principal; 
the “hidden cost of control” amounts to the degree to which agents reduce their efforts 
when the principal implements a minimum performance requirement. The effect is 
strong in the former study but somewhat weaker in the latter (where it is dominated by 
                                                 
2 For public goods experiments using non-binding minimum levels, see, e.g., Galbiati and Vertova (2008) 
and Riedel and Schildberg-Hörisch (2013). 
3 A related paper is Gerber et al. (2013), who examine minimum requirements with respect to formation 
of the coalition itself. 
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the positive effect of forcing low-performing agents to increase their effort). This effect 
is potentially magnified by subjects’ beliefs about others’ reactions following the 
introduction of the minimum contribution level. 
If hidden costs of control are pervasive, there is a risk that they will partly or even 
completely offset the direct effect of the minimum contribution level (forcing free riders 
to increase their contribution). In this case, legitimizing the minimum level by granting 
local decision rights to groups may be critical in order to achieve a more successful 
outcome. We test this by allowing groups to decide for themselves whether or not the 
minimum level should be implemented. In more detail, we study experimentally the 
implementation of a minimum contribution level in a linear public goods game.4 Groups 
either face the minimum level exogenously imposed by a central authority or are 
allowed to choose whether or not to implement it based on the outcome of majority 
voting. 
A growing experimental literature examines how centralized institutions with 
exogenous power to implement policies can increase cooperation in social-dilemma 
situations. In this setting, the degree of crowding out due to hidden costs of control and 
whether it can be alleviated through endogenous institutional formation is still an open 
empirical question, which we address in the current paper. We find a minimum 
contribution level to have a positive and substantial effect on cooperation. The main 
impact is on the extensive margin, meaning that it is possible to force free riders to 
increase their contribution without crowding out others’ voluntary contributions. This 
result is robust to the mode of implementation; that is, exogenous minimum levels are 
as effective as endogenous minimum levels. This result stands in contrast to several 
recent papers documenting that endogenously chosen institutions do alleviate collective-
action problems to a larger extent than when the same institutions are exogenously 
imposed. Tyran and Feld (2006) let subjects vote on the introduction of a law that 
prescribes full contribution to the public good. They find that a “mild law,” which is 
backed up by a non-deterrent sanction, is more effective when chosen endogenously 
than when exogenously imposed. Dal Bó et al. (2010) introduce the possibility for 
                                                 
4 The main difference between our design using a linear payoff function and other experimental studies of 
minimum levels that instead use concave payoff functions (e.g., Andreoni, 1993; Chan et al., 2002; 
Gronberg et al., 2012) is that the minimum level is set above rather than below the Nash equilibrium. This 
is important since we want to consider the issue of conditional cooperation in combination with hidden 
costs of control and these potential effects become more salient with linear payoff functions. Papers using 
concave payoff functions have studied a different question, namely the neutrality of government spending 
with respect to privately provided public goods (Warr, 1982; Bergstrom et al., 1986; Andreoni, 1989, 
1990). 
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subjects to endogenously impose a fine on unilateral defection in a prisoners’ dilemma 
game, and find that this increases cooperation compared with the same fine exogenously 
imposed. Sutter et al. (2010), Markussen et al. (2014a), and Kamei et al. (2015) find that 
peer-to-peer punishment can sustain high levels of cooperation to a greater extent when 
democratically chosen than when exogenously imposed. However, Markussen et al. 
(2014b) find no effect of endogenous institutional choice. They investigate the effect of 
intergroup competition on local public good provision within groups, and find that 
competition is as effective if endogenously chosen as if exogenously imposed. 
Likewise, Sutter and Weck-Hannemann (2004) extend Andreoni (1993) by introducing 
endogenous taxation on public good contributions and find no positive effect on 
contributions compared with exogenous taxation. Taken together, the benefit of 
granting groups participation rights seems to be context dependent and we discuss our 
results in light of this in a concluding section of the paper. 
A majority of the groups in the endogenous treatment in our experiment successfully 
implement the minimum-level institution. This is in line with several other papers that 
examine endogenous institutional choice and find that groups – when given the freedom 
of choice – successfully implement efficiency-enhancing institutions. In Kroll et al. 
(2007), subjects submit proposals for how much everyone should contribute to the 
public good. Then they vote on the proposals and if one proposal receives sufficient 
support it is implemented. They find that when the vote is binding, it results in high 
levels of public good provision. Putterman et al. (2011) let subjects vote on the 
parameters of a centralized punishment scheme in the context of public good provision 
and find that most groups are able to implement a scheme where it is optimal for 
everyone to contribute their entire endowment. In Markussen et al. (2014a), groups 
endogenously choose between different types of punishment schemes. They find that 
most groups are able to implement low cost and deterrent sanctions, which can increase 
public good provision. Kosfeld et al. (2009) implement public goods experiments where 
groups can form an organization in which all members must contribute their entire 
endowment to the public good, while subjects in the group not covered by the 
organization can contribute as they wish. They find that contributions and welfare are 
higher when groups are allowed to form organizations. Finally, in Ertan et al. (2009), 
subjects endogenously choose the rules for peer-to-peer punishment. They find that 
most groups eventually implement a scheme that allows them to achieve high levels of 
public good provision.5 
                                                 
5 See also Dal Bó (2014) for an overview of the experimental literature on collective action and the 
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2. Experimental design 
We use a linear public goods experiment with a design similar to the one developed by 
Fischbacher et al. (2001) and where the main characteristic is that the strategy method is 
used. Each group consists of three randomly matched members, and the marginal per 
capita return (MPCR) from the public good is 0.5. For a rational and selfish subject, an 
MPCR below one results in a dominant strategy to free ride, i.e., to contribute zero to 
the public good. However, since MPCR*n > 1, where n is number of group members, it 
is socially optimal to contribute the whole endowment. Thus, our choice of marginal per 
capita return creates the conflict between private and social optima that characterizes a 
public good. Each subject has an endowment of 20 tokens, and we denote c the amount 
invested in the public good. Thus, the payoff for subject i is given by 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 20− 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 0.5∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗3𝑗𝑗=1  .   (1) 
The key difference between the Fischbacher et al. design and standard public goods 
experiments is that the former employs the strategy method. The subjects make two 
different types of decisions on how much they would like to contribute to the public 
good – one unconditional and one conditional. In the unconditional decision, the subject 
states how much she would like to contribute to the public good as in a standard public 
goods experiment. The conditional contribution to the public good is the amount a 
subject would like to contribute conditional on the other two group members’ average 
contribution. Each subject makes 21 conditional decisions in total, one for each integer 
number from 0 to 20, representing all the possible (integer) averages of the other two 
group members. All contribution decisions are incentive compatible since the payoff-
relevant decision for two randomly selected members of the group is the unconditional 
contribution, and by using their average unconditional contribution, the contribution of 
the third member is determined as the conditional contribution for that specific average 
contribution.  
The experiment consists of two stages, both of which are based on the design by 
Fischbacher et al. (2001): (i) a standard public goods experiment and (ii) a public goods 
experiment where a minimum contribution level is either exogenously or endogenously 
imposed. There are two treatments in the experiments: an exogenously imposed 
minimum contribution level and an endogenously imposed minimum contribution level. 
In the exogenous treatment, a minimum contribution level of 5 tokens is imposed, while 
in the endogenous treatment the implementation of a minimum level of 5 tokens is 
                                                                                                                                               
effects of democratic institutions. 
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subject to a group vote. There is no cost of voting, and the voting is made mandatory. A 
majority rule determines the outcome, and thus if at least 2 out of the 3 group members 
vote for the minimum contribution level of 5 tokens it is imposed, and vice versa.  
To test for the impact of a minimum contribution level, we run two types of sessions. 
Both of them begin with the baseline game described in the previous paragraph (and 
without any minimum level). In sessions with the exogenous treatment, the standard 
public goods experiment is followed by the same game but now exogenously imposing 
the rule that everyone must contribute at least 5 tokens to the public good. In sessions 
with the endogenous treatment, the standard public goods experiment is instead 
followed by a voting stage where each member casts a vote on whether or not they 
would like to introduce a minimum level of 5 tokens. Thus, the majority outcome of the 
vote determines whether or not a minimum level is imposed. This means that the 
baseline game is followed by either the standard public goods experiment again or the 
same experiment but with a minimum level of 5 tokens depending on the majority 
decision in the voting stage. We use perfect stranger matching and the subjects are not 
informed about the outcome of the first public goods experiment until the final payment 
is made. This is clearly stated in the instructions given to the subjects (see Appendix).6 
Thus, we will be able to document the importance of participation rights if the 
endogenous minimum level either increases contributions to a larger extent or decreases 
contributions to a lesser extent than does the exogenous minimum level. 
The logistics of the experiment were as follows. The standard public goods experiment 
was first explained and then conducted. The experiment instructions included examples 
and individual exercises to be solved to ensure that subjects understood the setup. Upon 
completion of the exercises, they were also solved in public by the experimenter in 
order to facilitate understanding. Questions were answered in private throughout the 
experiments. The subjects were randomized into a session with either exogenous or 
endogenous imposition of the minimum level. The voting stage preceded the second 
public goods game in sessions with the endogenous treatment, where subjects were 
asked to vote either for or against imposition of a minimum contribution level of 5 
tokens. The exogenous treatment was identical except for the voting, and thus a 
paragraph was excluded from the instructions, which otherwise were exactly the same. 
                                                 
6 We do not test for order effects. The reason is that the imposed order is natural, in the sense that we are 
interested in the effect of a minimum-level policy when subjects are experienced with the baseline 
(voluntary contribution mechanism). This is what typically happens in reality: a collective-action problem 
is identified and a remedy – the minimum level – is sought and implemented. Differences across 
treatments are tested as the difference between within-subject estimates. 
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After both experiments were finished, we elicited each subject’s belief about others’ 
contributions; subjects were asked to guess the average contribution of the other group 
members, and correct guesses were monetarily rewarded. Note that the outcome of the 
public goods experiment was not revealed to the subjects until the end of the 
experiment. Finally, subjects answered a post-experiment questionnaire related to socio-
economic background factors. The experiment was conducted in a total of six sessions 
at the University of Gothenburg using pen and paper. Subjects were recruited using 
ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). An experimental session lasted on average 90 minutes, and 
one token corresponded to 2 SEK (at the time of the experiment corresponding to 0.30 
USD). A total of 144 subjects participated, 51 in the exogenous treatment and 93 in the 
endogenous treatment,7 each earning an average of 150 SEK (22.50 USD). 
3. Results 
We begin the analyses by focusing on the unconditional contributions, which are 
summarized in Table 1. In the standard public goods experiment, the averages of the 
unconditional contributions are very similar among the subjects who in the second stage 
were allocated to either the exogenous or the endogenous treatment, i.e., 8.35 and 8.24 
tokens, respectively. The small difference in contributions is insignificant, indicating 
that the randomization of subjects between treatments was successful (Mann-Whitney U 
test; p = 0.93).8 The contribution levels in the standard public goods experiment 
correspond to slightly more than 40% of the endowment, which is in line with other 
public goods experiments (e.g., Chaudhuri, 2011). As expected, contribution levels are 
higher in the public goods experiment with minimum levels (MCL). When the 
minimum level is exogenously imposed, the average contribution goes up to 9.43, 
implying a statistically significant increase of 1.08 tokens (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p 
= 0.01). In the endogenous treatment, the corresponding effect is a 0.85-unit increase in 
average contribution and again the effect is significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p < 
0.01). 
In the endogenous treatment, the group members voted about imposing a minimum 
contribution level of 5 tokens. A majority of the subjects voted in favor of the minimum 
level. Of the 93 subjects in the endogenous treatment, 75 (81%) voted in favor of the 
minimum contribution level and 18 voted against it. Correspondingly, 27 of the 31 
                                                 
7 We choose a larger sample size in the endogenous treatment to avoid too few groups voting in favor of 
imposing the minimum level.  
8 We report from two-sided tests throughout the paper. 
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groups (87%) voted for imposing a minimum contribution level. Interestingly, we find 
that men are much more likely to vote no. Fourteen of the 18 no-voters (78%) are men; 
in total, 28% of the men but only 10% of the women oppose the minimum-level 
institution by vote. The difference in proportions is significant at the 5% level (Kruskal-
Wallis test; p = 0.03). 
The attractive feature of a minimum contribution level is that it forces any free riders, or 
low contributors, to increase their contribution up to the imposed mandatory minimum. 
In addition to this effect, subjects contributing more than the imposed minimum can 
voluntarily adjust their contribution: they are crowded in if they voluntarily increase 
their contribution and crowded out if they voluntarily decrease their contribution. For 
example, subjects could be crowded out since the minimum level can signal distrust 
similar to the hidden cost of control in Falk and Kosfeld (2006), or it may serve as a 
focal point. Conditional cooperators can also be crowded in, since the minimum level 
forces free riders to increase their contribution, or they can be crowded out due to the 
belief that others will react negatively to the hidden costs of control or due to the belief 
that the minimum level will serve as a focal point. Thus, the overall effect is ex-ante 
unclear and we analyze the effect of the minimum level conditional on the contributions 
in the baseline case.  
The main behavioral difference between the exogenous and endogenous treatments is 
that the hidden costs of control can be avoided in the latter case since subjects can 
decide for themselves on institution formation rather than being forced to contribute the 
minimum level. That is, when groups are given the freedom of choice, do they on 
average increase their public good contribution to a larger extent than groups not given 
this opportunity? We investigate this by comparing the impact of a minimum provision 
level between the exogenous and endogenous treatments. We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of no effect of endogenous institutional choice; the difference (in 
differences) between the treatments is 0.04 tokens in public good contributions (Mann-
Whitney U test; p = 0.57). Thus, the feature of having the possibility to choose 
institution has a zero net effect on contributions. This seems to indicate that the main 
driver of the result is the direct effect of increased contributions from free riders and 
low contributors, which we analyze in more detail below. 
Result 1. Minimum contribution levels have a significantly positive effect on public 
good contributions. 
Result 2. A majority of the groups implemented the minimum level in the endogenous 
treatment. 
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Result 3. The endogenous and exogenous treatments have similar significant positive 
effects on public good contributions, indicating a low net effect of hidden costs of 
control.  
Table 1 about here 
Table 2 shows contributions and beliefs in the two treatments. In both the exogenous 
and the endogenous treatment, subjects increase their belief about others’ contribution 
when the minimum level is implemented (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests; p < 0.01 in either 
case). One advantage in the endogenous treatment is that subjects are free to decide 
whether or not to impose the minimum level. If the hidden cost of control is expected to 
be a substantial problem in the case of exogenous minimum levels, there are mainly two 
positive effects of endogenous formation of (minimum-level) institutions. First, if 
individuals value the freedom of choice per se, the hidden cost of control might be 
overall reduced when groups are granted the right to decide for themselves whether or 
not to introduce minimum levels. Second, some individuals might be more control 
averse than others. Thus, by allowing for endogenous formation of minimum-level 
institutions, those groups where the exogenous minimum level would be most likely to 
crowd out voluntary contributions are allowed to endogenously opt out, by voting 
against the implementation. 
The bottom panel of Table 2 shows the changes in contributions and beliefs by voting 
and group decision in the endogenous treatment. By and large, subjects should vote yes 
unless they believe that contributions were already at substantial levels (“high beliefs” 
hereafter) in the baseline (or if they are risk averse and uncertain about the accuracy of 
their high beliefs) or they have a strong aversion against control.9 A yes-vote signals 
that individuals are (i) selfish and believe that others contribute at low levels (the 
minimum level is a Pareto improvement), (ii) conditional cooperators who believe that 
others contribute at low levels (the minimum level enforces conditional cooperation at 
higher contribution levels), and/or (iii) not strongly averse to control. Thus, in a Yes-
Yes group (“yes” for own and group vote, respectively), we expect an increase in both 
                                                 
9 To a selfish player with high beliefs, the minimum level will only have a direct effect on own 
contributions (which she will be forced to increase), and, furthermore, a yes-vote does not work as a “bait 
strategy” since conditional cooperators are already contributing substantially (according to her belief). To 
a conditional cooperator with high beliefs, the minimum level will not have a strong direct effect on 
others’ contributions since according to her belief, nobody is free riding. Furthermore, a subject with high 
beliefs about others’ contributions might be more likely to fear that others will be crowded out due to the 
hidden costs of control (and therefore vote no). However, if subjects are uncertain about the accuracy of 
their beliefs, risk-averse individuals might still vote yes in order to hedge against the possibility that their 
high beliefs are wrong. 
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contributions and beliefs about others’ contributions, since subjects who vote yes are 
either selfish or conditional cooperators and either type would respond by an increase in 
contributions and believe that others in the group do the same. This is what we see in 
Table 2: For the 72 individuals who voted yes and ended up in a group where the 
majority voted yes, contributions and beliefs significantly increase following the 
implementation of the minimum level (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests; p < 0.01 in either 
case). No-voters who nevertheless end up in a group where the majority voted yes (No-
Yes) face the same restriction ex-post, i.e., the minimum level. For these individuals, 
the impact on own contributions should be negative if the individual voted no due to a 
strong aversion against control, but not if the no-vote was due to a fear that others in the 
group were averse toward control, since they seem not to be since they voted yes. The 
predicted change in contribution is thus ambiguous for this group, and we cannot reject 
a null hypothesis of no change when the minimum level is implemented (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test; p = 0.63). In neither of the two bottom rows of the table (No-No and 
Yes-No) do we expect much of a change in contributions or beliefs since the minimum 
level is not implemented. This is also in line with the results in the table.10 
We have argued that the hidden cost of control is the main reason for voting against the 
minimum level, either directly or indirectly due to a fear that others will react 
negatively, and find that the results in Table 2 point in this direction since subjects in 
Yes-Yes groups on average increase their contributions under minimum levels more 
than subjects in No-Yes groups. Interestingly, No-Yes groups do not increase their 
contributions more than No-No groups even though in the former, free riders and low 
contributors are forced to contribute at least at the minimum level. 
Table 2 about here 
Result 4. When a group majority decides to implement the minimum contribution level, 
subjects voting yes increase their contributions significantly more than subjects voting 
no, while there is no significant difference in contribution behavior between the two 
groups of voters in the standard public goods experiment. 
Subjects could be crowded out or crowded in by the minimum level and here we 
                                                 
10 In No-No groups, the minimum level is not implemented and this is in line with the own vote (the 
subject got what she wanted). In Yes-No groups, if the individual is a pessimistic conditional cooperator 
(and hence voted yes), there is no expected increase in others’ contributions to respond to, and if the 
individual was selfish and voted yes because of an expected increase in everyone’s contributions, we 
would not expect a behavioral response regardless (we would only expect a forced increase in 
contributions if the minimum level were to be implemented). 
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investigate this issue in more detail. We plot individual contributions before and after 
the minimum provision level is imposed in the exogenous (Figure 1) and endogenous 
(Figure 2) treatments, respectively.11 In the figures, on the x-axis we show contribution 
in the standard public goods game, while on the y-axis we show the contribution when 
the minimum level is imposed. Any observation below the 45-degree line shows a 
higher contribution in the baseline than when the minimum level is imposed, i.e., 
crowding out, whereas any observation above the 45-degree line shows crowding in for 
subjects who contributed at least 5 tokens in the baseline, i.e., the imposed minimum 
level. The figures indicate substantial individual heterogeneity as to whether subjects 
are crowded in, crowded out, or unaffected by the minimum level. 
Figures 1 and 2 about here 
Tables 3–5 add more detailed information. Table 3 shows that 49% and 43% increased 
their contribution under the minimum level in the exogenous and endogenous treatment, 
respectively, and this corresponds to the number of observations above the 45-degree 
line in Figures 1 and 2. Conversely, 20% and 17% decreased their contribution in the 
respective treatment. The positive effect clearly dominates, and we know this from 
Result 1, but the values include the direct effect of forcing free riders and low 
contributors to contribute at least the enforced minimum. Therefore, in Tables 4 and 5 
we separate out this direct effect (top row) from subjects’ behavioral responses to the 
minimum level, for the exogenous and endogenous treatment, respectively. In the 
exogenous treatment (Table 4), 23% of the subjects contributed nothing in the standard 
public goods experiment and exactly 5 tokens when this was the enforced minimum, 
and 8% increased their contribution from 5 to an average of 8.25 tokens under the 
minimum level, indicating that they were crowded in. Conversely, 12% of subjects 
reduced their contribution from an average contribution of 8.83 in the baseline all the 
way down to the enforced minimum level, and they were thus crowded out by the 
minimum level. The average contribution of the remaining 49% was virtually 
unchanged. The pattern is similar for the endogenous treatment (Table 5), with the main 
difference that crowding out is stronger: 10% of the subjects drop from an average of 
11.38 all the way down to the enforced minimum of 5 tokens. By and large, crowding in 
seems to occur mainly at low levels of standard public goods contributions, which 
perhaps was caused by pessimistic conditional contributors, whereas crowding out is 
more likely for subjects who already contribute substantially to the public good. 
                                                 
11 From here on we drop the four groups in the endogenous treatment in which the majority voted against 
the minimum level. 
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However, for many subjects, the average contribution is rather stable and thus the main 
share of the positive overall minimum-level effect demonstrated in Table 1 comes from 
the direct effect of pushing free riders and low contributors up to the minimum level. 
For behavioral responses beyond this, the net effect is more or less zero on average. 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 about here 
Result 5. Minimum contribution levels effectively work on the extensive margin; there is 
no evidence that it will serve to crowd out voluntary contributions to the public good. 
Previous empirical research has suggested that a large fraction of people are conditional 
cooperators, i.e., they cooperate if others cooperate and vice versa (e.g., Fischbacher et 
al., 2001). The unconditional results in Table 2 indicate a correlation between 
contributions and beliefs. In Figures 3 and 4, we explore how contributions match 
beliefs about others’ contributions. The difference in contributions between the MCL 
public goods experiment and the standard public goods experiment (y-axis) is plotted 
against the corresponding difference in beliefs about others’ contributions (x-axis). On 
average, individuals who believe that the aggregate public good provision will increase 
also increase their own contribution. For those who instead believe in a reduction of 
contributions, the opposite is true, i.e., they decrease their own contribution. Behavior in 
our experiment is thus consistent with the notion of conditional cooperation. 
Figures 3 and 4 about here 
The other part of the public goods experiment elicited conditional contributions.12 
Conditional contributions are elicited using a variant of the strategy method. The main 
advantage with this procedure is that we can control for subjects’ beliefs about others’ 
contributions in an incentive-compatible way using the strategy method and furthermore 
classify subjects into different contributor types. We can thus in more detail analyze the 
direct impact of the policy on subjects’ cooperative preferences. For instance, those who 
in the baseline contribute substantially to the public good regardless of others’ 
contributions might shift their schedule downwards due to hidden costs of control; or 
conditional cooperators might shift their schedule upwards at low levels of others’ 
average contribution if they like the idea that everybody has to contribute to the public 
                                                 
12 One subject in the endogenous treatment contributed less than the required minimum of 5 tokens in the 
MCL contribution table. Since all entries were below the minimum level, we treat this subject in our 
analyses as if she had contributed 5 tokens throughout the contribution table. 
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good under the new institution.13 
Figures 5 and 6 show the average conditional contribution for each level of average 
contribution level of the others separated by treatment, i.e., endogenous and exogenous 
minimum level, respectively. The average own contributions to the public good (y-axis) 
are plotted against the conditional average contributions of the other two group 
members (x-axis), following Fischbacher et al. (2001). As expected, there is an overall 
positive relationship between own contributions and others’ average contributions. 
These results show that subjects are on average conditional contributors since their own 
contribution levels increase when the average contributions by others increase. 
Interestingly, under the minimum contribution level, the slopes of the schedules are 
approximately the same as for the standard public goods experiment, but there is a shift 
in levels for a given average contribution by others. This corroborates the finding that 
minimum provision levels are effective; free riders can be forced to increase their 
contribution without ex-ante compliers reacting against the control exerted upon the 
group as a whole. The results hold if beliefs about others’ average contributions remain 
unchanged or do not decrease more than 2–3 tokens.  
Figures 5 and 6 about here 
In Table 6, we follow up more closely on the individual data used in Figures 5 and 6. 
We regress own conditional contributions on others’ average contributions. In column 
1, we pool the sample and investigate the impact of the minimum level on the intercept 
and slope of the regression line, where the latter measures the marginal increase in 
contribution when others’ average contribution increases with one token. The MCL 
dummy captures the impact of the minimum level. For instance, when the average 
contribution of the other group members equals 5 tokens, subjects on average report an 
own contribution of 3.62 (1.37 + 5×0.45) tokens in the baseline and this number 
increases to 5.82 (1.37 + 5×0.45+2.57 - 5×0.07), i.e., by 2.22 tokens, following the 
implementation of the minimum level. In column 2, we investigate the full within-
between dimension of the data, comparing differences between the endogenous and 
exogenous treatments in the effect of the minimum level on conditional contributions. 
Neither with respect to intercept (Endo × MCL) nor slope (Endo × MCL × Others) is 
the MCL effect different between the treatments, since the estimated effects are both 
                                                 
13 In experiments, it is well documented that subjects on average bear a strong aversion against free 
riding. For instance, Cubitt et al. (2011) document that most people view free riding as morally 
reprehensible, and in games where peer-to-peer punishment is available, the intensity of costly 
punishment is usually strongly increasing in the receiver’s negative deviation from the group’s average 
contribution (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). 
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small and insignificant. Thus, there is no evidence of a more pronounced minimum-
level effect in the endogenous treatment vis-à-vis the exogenous treatment, which is in 
line with previously reported descriptive statistics. 
Table 6 about here 
In more detailed analyses, we categorize subjects into contributor types following the 
convention introduced by Fischbacher et al. (2001). They classified subjects into four 
types: conditional cooperators, free riders, hump-shaped contributors, and others.14 
Tables 7 and 8 show the distribution of types both in baseline and with the minimum 
contribution level, for the exogenous and endogenous treatment, respectively. The 
tables enable us to investigate type stability, which is related to the discussion about 
crowding in and crowding out as a behavioral response to the minimum-level 
institution, and again we can analyze this issue while controlling for beliefs about 
others’ behavior.  
Most notably, in both treatments, the share of conditional cooperators decreases 
whereas the share of free riders increases. For example, in the exogenous treatment 
(Table 7), the share of free riders increases from 17.65% in the baseline to 25.49% 
under the minimum level; 5.88 of this 7.84 percentage point increase constitute baseline 
conditional cooperators. Of the 64.7% baseline conditional cooperators, only 52.94 
percentage points remain under the minimum level. The pattern is very similar in the 
endogenous treatment. To fully account for behavioral responses, we also present, in 
Table 9, the type distribution when the types in the baseline are characterized after we 
manually adjust all subjects up to the minimum of 5 tokens in the standard public goods 
experiment. Thus, any remaining effect comes from subjects’ behavioral reaction to the 
implementation of the minimum level. Interestingly, when we characterize baseline 
types in relation to the adjusted minimum level, contributor types are remarkably stable 
across baseline and the minimum-level institution. For example, when a baseline free 
rider is characterized as someone who never contributes above 5 tokens (rather than 
someone who never contributes above 0 tokens), there are 25.49% free riders already in 
the exogenous baseline and thus there is no aggregate increase in the share of free riders 
when we measure types in this way. In the endogenous treatment, there is a 3.70 
                                                 
14 Based on their conditional contribution schedule, we define types as follows: Conditional cooperators 
have either a weakly increasing schedule or the Spearman correlation (with the others’ average 
contribution) is positive and significant at the 1% level; free riders always contribute the lowest amount 
allowed; hump-shaped contributors display a positive (negative) Spearman correlation up to (beyond) 
their highest contribution, both significant at the 1% level; and “others” do not fit into any of these 
categories. For a discussion on classification, see, e.g., Fischbacher et al. (2001). 
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percentage point increase in the share of free riders, but this is a substantially smaller 
rise than the 16.05 percentage point increase we observe in Table 8 when we use the 
normal type characterization without the adjustment of a minimum level of 5 tokens in 
the standard public goods experiment. Thus, the change in type distribution brought 
about by the minimum level seems to be an artefact of the minimum level automatically 
classifying weak contributors as free riders.15 In conjunction with the regression results 
in Table 6, the absence of treatment-driven differences in the distribution of 
contribution types supports our main conclusion regarding the impact of endogenous 
institution formation on cooperative preferences. 
Tables 7, 8 and 9 about here 
Result 6. Allowing groups to decide for themselves whether or not a minimum provision 
level should be implemented does not make individuals more cooperative. Vis-à-vis 
exogenous implementation, the opportunity to vote does not affect subjects’ cooperative 
preferences. 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of imposing a minimum contribution level on 
cooperative behavior. A centralized institution with exogenous imposition of rules and 
regulations of minimum levels is in many cases the only feasible option for policy 
makers since letting individuals themselves be responsible for punishment, rewards, and 
potentially ostracizing others is not possible in many situations, including taxation and 
environment. Without considering behavioral responses, we would expect an imposed 
minimum contribution level to increase cooperation levels if the society consists of free 
riders or subjects who contribute a small amount. However, imposing a minimum level 
might add an additional control cost as discussed by Falk and Kosfeld (2006), which 
could result in reduced contributions to the public good among subjects who already 
contributed above the imposed minimum level. Previous research has also shown that it 
is not only the introduction of an institution per se that might affect behavior, but also 
the way it is introduced (e.g., Dal Bó et al., 2010; Markussen et al., 2014a; Sutter et al., 
2010; Tyran and Feld, 2006).  
The objective of this paper was to investigate, by using a public goods experiment, the 
effect of (i) imposing a minimum level of contribution to a public good and (ii) the 
                                                 
15 For instance, a conditional contributor with a positive contribution schedule that never reaches above 5 
tokens would be classified as a free rider in Table 9 once the minimum level has been implemented. 
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mode of implementation, i.e., whether the way in which the minimum level is 
introduced, either endogenously by majority voting or exogenously, affects 
contributions. 
We believe that a low minimum level, which we in our experiment set to 25% of the 
endowment, is the most feasible policy option since too high exogenous minimum 
levels would be met with resistance since people differ in terms of their preferences, 
their endowments, and in some cases also in their costs of contributing to the public 
good, e.g., costs of effort. In addition, too high endogenous minimum levels would 
likely be opposed and voted down for the same reasons. An alternative could be to 
introduce non-binding minimum levels, but empirical evidence indicates that non-
binding announcements and promises have little or no effect on voluntary contributions 
to public goods (e.g., Bochet and Putterman, 2009). 
Overall, our results show that a minimum contribution level has a positive and sizeable 
effect on cooperation whether imposed exogenously or endogenously. This positive 
effect is mainly due to the fact that free riders are forced to increase their contribution, 
while at the same time the contributions by those who originally contributed above the 
imposed minimum level were not crowded out. In the context of cooperation, there does 
not seem to be a hidden cost of control. This is probably linked to the fact that imposing 
a minimum level actually has a potentially positive welfare effect per se, while in the 
case of Falk and Kosfeld (2006) the control mechanism is directly linked to distrust. 
However, we cannot rule out a spillover effect of the imposed minimum level in one 
area on other areas with clearer elements of trust, which would then be an indirect 
negative welfare effect of the policy. 
Our findings are robust to whether the minimum contribution level is imposed 
exogenously or endogenously by voting. Thus, the overall effect of majority voting as a 
signal of cooperation does not seem to be strong in this context. An explanation is that 
there is an incentive for selfish players to vote in favor of the minimum level, since it 
has a potentially positive welfare effect per se, which makes it difficult for intrinsically 
cooperative individuals to signal their cooperative intentions by voting yes. By 
comparison, in Tyran and Feld (2006), voting for a non-deterrent law of full 
contribution is a strong signal of cooperative intentions since selfish players would vote 
no unless they think that there are conditional cooperators in the group who would take 
a yes vote as a signal of cooperative intentions. Likewise, in Dal Bó et al. (2010), the 
only reason a selfish player would vote to impose a fine on unilateral defection in a 
prisoners’ dilemma game would be to use it as a “bait strategy,” i.e., to signal that one 
intends to cooperate when in reality one plans to defect (since the payoff from defection 
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is higher if the other player cooperates). Similarly, in Sutter et al. (2010) and Markussen 
et al. (2014a), subjects voting in favor of introducing peer-to-peer punishment signal 
their intention to make use of this mechanism in order to enforce higher levels of 
cooperation. To summarize, the main difference between our paper and for instance the 
four papers discussed above is that even if nobody wants to cooperate, there is still an 
incentive to vote yes in our setting. This is not the case in any of the other papers. 
Still, there could be reasons beyond signaling for why individuals cooperate more under 
endogenous institutions. Dal Bó et al. (2010) discuss the establishment of a cooperative 
norm and coordination as possible reasons beyond signaling, and furthermore show that 
signaling is not the main driver behind a sizeable effect of democratically chosen 
institutions on cooperation in their setting. In our setting, one such effect could be that 
endogenous formation of institutions reduces the hidden costs of control and thus has a 
legitimizing effect on ex-post cooperation. The likely explanation for an absence of 
such an effect is that a hidden cost of control seems not to be pervasive in the context of 
cooperation. The societal welfare effect of a minimum-level policy depends on a 
number of factors, including the perceived control cost and the signaling effect of voting 
in favor of imposing the minimum level. An important ingredient for the welfare effect 
is the composition of contributor types, and how the above mentioned policy variables 
affect this composition. Societies with a high fraction of free riders or where there is a 
strong and positive signal of increased contributions when imposing a minimum level 
will clearly benefit from the policy, while the opposite might hold for societies with 
high trust levels and a large fraction of conditional cooperators. Since minimum levels 
are used in many areas of society, it is important to understand their welfare effects, 
especially considering that the imposed minimum level often is low. 
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Appendix A: Instructions for the exogenous treatment 
 
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating! 
 
Please do not talk to other participants. 
 
You are now taking part in an economics experiment. If you read the following 
instructions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn money in addition 
to the 50 kronor that you will receive in any case. The entire amount of money that you 
earn with your decisions will be added up and paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. These instructions are solely for your private information. You are not 
allowed to communicate during the experiment. Violation of this rule will lead to 
exclusion from the experiment and all payments. If you have questions, please ask us. 
We are happy to answer your questions in private. 
 
We will not speak of Swedish kronor during the experiment, but rather of points. Your 
whole income will first be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, the total 
amount of points you earned will be converted to kronor at the following rate: 
 
1 point = 2 kronor 
 
All participants will be divided into groups of three. Except for us – the experimenters 
– no one will know who is in which group. This means that the other participants will 
neither during nor after the experiment learn how much you earn. We never link names 
and data from experiments. Please return the form with your ID number in exchange for 
your payment on your way out after the experiment. 
 
We describe the exact experiment process below. The experiment consists of three 
parts. You will receive instructions for a part after the previous part has ended. The 
parts of the experiment are completely independent; the decisions made in one part will 
not affect your earnings in later parts. The sum of earnings from the different parts will 
constitute your total earnings from the experiment (together with the 50 kronor show-up 
fee). 
 
Throughout the experiment, you will write down your decisions on separate pieces of 
paper (the decision forms), which will be handed out during the experiment. The 
forms will be collected by an experimenter once all participants have made their 
decisions. 
 
Part I 
 
The decision situation 
You will learn how the experiment will be conducted later. Let us first introduce you to 
the basic decision situation. At the end of the description of the decision situation, you 
will find control questions that will help you understand the decision situation. You will 
be a member of a group consisting of 3 people. Each group member has to decide on 
the allocation of 20 points. You can put the 20 points into your private account or you 
can put them fully or partially into a group account. You have to use your entire 
endowment (= 20 points), which means that the points you put into the group account 
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and the points you put into the private account have to sum to 20. 
 
Your income from the private account: 
You will earn one point for each point you put into your private account. For example, 
if you put 20 points into your private account (and therefore do not put anything into the 
group account), your income will amount to exactly 20 points out of your private 
account. If you put 6 points into your private account, your income from this account 
will be 6 points. No one except you earns something from your private account. 
 
Your income from the group account: 
Each group member will profit equally from the amount you put into the group account. 
Moreover, you will also get a payoff from the other group members’ payments into the 
group account. The income for each group member out of the group account will be 
determined as follows: 
 
  
Income from group account = 
Sum of all group members’ contributions to the group account × 0.5 
 
 
 
If, for example, the sum of all group members’ contributions to the group account is 60 
points, then you and the other members of your group will each earn 60×0.5 = 30 points 
out of this account. If the three group members contribute a total of 10 points to the 
group account, you and the other members of your group will each earn 10×0.5 = 5 
points out of this account.  
 
Total income: 
Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and that from 
the group account: 
 
   
 Income from your private account (= 20 – contribution to group account)  
 + Income from group account (= 0.5 × sum of all contributions to group account)  
 = Total income  
   
 
Control questions 
 
Please answer the following control questions. They will help you gain an 
understanding of the calculation of your income, which will vary with how you choose 
to distribute your 20 points. Please answer all the questions and write down your 
calculations. 
 
1. Each group member has 20 points. Assume that no one in the group (including you) 
contributes anything to the group account.  
What will your total income be?   ___________  
What will the total income of the other group members be? ___________  
 
2. Each group member has 20 points. You contribute 20 points to the group account. 
Each of the other two members of the group also contributes 20 points to the group 
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account.  
What will your total income be?   ___________  
What will the total income of the other group members be? ___________  
 
3. Each group member has 20 points. The other 2 members contribute a total of 30 
points to the group account.  
a) What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 30 points – contribute 
0 points to the group account?  
Your Income    ___________  
b) What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 30 points – contribute 
8 points to the group account?  
Your Income    ___________  
c) What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 30 points – contribute 
15 points to the group account?  
Your Income    ___________  
 
4. Each group member has 20 points. Assume that you contribute 8 points to the group 
account.  
a) What is your total income if the other group members – in addition to your 8 
points – contribute another 7 points to the group account?  
Your Income    ___________  
b) What is your total income if the other group members – in addition to your 8 
points – contribute another 12 points to the group account?  
Your Income    ___________  
c) What is your income if the other group members – in addition to your 8 points – 
contribute another 22 points to the group account?  
Your Income    ___________ 
 
Procedure of Part I [handed out after the completion of the control questions] 
 
Part I includes the decision situation just described to you. The decisions in Part I will 
only be made once. As you know, you will have 20 points at your disposal. You can put 
them into your private account or you can put them into the group account. Each group 
member has to make two types of contribution decisions, which we will refer to below 
as the unconditional contribution and the contribution table. 
 
• In the unconditional contribution case you will decide how many of the 20 points 
you want to put into the group account. Please write down your unconditional 
contribution in the box on the relevant decision form. Please insert integer numbers 
only. Your contribution to the private account is determined automatically by the 
difference between 20 and your contribution to the group account. The decision form 
looks as follows: 
 
Your contribution to the group account is:  
 
• On the next decision form you will be asked to complete a contribution table. In the 
contribution table, please indicate how much you would like to contribute to the 
group account for each possible average contribution of the other group 
members (rounded to the next integer). Thus, you can condition your contribution 
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on the other group members’ average contribution. The contribution table looks as 
follows:   
 
(Rounded) Average 
contribution of the other 
group members to the 
group account 
Your contribution to the 
group account is 
0  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
The numbers in the left column are the possible (rounded) average 
contributions of the other group members 
 
The numbers in the left column are the possible (rounded) average contributions of the 
other group members to the group account. You will simply have to insert into each 
input box how many points to contribute to the group account – conditional on the 
indicated average contribution. You have to insert a value in each input box. For 
example, you will have to indicate how much to contribute to the group account if the 
others contribute 0 points to the group account on average, how much to contribute if 
the others contribute 1, 2, or 3 points on average, etc. You can insert any integer number 
from 0 to 20 in each input box. 
 
Only the contribution table will be the payoff-relevant decision for one randomly 
determined subject in each group. Only the unconditional contribution will be the 
payoff-relevant decision for the other two group members. Except for us – the 
experimenters – no one will know who the randomly selected subject is. You will 
therefore have to think carefully about both types of decisions since either one may 
become relevant for you. Two examples should make this clear. 
 
Example 1: Assume that you are the randomly selected subject in your group. This 
implies that your relevant decision will be your contribution table. The 
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unconditional contribution is the relevant decision for the other two group members. 
Assume they made unconditional contributions of 0 and 4 points. The average rounded 
contribution of these three group members, therefore, is 2 points ((0+4)/2 = 2). If you 
indicated in your contribution table that you will contribute 1 point to the group account 
if the others contribute 2 points on average, then the total contribution to the group 
account is given by 0+4+1 = 5 points. All group members will therefore earn 0.5×5 = 
2.5 points out of the group account plus their respective income from the private 
account. If, instead, you indicated in your contribution table that you would contribute 
19 points if the others contribute two points on average, then the total contribution of 
the group to the group account is given by 0+4+19 = 23. All group members will 
therefore earn 0.5×23 = 11.5 points out of the group account plus their respective 
income from the private account. 
 
Example 2: Assume that you are not the randomly selected subject in your group, 
implying that the unconditional contribution is taken as the payoff-relevant 
decision for you and one other group member. Assume that your unconditional 
contribution to the group account is 16 points and that of the other group member is 20 
points. The average unconditional contribution of you and the other group member is 
therefore 18 points ((16+20)/2 = 18). If the group member who is the randomly selected 
subject indicates in her contribution table that she will contribute 1 point to the group 
account if the other three group members contribute on average 18 points, then the total 
contribution to the group account is given by 16+20+1 = 37 points. All group members 
will therefore earn 0.5×37 = 18.5 points out of the group account plus their respective 
income from the private account. If, instead, the randomly selected group member 
indicates in her contribution table that she would contribute 19 points to the group 
account if the others contribute on average 18 points, then the total contribution to the 
group account is given by 16+20+19 = 55 points. All group members will therefore earn 
0.5×55 = 27.5 points out of the group account plus their respective income from the 
private account.  
 
The following figure illustrates the situation in example 1. You are the person on the 
right side (group member number 3). You are the randomly selected subject and 
therefore your conditional contribution is payoff-relevant. For the other two group 
members, the unconditional contribution is payoff-relevant. 
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You will make all your decisions only once. After the end of Part I you will get the 
instructions for Part II. 
 
[Decision sheets handed out] 
 
Part II [handed out after the completion of part I] 
 
We will now conduct another experiment. As in the previous experiment, you are in 
anonymous groups of three people. The members of your group will, however, be 
different in Part II from your group members in Part I. 
 
The basic decision situation is the same as that described on page 2 of the instructions 
of the previous experiment (Part I). Each group member has to decide on the allocation 
of 20 points. You can put these 20 points into your private account or you can put them 
fully or partially into a group account. You have to use your entire endowment (= 20 
points). The points you put into the group account and the points you put into the 
private account have to sum to 20. Your income will be determined in the same way as 
before. Remember: 
 
   
 Income from your private account (= 20 – contribution to group account)  
 + Income from group account (= 0.5 × sum of all contributions to group account)  
 = Total income  
   
 
In the experiment, each group member is required to make a minimum contribution 
of 5 points to the group account. This means that you must allocate anything from 5 to 
20 points to the group account; the remaining points must be allocated to the private 
account. 
 
Procedure of Part II 
 
Part II includes the decision situation just described to you. The decisions in Part II will 
only be made once. Each group member is required to make a minimum contribution of 
5 points to the group account. As in Part I, each group member has to make two types 
of contribution decisions which we will refer to below as the unconditional 
contribution and the contribution table. 
 
In the unconditional contribution case you decide how many of the 20 points you 
want to put into the group account. A minimum of 5 points is required. In the 
contribution table, please indicate how much you want to contribute to the group 
account for each possible average contribution of the other group members (rounded to 
the next integer). The contribution table looks as follows:   
 
(Rounded) Average 
contribution of the other 
group members to the 
group account 
Your contribution to the 
group account is (a 
minimum of 5 points is 
required) 
5  
6  
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7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
The numbers in the left column are the possible (rounded) average 
contributions of the other group members 
 
The numbers in the left column are the possible (rounded) average contributions of the 
other group members to the group account. Please insert into each input box how many 
points you want to contribute to the group account – conditional on the indicated 
average contribution. You have to enter at least 5 points in each input box. For 
example, you will have to indicate how much to contribute to the group account if the 
others contribute 5 points to the group account on average, how much to contribute if 
the others contribute 6, 7, or 8 points on average, etc. You can insert any integer 
number from 5 to 20 in each input box. 
 
As in Part I, only the contribution table will be the payoff-relevant decision for one 
randomly determined subject in each group. Only the unconditional contribution 
will be the payoff-relevant decision for the other two group members. Except for us – 
the experimenters – no one will know who the randomly selected subject is. You will 
therefore have to think carefully about both types of decisions since either one can 
become relevant for you. 
 
You will make all your decisions only once. After the end of Part II you will get the 
instructions for Part III. 
 
[Decision sheets handed out] 
 
Part III [handed out after the completion of part II] 
 
We will now ask you to indicate your expectation about the average unconditional 
contribution to the group account (rounded to the next integer) by the other two group 
members. You will be paid for the accuracy of your expectation: 
 
• If your expectation is exactly right (that is, if your expectation is exactly the 
same as the actual average contribution of the other group members), you will 
get 3 points in addition to your other income from the experiment. 
• If your expectation deviates by 1 point from the correct result, you will get 2 
additional points. 
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• A deviation of 2 points still gives you 1 additional point. 
• If your expectation deviates by 3 or more points from the correct result, you will 
get no additional points. 
 
Each group member has to make two choices (each one pays a maximum of 3 points): 
 
• The expectation about the average unconditional contribution to the group 
account by the other two group members in Part I (when everyone could decide 
freely on their contribution). 
• The expectation about the average unconditional contribution to the group 
account by the other two group members in Part II (when everyone was 
required to make a minimum contribution of 5 points). 
 
The whole experiment will be finished once Part III has been completed, but we will 
ask you to fill in a post-experiment questionnaire. 
 
[Decision sheets handed out] 
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Appendix B: Instructions for the endogenous treatment 
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating! 
 
Please do not talk to other participants. 
 
You are now taking part in an economics experiment. If you read the following 
instructions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn money in addition 
to the 50 kronor that you will receive in any case. The entire amount of money that you 
earn with your decisions will be added up and paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. These instructions are solely for your private information. You are not 
allowed to communicate during the experiment. Violation of this rule will lead to 
exclusion from the experiment and all payments. If you have questions, please ask us. 
We are happy to answer your questions in private. 
 
We will not speak of Swedish kronor during the experiment, but rather of points. Your 
whole income will first be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, the total 
amount of points you earned will be converted to kronor at the following rate: 
 
1 point = 2 kronor 
 
All participants will be divided into groups of three. Except for us – the experimenters 
– no one will know who is in which group. This means that the other participants will 
neither during nor after the experiment learn how much you earn. We never link names 
and data from experiments. Please return the form with your ID number in exchange for 
your payment on your way out after the experiment. 
 
We describe the exact experiment process below. The experiment consists of three 
parts. You will receive instructions for a part after the previous part has ended. The 
parts of the experiment are completely independent; the decisions made in one part will 
not affect your earnings in later parts. The sum of earnings from the different parts will 
constitute your total earnings from the experiment (together with the 50 kronor show-up 
fee). 
 
Throughout the experiment, you will write down your decisions on separate pieces of 
paper (the decision forms), which will be handed out during the experiment. The 
forms will be collected by an experimenter once all participants have made their 
decisions. 
 
Part I 
 
The decision situation 
You will learn how the experiment will be conducted later. Let us first introduce you to 
the basic decision situation. At the end of the description of the decision situation, you 
will find control questions that will help you understand the decision situation. You will 
be a member of a group consisting of 3 people. Each group member has to decide on 
the allocation of 20 points. You can put the 20 points into your private account or you 
can put them fully or partially into a group account. You have to use your entire 
endowment (= 20 points), which means that the points you put into the group account 
and the points you put into the private account have to sum to 20. 
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Your income from the private account: 
You will earn one point for each point you put into your private account. For example, 
if you put 20 points into your private account (and therefore do not put anything into the 
group account), your income will amount to exactly 20 points out of your private 
account. If you put 6 points into your private account, your income from this account 
will be 6 points. No one except you earns something from your private account. 
 
Your income from the group account: 
Each group member will profit equally from the amount you put into the group account. 
Moreover, you will also get a payoff from the other group members’ payments into the 
group account. The income for each group member out of the group account will be 
determined as follows: 
 
  
Income from group account = 
Sum of all group members’ contributions to the group account × 0.5 
 
 
 
If, for example, the sum of all group members’ contributions to the group account is 60 
points, then you and the other members of your group will each earn 60×0.5 = 30 points 
out of this account. If the three group members contribute a total of 10 points to the 
group account, you and the other members of your group will each earn 10×0.5 = 5 
points out of this account.  
 
Total income: 
Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and that from 
the group account: 
 
   
 Income from your private account (= 20 – contribution to group account)  
 + Income from group account (= 0.5 × sum of all contributions to group account)  
 = Total income  
   
 
Control questions 
 
Please answer the following control questions. They will help you gain an 
understanding of the calculation of your income, which will vary with how you choose 
to distribute your 20 points. Please answer all the questions and write down your 
calculations. 
 
1. Each group member has 20 points. Assume that no one in the group (including you) 
contributes anything to the group account.  
What will your total income be?   ___________  
What will the total income of the other group members be? ___________  
 
2. Each group member has 20 points. You contribute 20 points to the group account. 
Each of the other two members of the group also contributes 20 points to the group 
account.  
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What will your total income be?   ___________  
What will the total income of the other group members be? ___________  
 
3. Each group member has 20 points. The other 2 members contribute a total of 30 
points to the group account.  
a) What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 30 points – contribute 
0 points to the group account?  
Your Income    ___________  
b) What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 30 points – contribute 
8 points to the group account?  
Your Income    ___________  
c) What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 30 points – contribute 
15 points to the group account?  
Your Income    ___________  
 
4. Each group member has 20 points. Assume that you contribute 8 points to the group 
account.  
a) What is your total income if the other group members – in addition to your 8 
points – contribute another 7 points to the group account?  
Your Income    ___________  
b) What is your total income if the other group members – in addition to your 8 
points – contribute another 12 points to the group account?  
Your Income    ___________  
c) What is your income if the other group members – in addition to your 8 points – 
contribute another 22 points to the group account?  
Your Income    ___________ 
 
Procedure of Part I [handed out after the completion of the control questions] 
 
Part I includes the decision situation just described to you. The decisions in Part I will 
only be made once. As you know, you will have 20 points at your disposal. You can put 
them into your private account or you can put them into the group account. Each group 
member has to make two types of contribution decisions, which we will refer to below 
as the unconditional contribution and the contribution table. 
 
• In the unconditional contribution case you will decide how many of the 20 points 
you want to put into the group account. Please write down your unconditional 
contribution in the box on the relevant decision form. Please insert integer numbers 
only. Your contribution to the private account is determined automatically by the 
difference between 20 and your contribution to the group account. The decision form 
looks as follows: 
 
Your contribution to the group account is:  
 
• On the next decision form you will be asked to complete a contribution table. In the 
contribution table, please indicate how much you would like to contribute to the 
group account for each possible average contribution of the other group 
members (rounded to the next integer). Thus, you can condition your contribution 
on the other group members’ average contribution. The contribution table looks as 
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follows:   
 
(Rounded) Average 
contribution of the other 
group members to the 
group account 
Your contribution to the 
group account is 
0  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
The numbers in the left column are the possible (rounded) average 
contributions of the other group members 
 
The numbers in the left column are the possible (rounded) average contributions of the 
other group members to the group account. You will simply have to insert into each 
input box how many points to contribute to the group account – conditional on the 
indicated average contribution. You have to insert a value in each input box. For 
example, you will have to indicate how much to contribute to the group account if the 
others contribute 0 points to the group account on average, how much to contribute if 
the others contribute 1, 2, or 3 points on average, etc. You can insert any integer number 
from 0 to 20 in each input box. 
 
Only the contribution table will be the payoff-relevant decision for one randomly 
determined subject in each group. Only the unconditional contribution will be the 
payoff-relevant decision for the other two group members. Except for us – the 
experimenters – no one will know who the randomly selected subject is. You will 
therefore have to think carefully about both types of decisions since either one may 
become relevant for you. Two examples should make this clear. 
 
Example 1: Assume that you are the randomly selected subject in your group. This 
implies that your relevant decision will be your contribution table. The 
unconditional contribution is the relevant decision for the other two group members. 
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Assume they made unconditional contributions of 0 and 4 points. The average rounded 
contribution of these three group members, therefore, is 2 points ((0+4)/2 = 2). If you 
indicated in your contribution table that you will contribute 1 point to the group account 
if the others contribute 2 points on average, then the total contribution to the group 
account is given by 0+4+1 = 5 points. All group members will therefore earn 0.5×5 = 
2.5 points out of the group account plus their respective income from the private 
account. If, instead, you indicated in your contribution table that you would contribute 
19 points if the others contribute two points on average, then the total contribution of 
the group to the group account is given by 0+4+19 = 23. All group members will 
therefore earn 0.5×23 = 11.5 points out of the group account plus their respective 
income from the private account. 
 
Example 2: Assume that you are not the randomly selected subject in your group, 
implying that the unconditional contribution is taken as the payoff-relevant 
decision for you and one other group member. Assume that your unconditional 
contribution to the group account is 16 points and that of the other group member is 20 
points. The average unconditional contribution of you and the other group member is 
therefore 18 points ((16+20)/2 = 18). If the group member who is the randomly selected 
subject indicates in her contribution table that she will contribute 1 point to the group 
account if the other three group members contribute on average 18 points, then the total 
contribution to the group account is given by 16+20+1 = 37 points. All group members 
will therefore earn 0.5×37 = 18.5 points out of the group account plus their respective 
income from the private account. If, instead, the randomly selected group member 
indicates in her contribution table that she would contribute 19 points to the group 
account if the others contribute on average 18 points, then the total contribution to the 
group account is given by 16+20+19 = 55 points. All group members will therefore earn 
0.5×55 = 27.5 points out of the group account plus their respective income from the 
private account.  
 
The following figure illustrates the situation in example 1. You are the person on the 
right side (group member number 3). You are the randomly selected subject and 
therefore your conditional contribution is payoff-relevant. For the other two group 
members, the unconditional contribution is payoff-relevant. 
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You will make all your decisions only once. After the end of Part I you will get the 
instructions for Part II. 
 
[Decision sheets handed out] 
 
Part II [handed out after the completion of part I] 
 
We will now conduct another experiment. As in the previous experiment, you are in 
anonymous groups of three people. The members of your group will, however, be 
different in Part II from your group members in Part I. 
 
The basic decision situation is the same as that described on page 2 of the instructions 
of the previous experiment (Part I). Each group member has to decide on the allocation 
of 20 points. You can put these 20 points into your private account or you can put them 
fully or partially into a group account. You have to use your entire endowment (= 20 
points). The points you put into the group account and the points you put into the 
private account have to sum to 20. Your income will be determined in the same way as 
before. Remember: 
 
   
 Income from your private account (= 20 – contribution to group account)  
 + Income from group account (= 0.5 × sum of all contributions to group account)  
 = Total income  
   
 
In the experiment, you and the other group members can participate in a vote and make 
other decisions. There are two possible institutions. 
 
Institution (a) – Decide freely on your contribution 
Under this institution, each group member is free to decide how to allocate their 20 
points. This means that you can allocate anything from 0 to 20 points to the group 
account; the remaining points must be allocated to the private account. This is the same 
decision situation as in Part 1. 
 
Institution (b) – Required to make a minimum contribution of 5 points 
Under this institution, each group member is required to make a minimum contribution 
of 5 points to the group account. This means that you must allocate anything from 5 to 
20 points to the group account; the remaining points must be allocated to the private 
account. 
 
A vote 
You and all other group members will participate in a vote on the institution that will be 
valid in your group. You have to indicate which one of the two possible institutions you 
prefer for your group. The institution that receives a majority of the votes (i.e., 2 or 3 
votes) will be valid in your group. 
 
Procedure of Part II 
 
Part II includes the decision situation just described to you. The decisions in Part II will 
only be made once. First each group member will participate in the vote. After you have 
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learned the outcome of the vote, please make your contribution decision under the 
institution that is valid in your group. You are asked to make both an unconditional and 
a conditional contribution, but for this institution only. 
 
1. The vote 
Please vote by marking the box next to the institution you prefer for your group. The 
voting form looks as follows: 
 
    
I vote for Institution (a) – everyone can decide freely on their contribution:    
    I vote for Institution (b) – everyone is required to make a minimum contribution of 5 points:    
    
 
2. Your contribution decision 
You will learn the outcome of the vote in your group when the decision forms for the 
contribution are handed out. 
 
• If a majority of the members of your group have voted for Institution (a), you 
and everyone else in your group will receive decision forms for this institution only. 
Each group member is free to decide how to allocate their 20 points. The forms look 
exactly as in Part I. In the unconditional contribution case, you must decide how 
many of the 20 points you want to put into the group account. In the contribution 
table, please indicate how much you want to contribute to the group account for each 
possible average contribution of the other group members (rounded to the next 
integer). 
 
• If a majority of the members of your group have voted for Institution (b), you 
and everyone else in your group will receive decision forms for this institution only. 
Each group member is required to make a minimum contribution of 5 points to the 
group account. In the unconditional contribution case, you must decide how many of 
the 20 points you want to put into the group account. A minimum of 5 points is 
required. In the contribution table, please indicate how much you want to contribute 
to the group account for each possible average contribution of the other group 
members (rounded to the next integer). The contribution table looks as follows:   
 
(Rounded) Average 
contribution of the other 
group members to the 
group account 
Your contribution to the 
group account is (a 
minimum of 5 points is 
required) 
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
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15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
The numbers in the left column are the possible (rounded) average 
contributions of the other group members 
 
The numbers in the left column are the possible (rounded) average contributions of the 
other group members to the group account. Please insert into each input box how many 
points you want to contribute to the group account – conditional on the indicated 
average contribution. You have to enter at least 5 points in each input box. For 
example, you will have to indicate how much to contribute to the group account if the 
others contribute 5 points to the group account on average, how much to contribute if 
the others contribute 6, 7, or 8 points on average, etc. You can insert any integer 
number from 5 to 20 in each input box. 
 
As in Part I, only the contribution table will be the payoff-relevant decision for one 
randomly determined subject in each group. Only the unconditional contribution 
will be the payoff-relevant decision for the other two group members. Except for us – 
the experimenters – no one will know who the randomly selected subject is. You will 
therefore have to think carefully about both types of decisions since either one can 
become relevant for you. 
 
You will make all your decisions only once. After the end of Part II you will get the 
instructions for Part III. 
 
[Decision sheets handed out; first for the vote then for the contribution decisions for the 
institution implemented by the vote in each group] 
 
Part III [handed out after the completion of part II] 
 
We will now ask you to indicate your expectation about the average unconditional 
contribution to the group account (rounded to the next integer) by the other two group 
members. You will be paid for the accuracy of your expectation: 
 
• If your expectation is exactly right (that is, if your expectation is exactly the 
same as the actual average contribution of the other group members), you will 
get 3 points in addition to your other income from the experiment. 
• If your expectation deviates by 1 point from the correct result, you will get 2 
additional points. 
• A deviation of 2 points still gives you 1 additional point. 
• If your expectation deviates by 3 or more points from the correct result, you will 
get no additional points. 
 
Each group member has to make two choices (each one pays a maximum of 3 points): 
 
• The expectation about the average unconditional contribution to the group 
account by the other two group members in Part I (when everyone could decide 
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freely on their contribution). 
• The expectation about the average unconditional contribution to the group 
account by the other two group members in Part II (when the outcome of the 
vote determined whether everyone should be allowed to decide freely on their 
contribution, or if everyone should be required to make a minimum contribution 
of 5 points). 
 
The whole experiment will be finished once Part III has been completed, but we will 
ask you to fill in a post-experiment questionnaire. 
 
[Decision sheets handed out] 
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Tables 
Table 1. Results from the public goods experiments: unconditional contributions. 
Treatment Standard MCLa H0: 
Standard=MCL 
(p-values) 
Exogenous (n = 51) 8.35 (6.80) 9.43 (5.47) 0.01 
Endogenous (n = 93) 8.24 (7.00) 9.09 (5.68) < 0.01 
Note: Standard deviations in brackets. n = number of subjects. a For subjects in groups rejecting the 
endogenous minimum level, the minimum level is not imposed in the second stage; instead they 
participate in a standard public goods experiment. 
 
Table 2. Voting behavior in the endogenous treatment. 
 Standard 
contr. 
Standard 
belief 
MCL 
contr. 
MCL 
belief 
H0: Standard 
contr.=MCL 
contr. (p-values) 
H0: Standard 
contr.= 
Standard belief 
(p-values) 
Exogenous 
(n = 51) 
8.35 7.76 9.43 9.57 0.01 < 0.01 
Endogenous 
(n = 93) 
8.25 7.66 9.09 9.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
       
Endogenous: own 
and group vote 
      
-Yes/Yes (n = 72) 8.39 7.43 9.75 9.54 < 0.01 < 0.01 
- No/Yes (n = 9) 8.22 8.89 6.67 7.78 0.63 0.37 
- No/No (n = 9) 8.44 9.22 7.78 7.78 0.16 0.58 
- Yes/No (n = 3) 4.33 4.67 4.33 3.67 . 0.17 
 
Table 3. Behavioral response to imposing the minimum level. 
 Higher in 
MCL 
No 
difference 
Lower in 
MCL 
Exogenous (n = 51) 49% 31% 20% 
Endogenous (n = 81) 43% 40% 17% 
    
Endogenous: own 
and group vote 
   
-Yes/Yes (n = 72) 44% 42% 14% 
- No/Yes (n = 9) 33% 22% 44% 
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Table 4. Behavioral response to imposing the minimum level for exogenous treatment 
(n = 51). 
Contributions in 
standard public 
goods 
experiment 
Contributions 
in MCL public 
goods 
experiment 
Proportion of 
subjects 
Average 
contribution in 
standard public 
goods 
experiment 
Average 
contribution in 
minimum level 
public goods 
experiment 
0,…,4 5 23% 0.00 5.00 
0,…,4 6,…,20 2% 2.00 6.00 
5 5 6% 5.00 5.00 
5 6,…,20 8% 5.00 8.25 
6,…,20 5 12% 8.83 5.00 
6,…,20 6,…,20 49% 13.44 13.48 
 
Table 5. Behavioral response to imposing the minimum level for endogenous treatment 
(yes-groups, n = 81). 
Contributions in 
standard public 
goods 
experiment 
Contributions 
in MCL public 
goods 
experiment 
Proportion of 
subjects 
Average 
contribution in 
standard public 
goods 
experiment 
Average 
contribution in 
minimum level 
public goods 
experiment 
0,…,4 5 27% 0.10 5.00 
0,…,4 6,…,20 2% 1.50 7.50 
5 5 5% 5.00 5.00 
5 6,…,20 5% 5.00 8.25 
6,…,20 5 10% 11.38 5.00 
6,…,20 6,…,20 51% 13.22 13.27 
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Table 6. Cooperative preferences by treatment (linear regression). 
Dependent variable: 
Conditional contribution 
(1) (2) 
   
Constant 1.37 (0.40)*** 1.53 (0.75)** 
Others 0.45 (0.04)*** 0.44 (0.06)*** 
MCL 2.57 (0.34)*** 2.05 (0.64)*** 
MCL × Others -0.07 (0.03)** -0.03 (0.04) 
Endo - -0.26 (0.88) 
Endo × Others - -0.02 (0.08) 
Endo × MCL - 0.84 (0.74) 
Endo × MCL × Others - -0.06 (0.06) 
   
Observations 4889 4889 
- Clusters 132 132 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on individuals (in brackets). Others is the average contribution of 
the others in the group, MCL is a dummy for the second stage when the minimum level is imposed, and 
Endo is a dummy for the endogenous treatment. The dependent variable is individual i’s conditional 
contribution, both in the baseline and with the minimum provision level. *** denotes significance at the 
1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. 
 
Table 7. Distribution of contributor types for exogenous treatment (n =51). 
           MCL      
 
Standard 
 Conditional 
cooperators 
Free riders 
(=5) 
Hump-
shaped Others 
 
 Conditional 
cooperators 
50.98% 
 
 
5.88% 
 
0.00% 
 
7.84% 
 
64.70% 
 
 Free 
riders 
(=0) 
(=5) 
0.00% 
 
 
17.65% 
 
0.00% 
 
0.00% 
 
17.65% 
 
 Hump- 
shaped 
0.00% 
 
 
0.00% 
 
0.00% 
 
1.96% 
 
1.96% 
 
 Others 
 
1.96% 
 
 
1.96% 
 
0.00% 
 
11.76% 
 
15.69% 
 
  52.94% 25.49% 0.00% 21.57% 100.00% 
Note: Type definition follows Fischbacher et al. (2001). Conditional cooperators: increasing schedule or 
positive Spearman correlation (with others’ average contribution) at 1%; free riders: contribute the lowest 
amount allowed; hump-shaped: positive (negative) Spearman correlation at 1% up to (beyond) their 
highest contribution. 
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Table 8. Distribution of contributor types for endogenous treatment (yes-groups, n = 
81). 
           MCL      
 
Standard 
 Conditional 
cooperators 
Free riders 
(=5) 
Hump-
shaped Others 
 
 Conditional 
cooperators 
41.98% 
 
 
9.88% 
 
1.23% 
 
6.17% 
 
59.26% 
 
 Free 
riders 
(=0) 
(=5) 
0.00% 
 
 
13.58% 
 
0.00% 
 
1.23% 
 
14.81% 
 
 Hump- 
shaped 
2.47% 
 
 
1.23% 
 
2.47% 
 
1.23% 
 
7.41% 
 
 Others 
 
2.47% 
 
 
6.17% 
 
0.00% 
 
9.88% 
 
18.52% 
 
  46.91% 30.86% 3.70% 18.51% 100.00% 
Note: Type definition follows Fischbacher et al. (2001). Conditional cooperators: increasing schedule or 
positive Spearman correlation (with others’ average contribution) at 1%; free riders: contribute the lowest 
amount allowed; hump-shaped: positive (negative) Spearman correlation at 1% up to (beyond) their 
highest contribution. 
 
Table 9. Distribution of contributor types when a minimum level is manually imposed 
on the data from the standard public goods experiment. 
 Exogenous 
(n = 51) 
Endogenous 
(yes-groups, n =81)  
          Standard MCL Standard MCL 
Conditional cooperators 56.86% 52.94% 54.32% 46.91% 
Free riders (=5) 25.49% 25.49% 27.16% 30.86% 
Hump-shaped 1.96% 0.00% 6.17% 3.70% 
Others 15.69% 21.57% 12.35% 18.52% 
Note: Type definition follows Fischbacher et al. (2001). In this table we define contributor types in the 
standard public goods game are after we manually adjust all subjects up to the minimum of 5 tokens in 
the standard public goods experiment. This implies that someone who never contributes above 5 tokens in 
the standard public goods experiment is characterized as a free rider. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Individual contributions in exogenous treatment (n = 51). 
 
Figure 2. Individual contributions in endogenous treatment (n = 81). 
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Figure 3. Contributions and beliefs about others’ contributions for exogenous treatment 
(n = 51). 
 
Figure 4. Contributions and beliefs about others’ contributions for endogenous 
treatment (n = 81). 
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Figure 5. Average conditional contributions for exogenous treatment (n = 51). 
 
Figure 6. Average conditional contributions for endogenous treatment (n = 81). 
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Abstract 
Using a laboratory experiment in the field, we examine how the choice architecture of 
framing a social dilemma – give to or take from a public good – interacts with a policy 
intervention that enforces a minimum contribution level to the public good. We find that 
cooperation is significantly higher in the give frame than in the take frame in our 
standard public goods experiment. When a minimum contribution level is introduced, 
contributions are significantly higher in the take frame since contributions are crowded 
out in the give frame but crowded in in the take frame. Our results therefore stress the 
importance of choosing the frame when making policy recommendations. 
Keywords: Choice architecture, Framing, Public goods, Minimum level, Experiment, 
Ethiopia. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper focuses on the design of institutions that foster cooperation in the provision 
of local public goods, for example local environmental quality. Using lab-in-the-field 
experiments, we investigate the role of framing and minimum levels in public good 
provision in rural Ethiopia. These are two prominent institutional factors that policy 
makers can use in their role as choice architects.1 Thaler and Sunstein (2009) coined the 
expression nudging to describe that the policy makers, i.e., choice architects, have the 
possibility to affect people’s behavior and still respect freedom of choice, i.e., 
libertarian paternalism. The objective of our paper is to investigate the interaction 
effects between framing and minimum levels in a non-student and non-Western subject 
pool. Although previous experiments have shown that other institutions such as 
monetary punishment and exclusions are promising institutions to increase cooperation 
(e.g., see overview in Chaudhuri, 2011), we firmly believe that framing and minimum 
level are the institutions that are possible and easy to affect by policy makers, especially 
in developing countries. To our knowledge, this is the first study that experimentally 
explores the interaction between framing and formal institutions such as minimum 
levels in public good games. 
Policy makers can affect cooperative behavior by changing the frame of a given 
cooperation problem, by choosing whether the activity should be designed in terms of 
giving to or taking from a public good. We frame public goods in terms of giving or 
taking and investigate the impact on cooperative behavior. Previous experimental 
literature on framing effects in social dilemmas has mostly focused on understanding 
the difference in behavior, and the results show more cooperation in give frames, or no 
difference,2 despite the fact that individuals face the same fundamental economic 
problem in both frames (e.g., Andreoni, 1995; Cox, 2015; Dufwenberg, et al., 2011; 
Fosgaard et al., 2014; Khadjavi and Lange, 2015). However, our focus is on the 
relevance of framing for policy design, in particular concerning the interaction between 
framing and minimum levels in public good provision. Minimum levels are often 
imposed in order to secure some provision of a public good. For example, in developing 
countries it is common to provide local public goods directly through mandatory 
community-based labor exchange, with provision of the public good enforced without a 
                                                 
1 A neutral design does not exist. Any design choice a decision maker makes influence people’s behavior, 
from the order of food choices on a menu to whether CO2 compensation of a flight is by default included 
or not included in the flight price. 
2 For a summary of previous experiments on take and give frames, see Gächter et al. (2014). See also 
Cookson (2000). 
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formal institution, through peer-pressure and social norms (Olken and Singhal, 2011; 
Ostrom, 1991). A minimum level should increase the total provision of the public good 
since any free rider is forced to contribute at least the announced minimum, and this in 
turn might make conditional cooperators increase their contribution since they want to 
cooperate if others cooperate and vice versa (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001). However, 
the minimum level could also result in crowding out, i.e., that individuals contribute less 
to the public good when the minimum level is imposed than when it is not imposed 
because the minimum level might send a signal of distrust to intrinsically cooperative 
agents. In this case the minimum level entails a “hidden cost of control” (Falk and 
Kosfeld, 2006; Ziegelmeyer et al., 2012).3 Results from previously conducted 
experiments of minimum levels using the standard give frame, i.e., subjects are asked to 
give to the public good, are mixed regarding the effect of minimum levels on public 
good provision. For instance, Andreoni (1993) and Gronberg et al. (2012) find a 
positive effect of a minimum level on public good provision using concave payoff 
functions, Eckel et al. (2005) implement a dictator game with a charity as recipient and 
find that a minimum level crowds out donations to the charity when it is framed as a 
tax, and Kocher et al. (2016) use a linear public goods game and find instances of both 
crowding out and crowding in following the introduction of a minimum level. 
The decision maker has the important role of being a choice architect. In order to use 
framing as a policy design tool it is helpful to distinguish between situations where it is 
possible to meaningfully change the frame of a given cooperation problem and 
situations where the frame is simply a structural aspect of the cooperation problem. In 
the former case, changing the framing can be a policy tool in itself and hence an 
important design problem for a choice architect. For instance, cooperative behavior can 
be encouraged by using positive language (e.g., emphasize the positive effect of doing 
something which is good for the community) or negative language (e.g., emphasize the 
negative effect of doing something which is bad for the community), and the policy 
maker can also affect the design of the activity itself such that it involves either giving 
to or taking from a public good.4 In the latter case, understanding framing as a structural 
aspect of the cooperation problem could be useful in the selection of other policy tools 
such as minimum levels. It is very important for policy makers to know whether 
                                                 
3 See for instance Deci (1971, 1975) and Bowles and Polanía-Reyes (2012) for general discussions on 
crowding out of intrinsic motivation and control aversion. 
4 This is closely related to the literature on choice architecture. For instance, framing has been found to 
affect savings behavior (Brown et al., 2008), energy conservation (Gromet et al., 2013), and the impact of 
conditional incentives on worker productivity (Hossain and List, 2012) and teacher performance (Fryer et 
al., 2012). 
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minimum levels work differently for give and take frames when considering future 
choice architecture designs.5 This is indeed the key motivation for exploring the 
interaction between framing and minimum levels. 
Framing can influence how subjects conceive their own actions and others’ actions 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). In terms of our public goods game, actions are kind in 
the give frame (“to give”) but unkind in the take frame (“to take”), and this possibly 
affects behavior. For instance, we might expect higher public good provision in the give 
frame because of reciprocity (since subjects reciprocate kind actions with kindness; Cox 
et al., 2008, 2013); or because of “warm glow,” if subjects derive more utility from 
doing something good than from refraining from doing something bad (Andreoni, 
1995).6 However, if subjects care about what is socially appropriate, then we might 
instead expect higher provision in the take frame (since it is a less socially appropriate 
action to take than to give; Krupka and Weber, 2013). The minimum level could have 
an effect along some or all of these dimensions. It could for instance act as a signal or 
reference point, thus affecting subjects’ view of what is socially appropriate and also 
their belief about what others are doing. These effects might differ depending on 
whether public good provision is framed as give or take. Moreover, the minimum level 
might be perceived as more lenient in the take frame since it is binding from above 
(“take at most”) and thus someone who considers taking less than the imposed 
maximum might feel unaffected by this constraint; conversely, by contributing more 
than the imposed minimum in the give frame, one might feel that the part of the 
contribution stipulated by the mandatory minimum (“give at least”) was a forced choice. 
Thus, the predicted net effects are difficult to pin down theoretically. Our experiments 
provide empirical evidence on the relationship between framing and minimum levels. 
Our results are based on lab-in-the-field experiments in rural Ethiopia, where the 
subjects were farm household heads actively engaged in a number of public-good-like 
decisions such as environmental rehabilitation and the maintenance of local 
infrastructure. Thus, we also contribute to extending the conventional analysis of 
cooperation to a non-student and non-Western subject pool (e.g., Henrich et al., 2010). 
This is especially important since societies across the world differ substantially in terms 
                                                 
5 It is possible that both dimensions of framing as policy are applicable to the same cooperation problem. 
For example, the problem of labor contribution to a local public good can be considered as a structural 
give frame, while the problem of over-harvesting from a local public good can be considered as a 
structural take frame.  It is however possible to highlight the positive and negative consequences of 
individuals’ actions in each of the above problems.  
6 See also Cubitt et al. (2011), who find that subjects condemn free riding more strongly in give situations 
than in take situations. 
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of social organization, trust, fairness norms, and also in the nature of day-to-day 
cooperation problems.7 Results from developing-country subject pools like ours could 
therefore be particularly important both in examining the generalizability of 
experimental findings and in drawing conclusions about social dilemmas prevalent in 
such places. Moreover, our results provide information for the choice architecture of 
public goods projects. Fosgaard et al. (2014) were the first to implement a public goods 
game framed as either take-from or give-to in a non-student sample, namely a large-
scale sample of the Danish population. Interestingly, their treatment effects differ from 
the majority of experiments using conventional student samples in that they find more 
cooperation in the take frame. We extend the analysis further by conducting 
experiments with more than 300 farmers in Ethiopia. We find strong effects of framing 
and minimum levels on cooperation. More precisely, we find that cooperation is 
significantly higher in the give frame than in the take frame in our standard public 
goods experiment. When a minimum contribution level is introduced, contributions are 
significantly higher in the take frame since contributions are crowded out in the give 
frame but crowded in in the take frame. Overall, the highest level of cooperation is 
observed in the give frame with no minimum level. Our results show the importance of 
framing for choice architects. Furthermore, our results could be important inasmuch as 
they point to situations where policy makers can increase the efficiency of interventions 
with simple and cost-efficient framing techniques combined with formal institutions 
such as minimum levels in public good provision. These interventions are easier to 
implement than other institutional features such as monetary punishment or exclusion. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes the experimental 
design, Section 4 presents the results, and we provide concluding remarks in Section 5. 
2. Experiment 
2.1. Design 
The primary focus of our paper is to investigate the effect of (i) framing phrased as 
either give to (GIVE) or take from (TAKE) the public good combined with (ii) a 
minimum level. We begin with a description of the framing of the public goods and 
then we explain how the minimum level was implemented and finally how we tested for 
the effect on contributions to the public goods in both frames. 
                                                 
7 See for instance Henrich et al. (2001) for cross-cultural comparisons of economic experiments in small-
scale societies. See also Herrmann et al. (2008) and Vieder et al. (2015). 
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We implement a linear public goods experiment based on the design developed by 
Fischbacher et al. (2001), which in addition to eliciting unconditional contributions to 
public goods also uses the strategy method to elicit contributions to public goods 
conditional on others’ average contributions.8,9 We begin with a description of the 
public goods using the give frame, i.e., how much a subject would like to give10 to a 
public good. This is the common way to phrase contributions in public goods 
experiments. Subjects are matched into groups of four, each with an endowment of 10 
Ethiopian birr and the possibility to contribute any integer amount c from 0 to 10 
Ethiopian birr to the public good. To facilitate understanding, we choose to use the real 
currency directly rather than an experimental currency.11 The marginal per capita return 
from the public good is 0.5, i.e., a contribution of one unit results in 0.5 units of income 
for each of the four group members. This can easily be explained to the subjects by 
explaining that the total amount contributed to the public good is doubled and then split 
equally between the subjects. Since the marginal per capita return is 0.5 and the social 
marginal per capita return is 2, it is a dominant strategy for a payoff-maximizing 
individual to contribute nothing to the public good. However, it is socially optimal to 
contribute the whole endowment. The payoff for subject i is given by 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 10− 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 0.5∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗4𝑗𝑗=1 .   (2) 
The Fischbacher et al. design employs the strategy method. Subjects make two types of 
giving decisions, one unconditional and one conditional. In the unconditional decision, 
subjects decide how much they wish to give to the public good without knowing 
anything about anybody else’s contributions. In the conditional decision, each subject 
decides on the amount to give conditional on the average amount given by the other 
three group members. This is implemented by each subject stating how much she/he 
                                                 
8 For a discussion on the validity of using the strategy method to elicit cooperative preferences, see, e.g., 
Fischbacher et al. (2012). For a general discussion on the policy implications of results from public goods 
experiments, see Gächter (2007). For other experiments based on this design, see, e.g., Fischbacher and 
Gächter (2010), Herrmann and Thöni (2009), Kocher et al. (2008), Martinsson et al. (2013), and 
Martinsson et al. (2015). See also Rustagi et al. (2010) and Kosfeld and Rustagi (2015) for interesting 
applications to the management of forest commons in Ethiopia. 
9 We chose a design with linear rather than concave payoff functions (e.g., Andreoni, 1993) since it 
facilitates understanding and the use of the strategy method, which we think is important. This means that 
the minimum level is set above rather than below the Nash equilibrium of zero contribution, which makes 
the welfare effect of the minimum level more salient. 
10 To facilitate understanding, we deliberately use the word “give” instead of “contribute” when we write 
about the GIVE and TAKE treatments.  
11 In our Ethiopian case, this worked particularly well since the value of Ethiopian birr matched well with 
the opportunity cost we intended to use. The experiment with two stages was calibrated to give on 
average almost a daily salary (30 birr). 
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would give to the public good for each possible average amount given (in integers) by 
the others in the group ranging from 0 to 10. 
To make the decisions incentive compatible, the unconditional decision will be payoff 
relevant for three randomly selected group members, and by using the average 
unconditional amount given (rounded to the next integer) by them, the amount given by 
the fourth member is determined as his or her conditional giving matching that specific 
average amount. Payoffs are then calculated based on these amounts.  
In the take frame, the decision is framed as how much a subject would like to take from 
the public good. We follow standard procedures in the framing literature when we 
implement this frame (e.g., Andreoni, 1995; Fosgaard et al., 2014). In this treatment, 
subjects are not endowed with 10 Ethiopian birr as in the give frame. Instead, the public 
good consists of 4×10 = 40 Ethiopian birr and subjects decide on the (integer) amount w 
from 0 to 10 birr that they wish to take from the public good. The payoff function for 
subject i is given by 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 0.5�40− ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗4𝑗𝑗=1 �.   (3) 
The incentives are exactly the same across GIVE and TAKE since equations (2) and (3) 
describe the same underlying payoff function and only differ in how it is framed. 
In addition to testing for framing effects, we investigate the effect of introducing a 
minimum level in each frame. In the give frame, subjects must give at least the 
announced minimum level of 2 Ethiopian birr, which corresponds to 20% of the 
endowment. We follow Andreoni (1993) and present the minimum level as a restriction 
on individuals’ choice set. For instance, conditional giving is elicited by subjects 
making eleven giving decisions (one for each possible integer average amount given by 
the others in the group); when the minimum level of 2 Ethiopian birr has been 
implemented, subjects make nine giving decisions instead of eleven and they know that 
they are not allowed to give less than 2 Ethiopian birr. In the take frame, where the 
procedures are exactly the same with the exception that the game is presented as take-
from rather than give-to the public good, subjects must not take more than an 
announced amount of 8 Ethiopian birr, and hence leave at least 2 Ethiopian birr in the 
public good.  
In the experiment, subjects participate in sessions with public goods experiments 
framed as TAKE or GIVE and within each session they complete two stages. The first 
stage (Baseline) is a standard public goods experiment. It is followed by a second stage 
(MCL) which is a public goods experiment with an imposed minimum contribution 
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level.12 We use stranger matching, i.e., they are re-matched with three new group 
members in the second stage, and as described above a subject makes two types of 
decisions (unconditional and conditional) in each stage. They are paid for their 
decisions in both stages but learn nothing about the decisions of others in the group until 
they are paid some days after the experiment. 
2.2. Procedural details 
The experiment was conducted in 2013 in rural Ethiopia. It was a separate module of a 
household survey on community forestry that covered 15 villages scattered across the 
four major regions of the country. We ran experiments in eight of these villages.13 In 
each region we first randomly selected two villages from each region. Then one of the 
two villages was randomized into the give treatment and the other into the take 
treatment.14 With randomization of treatments at the regional level, we obtain a 
balanced sample where the regional mix of subjects is similar across the treatments. 
This is to ensure that our results are not driven by regional differences, which could be 
quite large given the wide (and diverse) geographical area covered. 
In each village, households were randomly selected for participation in the survey. The 
household heads were interviewed in their respective houses in private by a trained 
enumerator. At the end of the household survey, they were asked if they would like to 
participate in an economic experiment. All household heads covered in the survey 
agreed to participate in the experiment. The experiment was conducted face-to-face 
similar to in for example Henrich et al. (2001). The above described public goods 
experiment was clearly described to the subjects, who after a number of comprehension 
questions completed both stages of the experiment. Subjects were informed that similar 
experiments had or would take place in other households in their village and that they 
would be randomly and anonymously matched against other household heads in their 
village. They were also informed that payments would be distributed on a specific date 
and that this procedure was the same for everybody else participating in the 
                                                 
12 We do not test for order effects and the reason is that the order we impose is natural in most cases, in 
the sense that we are interested in the effect of a minimum level when subjects are experienced with the 
baseline, which is a voluntary contribution mechanism in the form of either take-from or give-to the 
public good. This is what typically happens in reality: a public goods problem is identified and a remedy 
is sought and implemented. 
13 The 15 villages in the household survey were selected on the basis of certain criteria, including the 
extent of forest cover, product diversity, and year and purpose of establishment of the community forestry 
program. 
14 Randomization of treatments within a village was not feasible since the experiments had to be rolled 
out over the course of several days and thus mixing treatments within a village would risk that subjects 
learn about this variation. 
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experiment.15 The enumerators were trained to carefully explain and demonstrate the 
structure of the experiment according to a script, and they knew the importance of doing 
so in a neutral manner.16 A total of 360 subjects participated in the experiment, 180 in 
each treatment. 
3. Results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample. As can be seen, about 90% of the 
household heads are males and over 50% are literate. Farming is the predominant 
activity for the households and the total size of parcels for own cultivation is slightly 
over 4 acres. When comparing the socio-economic characteristics between the 
treatments, there is no statistical difference based on non-parametric tests, except that 
subjects in the TAKE treatment are statistically significantly younger at the 5% level 
(49.0 years vs. 46.0 years; Mann-Whitney U-test; p = 0.03). However, we do not 
consider this average difference of 3 years to be of any economic significance. Overall, 
the randomization of subjects into treatments seems to have worked well.  
Table 1 about here 
Next, we turn to the impact of framing on unconditional contributions. For ease of 
comparison, we will mostly refer to “contributions” also in the take frame, and by this 
we mean the effective contribution, i.e., 10 – wi, where wi is the amount withdrawn from 
the public account. The results are presented in Table 2. Subjects in the GIVE treatment 
contribute on average 5.02 birr out of the endowment of 10 birr, i.e., 50.2%, whereas 
the average contribution in the TAKE treatment is 40.0%. In standard one-shot linear 
public goods games, average voluntary contributions (and normally a give frame is 
used) usually range from 40% to 60% of endowments (see, e.g., Chaudhuri, 2011). The 
difference between the two treatments is significant at the 1% level (Mann-Whitney U-
test; p < 0.01). Furthermore, there is a substantial difference across treatments in the 
share of subjects opting for free riding by contributing nothing and full contribution, 
respectively. In the GIVE treatment, 2.2% of the subjects contribute nothing and 7.8% 
contribute their full endowment. In the TAKE treatment, 19.4% opt to free ride and only 
1.1%, i.e., two subjects, contribute the whole endowment. At both ends of the spectrum 
– zero and full contribution – there is a highly significant difference in proportions 
                                                 
15 We established a credible procedure through the involvement of the Kebele leader in the organization 
of the experiments, and also by running the experiments, which were approved by the national 
government, through the Ethiopian Development Research Institute. 
16 See the Appendix for a complete transcript of the instructions. 
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between the treatments (Kruskal-Wallis tests; p < 0.01 in both cases). These results are 
in line with other experiments and thus we replicate the pattern of higher contributions 
in the GIVE frame using a non-standard subject pool, namely farmers in Ethiopia. 
Interestingly, the stark difference in proportion of free riders between the frames is 
remarkably similar to the results in Andreoni (1995). 
Table 2 about here 
Result 1. The average contributions are significantly higher and the proportion of free 
riders is significantly lower in the GIVE frame. 
We implement a minimum level in both frames and the results are presented in Table 3. 
In the GIVE treatment, the minimum level has a negative effect on contributions: the 
average contribution decreases from 5.02 birr to 4.46 birr, i.e., by 0.56 birr, which 
corresponds to 5.6 percentage points in terms of the initial endowment, and this 
difference is significant at the 1% level (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p < 0.01). 
Conversely, in the TAKE treatment the average contribution increases from 4.03 birr in 
the baseline to 4.74 birr after the introduction of the minimum level, which corresponds 
to a 7.1 percentage point increase (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p < 0.01). The 
contributions are significantly different between the two treatments at the 10% level 
(Mann-Whitney U-test; p = 0.08).  
Table 3 about here 
Result 2. When a minimum level is introduced in the GIVE frame, contributions to the 
public good decrease significantly; in contrast, when a minimum level is introduced in 
the TAKE frame, contributions increase significantly. Thus, the framing has a 
substantial effect on the efficiency of minimum levels. 
We provide more detailed information regarding the effect of the minimum level in 
Table 4, which is a disaggregation of the results in Table 3. For the baseline 
contributions, subjects are split into three categories: below, at, and above the minimum 
level of 2 birr. For contributions in the second stage, i.e., when the minimum level is 
implemented, subjects are separated into those who precisely match the minimum level 
of 2 birr, and those who contribute above it. This results in six possible contribution 
profiles, and thus we can obtain richer information on how different groups of subjects 
react to the minimum level and how these reactions differ between the two treatments. 
The top two rows of Table 4 make it clear that the effect along the extensive margin is 
much stronger in the TAKE treatment. Here, the minimum level has a direct effect on 
22% of the subjects who contributed less than 2 birr in the baseline, compared with only 
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4% of the subjects in GIVE. Interestingly, however, in the TAKE treatment about half 
of the subjects who contributed less than 2 birr in the baseline, i.e., 10% of the total 
number of subjects in this treatment, substantially increase their contribution in the 
second stage, on average from 0.6% of the endowment in the baseline to 57.1% when 
the minimum level has been implemented. Hence, they are strongly crowded in. 
Looking at the bottom two rows of the table, we can see that the majority of subjects 
contribute more than 2 birr in the baseline in (89% in GIVE and 74% in TAKE). When 
the minimum level is introduced, some of these subjects reduce their contribution all the 
way down to the postulated minimum and this effect is similar across treatments. Still, 
the majority of subjects in both treatments voluntarily contribute above the imposed 
minimum level and herein lays the main source of difference between the treatments, 
since subjects in the GIVE treatment on average decrease their contributions whereas 
those in the TAKE treatment instead increase their contributions. 
Table 4 about here 
Using the full sample, we summarize subjects’ reactions along the intensive margin by 
looking at the extent to which the average subject is crowded in, by voluntarily 
increasing their contribution, or crowded out, by voluntarily decreasing their 
contribution, when the minimum level is imposed. We calculate the average difference 
between subjects’ baseline contribution and their contribution when the minimum level 
has been imposed, counting only the contributions that are above 2 birr, which is the 
minimum level in both cases, but averaging over all subjects in each treatment.17 
Subjects in the GIVE treatment are crowded out by an average of 0.63 birr (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test; p < 0.01) while subjects in the TAKE treatment are crowded in by an 
average of 0.31 birr, yet this effect is only significant at the 10% level (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests; p = 0.08). These two effects are statistically different from each other 
at the 1% level (Mann-Whitney U test; p < 0.01), which means that subjects act 
differently along the intensive margin in GIVE and TAKE. 
Among the subjects who already contributed above 2 birr in the baseline, 56% are 
crowded out and 17% are crowded in in the GIVE treatment, whereas 38% are crowded 
out and 35% are crowded in in the TAKE treatment. The average crowding-out effect in 
                                                 
17 Mechanically, we follow Falk and Kosfeld (2006) and proceed as follows. First, baseline contributions 
below the minimum level are manually adjusted up to this level. Then we test whether the average 
difference between MCL and baseline contributions is different from zero using all subjects (the average 
difference is zero for contribution profiles in rows 1 and 3 of Table 4). A positive difference implies 
crowding in and a negative crowding out. 
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GIVE within this subsample is 0.85 birr, which is significant at the 1% level (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test; p < 0.01). In the TAKE treatment, the crowding-in effect we found 
when looking at the full sample does not exist within this subsample and instead there is 
a weak but insignificant crowding-out effect of 0.19 birr (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p 
= 0.49). 
Result 3. The minimum level significantly crowds out voluntary contributions to the 
public good in the GIVE frame but weakly crowds in contributions in the TAKE frame. 
The other part of the public goods experiment elicited conditional contributions 
following Fischbacher et al. (2001). Subjects stated their contribution for each possible 
average contribution of the other group members and we can thus investigate the impact 
of framing and minimum levels on subjects’ contribution strategies. Figure 1 displays 
average conditional contributions in the baseline for both treatments. The positive slope 
suggests that subjects are on average conditional cooperators, i.e., they contribute more 
when the other group members contribute more. The contribution schedule in the GIVE 
frame consistently lies above the schedule in the TAKE frame, which is in line with the 
theoretical prediction since a given outcome, e.g., the others contribute nothing to the 
public good, reveals less generosity in TAKE than in GIVE and is thus met with 
comparatively more negative reciprocity. 
Figure 1 about here 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the main effect of introducing the minimum level. 
Interestingly, the minimum level seems to have little overall effect on subjects’ 
contribution strategies; only in TAKE and at low levels of others’ public good 
contributions is there a marked difference, but the schedules gradually converge. 
Figures 2 and 3 about here 
Table 5 provides further information. In column 1, individual contributions in the 
baseline are regressed on others’ average contribution, a treatment dummy, and an 
interaction term between the two.18 The estimated intercept – own contribution 
conditioned on the others contributing nothing to the public good – is 2.68 birr in the 
base category, i.e., the GIVE treatment. The TAKE dummy identifies the difference in 
constant compared with the GIVE treatment. The difference is 1.01 birr less, which is 
significant at the 1% level. The interaction term captures the difference in slope 
                                                 
18 We report from OLS regressions in Table 5 but a Tobit model gives similar results. 
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compared with the GIVE treatment. It is statistically significant (steeper in TAKE) but 
the point estimate of 0.06 is small in both absolute economic terms and compared with 
the estimated slope in GIVE, which is 0.52 birr. By and large, the strong framing effect 
regarding baseline contributions to the public good thus prevails when we assess 
subjects’ contribution strategies by allowing them to condition their contribution on the 
other group members’ contributions.19 In column 2, the specification is the same but 
concerns contributions after the minimum level has been implemented. The main 
difference compared with the regression in column 1 is that both the TAKE dummy and 
the interaction term are insignificant, which means that there is no difference in 
contributions between the two treatments. The regression in column 3 is a difference-in-
difference specification and captures how the effect of introducing a minimum level 
compares across the GIVE and TAKE treatments. The MCL dummy and the interaction 
with the slope variable (Others) capture the effect of the minimum level in the GIVE 
treatment. The effect on the constant is an insignificant -0.26 birr and the effect on the 
slope is significant but not very large. The point estimate on TAKE×MCL captures the 
difference-in-differences in constant between TAKE and GIVE: when a minimum level 
is introduced, the effect on the constant is 0.74 birr stronger in TAKE than in GIVE. 
Interestingly, however, the difference in the effect on the slope goes in the other 
direction: when the minimum level is introduced, the effect on the slope of the 
contribution schedule is 0.09 birr weaker in TAKE than in GIVE. 
Table 5 about here 
Result 4. The framing has a substantial impact on subjects’ contribution strategies. 
When subjects can condition their decisions on the other group members’ contributions, 
they contribute significantly more in the baseline GIVE frame than in the baseline 
TAKE frame. To some extent, the framing also has an effect on the efficiency of 
minimum levels on subjects’ contribution strategies.  
Using the Fischbacher et al. design further enables us to classify subjects into 
contribution types following the convention introduced by these authors. We thus 
consider subjects as either conditional cooperators, free riders, hump-shaped 
                                                 
19 We can see in the table that there is a positive effect of others’ average contribution on individuals’ 
own contribution to the public good and this indicates that subjects on average are conditional 
cooperators. Another way to investigate this is to look at the correlation between subjects’ unconditional 
contributions and their beliefs about others’ unconditional contributions, which is similar to the 
information we get from the contribution table except for the additional uncertainty that subjects face 
concerning the accuracy of their beliefs. Regressing unconditional contributions on beliefs yields a 
positive effect that is significant at the 1% level in three of the four treatment combinations (it is 
insignificant in the TAKE treatment with a minimum level). 
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contributors, or others. We define types as follows: conditional cooperators either have 
a weakly increasing conditional contribution schedule, or their Spearman’s rho 
(correlation with the others’ average contribution) is positive and significant at the 1% 
level; free riders always contribute the lowest amount allowed; hump-shaped 
contributors display a positive Spearman correlation up to their highest contribution, 
whereafter the correlation is negative (both correlations should be significant at the 1% 
level); others do not fit into any of these categories. The distribution of contribution 
types is displayed in Tables 6 and 7 and we can see it is stable: the baseline type 
distribution is not significantly different between the GIVE and the TAKE treatment 
(Kruskal-Wallis test; p = 0.70), and, furthermore, 76% of subjects in the GIVE 
treatment and 74% in the TAKE treatment are classified as the same type in the baseline 
as in MCL (observations on the diagonal in either table).20 
Tables 6 and 7 about here 
Result 5. The distribution of contributor types is stable. Neither across the two frames 
in the baseline nor within each frame with respect to the implementation of a minimum 
contribution level do contributor type distributions differ significantly. 
4. Conclusion 
Contribution to public goods is an important issue for policy makers. In their role as 
policy makers, however, they have the possibility to act as choice architects. Two 
institutional factors they can affect fairly easily are whether to frame public goods in 
terms of giving or taking, and also whether or not to impose a low compulsory 
minimum level of contributions. These factors are easier to implement than other 
institutional features such as monetary punishment and exclusion. Our focus is on the 
relevance for policy design and we conduct our public goods experiments as a lab-in-
the-field experiment in rural Ethiopia. The objective of our paper is to investigate the 
interaction effects between framing and minimum levels. 
We find a strong frame dependency in the efficiency of minimum levels. Overall, we 
find the highest contributions in the give frame without a minimum level. In the 
standard public goods experiment, the give frame results in significantly higher 
contributions than the take frame. When the minimum level is introduced, the 
                                                 
20 Thus, in neither treatment is the distribution significantly altered following the introduction of a 
minimum contribution level (Kruskal-Wallis tests; p = 0.70 in GIVE and p = 0.18 in TAKE). However, 
the MCL type distributions do differ between frames (Kruskal-Wallis test; p = 0.04). 
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contribution levels between the frames are reversed and the levels are significantly 
higher in the take frame. Cooperation is crowded out in the give frame but crowded in 
in the take frame.  
The paper makes several contributions. First, some real-life cooperation problems might 
exhibit the aspects of the give frame whereas other problems might instead resemble the 
take frame. For example, the problem of labor contribution to a local public good can be 
considered a give frame, while the problem of over-harvesting from a local public good 
can be considered a take frame. Our results indicate that introducing minimum levels in 
order to curb underinvestment in local public goods is an efficient policy only in the 
latter case, despite the fact that individuals face the same underlying economic problem 
in both frames. Furthermore, this finding highlights the potential importance of framing 
lab experiments in accordance with the structural aspects of the real-life cooperation 
problem that we as researchers are trying to address. This is a question of external 
validity and could be relevant to the literature that examines institution formation, 
policy interventions, and the general impact of incentives on cooperation in public 
goods experiments, since these results almost exclusively rely on experiments using the 
give frame (rather than the take frame). Second, changing the framing can sometimes be 
a policy tool in itself. Our results indicate that the success of a policy intervention, like 
the introduction of minimum levels in public goods provision, can depend on the 
manner in which the situation is framed (e.g., whether cooperative behavior is 
encouraged by focusing on aspects of doing good or avoiding harm). To the extent it is 
possible, policy makers in the role as choice architect should thus use the best frame in a 
given context and for a given policy intervention. 
Framing and minimum levels are cheap and easy-to-implement local-level policy 
options, and they could be especially important in situations with comparatively weak 
centralized formal institutions. However, a potential drawback with a minimum level is 
the substantial heterogeneity in subjects’ reactions to it. It is important to acknowledge 
the fact that the high proportion of free riders found in experiments using students as 
subjects has not been replicated to the same extent using non-student samples, making 
the case for pure efficiency gain of a minimum level weaker but a negative effect of 
crowding out more possible. We find a high share of conditional cooperators, which 
policy makers need to account for in their choice of policy instruments. For example, 
Rustagi et al. (2010) and Kosfeld and Rustagi (2015) implement novel experiments in 
rural Ethiopia and document the importance of conditional cooperation for successful 
management of forest commons. By using the design in Fischbacher et al. (2001), our 
study together with those two papers and the large-scale study by Fosgaard et al. (2014) 
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contribute to improve our knowledge about people’s cooperative preferences in non-
student subject pools. 
There are potentially large gains in using simple policy regimes, especially in 
developing countries. Framing and minimum levels in public good provision are two 
such options. We analyze their interaction and impact on public good provision, looking 
at the net effects of implementing these institutions. The behavioral effects in our 
experiments are likely shaped by a combination of several mechanisms and an 
interesting avenue for future research would be to pin them down in more detail. 
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Appendix A: Instructions for the GIVE treatment 
You will now take part in another decision making experiment in which you can earn 
real money. The experiment consists of two parts that are completely independent of 
each other. This means that decisions that you and others make in part 1 have no impact 
on part 2. After completion of part 1, we will explain part 2. The experiment is designed 
so that your earnings will depend on your decisions and on the decisions of other people 
who make a similar decision. 
 
You will be a member of a group of four household heads in this village. This means 
there are three other household heads in your group. We selected your group partners 
randomly, and you will not know who they are. Neither will the other household heads 
in your group know who you are. Your group partners will be asked to make exactly the 
same decision as you. Your earnings will be paid in cash on (insert date). 
 
(Repeat) 
 
I will now explain the decision you and each member of your group have to make. 
Remember that you will earn money based on your decisions. There is no right or 
wrong decision. You can decide whatever you want.  
 
At the beginning of the experiment, each group member, including you, will receive 10 
birr. Each person has to decide how to divide their 10 birr into two places: a private 
bag and a public bag (show public bag). This means you will make this decision with 
the 10 birr you will receive (put money on table). You can put anything between 0 birr 
and 10 birr in the public bag and then put the rest in your private bag.  
 
After everyone in your group has made a decision, the payments to you and the other 
three household heads in your group will be determined as follows:  
 
The amount that you put in the private bag will be saved for you as it is.  
 
The amount that you and your group partners put in the public bag will be counted. 
Then we will double the total amount in the public bag. This doubled amount will be 
distributed equally among you and your group members regardless of how much 
everyone put in the public bag in the first place. For example, if the sum of what you 
and the other three household heads in your group put is 16 birr, we will add another 16 
birr to make it 32 birr. Then each one of you will earn 8 birr from the public bag (show 
with money).  
 
The total amount of money that you earn from this experiment is therefore what you put 
in your private bag, plus what you earn from the doubled amount of what you and your 
group members put in the public bag, which is shared equally.  
 
(Repeat) 
 
Please note that you can decide to put whatever you want in the public bag. The same 
applies to the other three household heads in your group. They will not know how much 
you put in the public bag before they decide. And you will not know how much they put 
in the public bag before you decide. But they too know that whatever is collected in the 
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public bag will be doubled by us and shared equally, regardless of the amount that each 
member put in the public bag.  
 
(Repeat) 
 
Now I will ask you some questions to make sure you have understood the decision you 
will make and how payments are determined.  
 
1. Assume that all group members (including you) put 0 birr into the public bag. 
a. How much will you earn? _____________ 
b. How much will the other people in your group each earn? __________ 
 
2. Assume also that all group members (including you) put the entire 10 birr into 
the public bag.  
a. How much will you earn? _____________ 
 
3. Assume that one of the other members in your group puts 5 birr in the public 
bag, another puts in 3 birr, and the third puts in 2 birr. This means there is 10 
birr in the public bag from your group partners.  
a. What is the total you will earn if you put 0 birr in the public bag?   
 _________ 
b. What is the total you will earn if you put 6 Birr in the public bag?  
 _________ 
c. What is the total you will earn if you put 10 birr in the public bag? 
 _________ 
 
Do you have any questions about how payments are calculated? Please ask me if 
anything is unclear.  
 
You will make two types of decisions.  
 
First, you will choose how much of your 10 birr you want to put in the public bag 
without knowing what the other three people in your group will decide. Remember that 
they have to make exactly the same decision as you. Second, I will ask you how much 
of your 10 birr you want to put in the public bag for each possible average contribution 
of the other group members (rounded to the next integer). Your contribution decision 
will therefore depend on how much other group members contribute. This will become 
clear to you when you see the contribution table (show table). If, for example, the other 
three group members have put 0 birr in the public bag, how much do you want to put 
in? If the others on average have put 1 birr in the public bag, how much do you want to 
put in? (demonstrate) 
 
Average contribution of 
other group members 
(explain average 
carefully) 
Your contribution 
(write answer) 
0 birr  
1 birr  
2 birr  
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3 birr  
4 birr  
5 birr  
6 birr  
7 birr  
8 birr  
9 birr  
10 birr  
 
After all group members in the experiment have made all decisions, one member of the 
group will be selected randomly by the supervisor. For this randomly determined group 
member, only the second decision will be relevant. For the three group members who 
are not selected by the random mechanism, the first decision will be the relevant 
decision. When you make your two decisions, you will not know whether you will be 
randomly selected. You will therefore have to think carefully about both decisions, 
since either one of them can become relevant for you. 
 
Your payment will either depend on the first or the second decision, and this will be 
determined by a lottery. First we will draw a lottery to select one person from your 
group. This person will be paid based on the second decision, while the other three will 
be paid based on their first decision. Thus, three people in your group will be paid based 
on how much they contribute without knowing what the other group members 
contribute. The first decisions of these three people will be used to calculate the average 
of their contributions. For the fourth individual, the second decision will then be used to 
determine how much he/she will be paid. For example, if the others on average 
contributed 4 birr, then the fourth person’s contribution will be…. (point table), while if 
the others on average contributed 8 birr, then the fourth person’s contribution will be 
(point table). Because it is a lottery, you could end up being the person who is paid 
based on the first decision or the second decision. You will therefore have to think 
carefully about each decision you make.   
 
(Repeat) 
 
Please note that you can decide to put whatever amount you want in the public bag. The 
same applies to the other three household heads in your group. They will not know how 
much you put in the public bag before they decide, and you will not know how much 
they put in the public bag before you decide. But they too will know that whatever is 
collected in the public bag will be doubled by us and shared equally, regardless of the 
amount that each member put in the public bag.  
   
(Make sure the person has understood the game before recording decisions. Repeat 
the whole thing again and again if needed) 
 
Decision 1: How much of your 10 birr do you want to contribute to the public bag?  
 
Answer:_________________________________________________________ 
 
Decision 2: Now I will ask you how much you would like to contribute to the public 
bag after telling you how much the other three contribute. 
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(For each row below, ask: “If your group members contribute x birr on average to the 
public bag, how much would you like to contribute to this bag?” Repeat each question.) 
 
Average contribution of 
other group members 
(explain average 
carefully) 
Your contribution 
(write answer) 
0 birr  
1 birr  
2 birr  
3 birr  
4 birr  
5 birr  
6 birr  
7 birr  
8 birr  
9 birr  
10 birr  
 
 
Part 2 
 
The basic decision situation in part 2 is the same as in part 1. Again you will be matched 
in groups of four people. The members of your group will, however, be different in part 
2 from your group members in part 1. 
 
Again, you have an endowment of 10 birr. You can put these in a private bag or the 
public bag. Each of the four group members has to make two types of decisions as 
before.  
 
In the first decision, you will decide how many birr you want to put in the public bag. 
This time, you are required to make a minimum contribution of 2 birr. Each 
member in your group has to contribute at least 2 birr, and everyone knows this.  
 
Your payment will be determined in the same way as in the previous part of the 
experiment. 
 
You will therefore have to think carefully about both decisions, since either one of them 
can become relevant for you. 
 
Decision 1: How much of your 10 birr do you want to contribute to the public bag? You 
must contribute at least 2 birr?  
 
Answer:_________________________________________________________ 
 
Decision 2: Now I will ask you how much you would like to contribute to the public 
bag after telling you how much the other three group members contribute on average. 
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(For each row below, ask: “If your group members contribute x birr on average to the 
public bag, how much would you like to contribute to the public bag?” Repeat each 
question) 
 
Average contribution of 
other group members 
(explain average 
carefully) 
Your contribution 
(write answer) 
2 birr  
3 birr  
4 birr  
5 birr  
6 birr  
7 birr  
8 birr  
9 birr  
10 birr  
 
Now we are done with the decisions. I would like to ask you some additional questions. 
 
1) Think back to the first part of the experiment where you could give anything 
from 0 to 10 birr.  
a. Please guess how many birr the other three group members have 
contributed to the public bag in total. Remember that the total 
contribution put in the public bag by the other three members can be 
anything from 0 and 30 birr. If you guess the correct amount, you will 
get 10 birr. So, how many birr do you think the other three group 
members have given to the public bag in total? 
 
Answer: _________________ birr  
 
b. Each member in your group has been asked the same guessing question 
you just answered. What do you think the other three people guessed? 
Please estimate the sum of the amounts that the other three group 
members guessed. The sum of the amounts guessed by the other three 
group members can be anything from 0 to 90 birr. If you guess the 
correct amount, you will get 10 birr.  
 
Answer:___________________ birr 
 
2) Think back to the second part of the experiment where you decided how much 
of the 10 birr to contribute, with a 2 birr minimum.  
a. Please guess how many birr the other three group members have 
contributed to the public bag in total. Remember that the total amount 
put in the public bag by the other three group members can be anything 
from 6 to 30 birr. If you guess the correct amount, you will get 10 birr. 
So, how many birr do you think the other three group members have 
given to the public bag in total? 
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Answer: _________________ birr  
 
b. Each member in your group has been asked the same guessing question 
that you just answered. What do you think the other three people 
guessed? Please estimate the sum of the amounts that the other three 
group members guessed about the contribution of you and the other two 
group members. The sum of the amounts guessed by the other three 
group members can be anything from 18 to 90 birr. If you guess the 
correct amount, you will get 10 birr.  
 
Answer:___________________ birr 
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Appendix B: Instructions for the TAKE treatment 
You will now take part in another decision making experiment in which you can earn 
real money. The experiment consists of two parts. The two parts are completely 
independent of each other. This means that decisions that you and others make in part 1 
have no impact on part 2. After completion of part 1, we will explain part 2.  The 
experiment is designed so that your earnings will depend on your decisions and on the 
decisions of other people who make a similar decision.  
 
You will be a member of a group of four household heads in this village. This means 
there are three other household heads in your group. We selected your group partners 
randomly, and you will not know who they are. Neither will the other household heads 
in your group know who you are. Your group partners will be asked to make exactly the 
same decision as you. Your earnings will be paid in cash on (insert date).  
 
(Repeat) 
 
I will now explain the decision you and each member of your group have to make. 
Remember that you will earn money based on your decisions. There is no right or 
wrong decision. You can decide whatever you want.  
 
You and the other three people in your group have to decide what to do with a sum of 
money that we have put in a public bag. There is 40 birr in the public bag. Each one of 
you can withdraw up to one-fourth or 10 birr from the public bag. Each person will only 
know how much he or she withdraws and not how much other group members 
withdraw. This means the other three people in your group will not know how much 
you choose to withdraw from the public bag. Remember that the maximum allowed for 
each person is 10 birr.  
 
After everyone in your group has decided how much to withdraw from the public bag, 
we will count what is left and double it. This amount will then be distributed equally 
among you and your group members regardless of how much everyone withdrew from 
the public bag. For example, if the sum of what is left in the public bag is 16 birr, we 
will add another 16 birr to make it 32 birr. Then each one of you will earn 8 birr from 
the public bag (show with money).  
 
So, the total money you will earn from this experiment is what you initially withdraw 
from the public bag plus what you get after the remaining sum is doubled and shared 
equally.  
 
(Repeat). 
 
Please note that you can decide to withdraw whatever you want from the public bag. 
The same applies to the other three household heads in your group. They will not know 
how much you withdraw from the public bag before they decide. And you will not 
know how much they withdraw from the public bag before you decide. But they too 
know that whatever remains in the public bag will be doubled by us and shared equally, 
regardless of the amount that each member withdrew from the public bag.  
 
(Repeat) 
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Now I will ask you some questions to make sure you have understood the decision you 
will make and how payments are determined.  
 
1. Assume that all group members (including you) withdraw 10 birr from the 
public bag. 
a. How much will you earn? _____________ 
b. How much will the other people in your group earn each? __________ 
 
2. Assume that all group members (including you) withdraw 0 birr from the public 
bag.  
a. How much will you earn? _____________ 
 
3. Assume that one of the other members in your group withdraws 5 birr from the 
public bag, another withdraws 3 birr, and the third withdraws 8 birr. This means 
your group members withdraw a total of 16 birr.  
a. What is the total you will earn if you withdraw 0 birr from the public 
bag? _____________ 
b. What is the total you will earn if you withdraw 4 birr from the public 
bag? _____________ 
c. What is the total you will earn if you withdraw 10 birr from the public 
bag? _____________ 
 
Do you have any questions about how payments are calculated? Please ask me if 
anything is unclear.  
 
You will make two types of decisions.  
 
First, you will choose how much you want to withdraw from the public bag without 
knowing what the other three people in your group will decide. Remember that they 
have to make exactly the same decision as you. Second, I will ask you how much you 
want to withdraw from the public bag for each possible average withdrawal by the other 
group members (rounded to the next integer). Your withdrawal decision will therefore 
depend on how much other group members withdraw. This will become clear to you 
when you see the withdrawal table (show table). If, for example, the other three group 
members have withdrawn 0 birr each from the public bag, how much do you want to 
withdraw? If the others on average have withdrawn 1 birr from the public bag, how 
much do you want to withdraw? (demonstrate) 
 
Average withdrawal by 
other group members 
(explain average 
carefully) 
Your withdrawal 
(write answer) 
0 birr  
1 birr  
2 birr  
3 birr  
4 birr  
5 birr  
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6 birr  
7 birr  
8 birr  
9 birr  
10 birr  
 
After all group members in the experiment have made all decisions, one member of the 
group will be selected randomly by the supervisor. For this randomly determined group 
member, only the second decision will be relevant. For the three group members who 
are not selected by the random mechanism, the first decision will be the relevant 
decision. When you make your two decisions, you will not know whether you will be 
randomly selected. You will therefore have to think carefully about both decisions, 
since either one of them can become relevant for you. 
 
Your payment will either depend on the first or the second decision, and this will be 
determined by a lottery. First we will draw a lottery to select on person from your 
group. This person will be paid based on the second decision, while the other three will 
be paid based on their first decision. Thus, three people in your group will be paid based 
on how much they withdraw without knowing what the other group members have 
withdrawn. The first decisions of these three people will be used to calculate the 
average of their withdrawal. For the fourth individual, the second decision will then be 
used to determine how much he/she will be paid. For example, if the others on average 
have withdrawn 4 birr, then the fourth person’s withdrawal will be…. (point table), 
while if the others on average have withdrawn 8 birr, then the withdrawal by the fourth 
individual will be (point table). Because it is a lottery, you could end up being the 
person who is paid based on the first decision or second decision. You will therefore 
have to think carefully about each decision you make. 
 
(Repeat) 
 
Please note that you can decide to withdraw whatever amount you want from the public 
bag. The same applies to the other three household heads in your group. They will not 
know how much you withdraw from the public bag before they decide, and you will not 
know how much they withdraw from the public bag before you decide. But they too 
know that whatever is left in the public bag will be doubled by us and shared equally, 
regardless of the amount that each member withdrew from the public bag.  
 
(Make sure the person has understood the game before recording decisions. Repeat 
the whole thing again and again if needed) 
 
Decision 1: How much do you want to withdraw from the public bag?  
 
Answer:_________________________________________________________ 
 
Decision 2: Now I will ask you how much you would like to withdraw from the public 
bag after telling you how much the other three have withdrawn on average. 
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(For each row below, ask: “If your group members withdraw x birr on average from 
the public bag, how much would you like to withdraw from this bag?” Repeat each 
question) 
 
Average withdrawn by 
other group members 
(explain average 
carefully) 
Your withdrawal 
(write answer) 
0 birr  
1 birr  
2 birr  
3 birr  
4 birr  
5 birr  
6 birr  
7 birr  
8 birr  
9 birr  
10 birr  
 
 
Part 2 
 
The basic decision situation in part 2 is the same as in part 1. Again you will be matched 
in groups of four people. The members of your group will, however, not be the same as 
in part 1. 
 
Each of the four group members, including you, has to make two types of decisions as 
before.  
In the first decision, you will decide how much you want to withdraw from the public 
bag, which has 40 birr in it. This time, you are required to withdraw a maximum of 
8 birr, or leave at least 2 birr in the public bag. Each group member has to leave at 
least 2 birr in the public bag.  
 
Your payment will be determined in the same way as in the previous part of the 
experiment. 
 
You will therefore have to think carefully about both decisions, since either one of them 
can become relevant for you. 
 
Decision 1: How much do want to withdraw from the bag, given that you have to leave 
at least 2 birr?  
 
Answer:_________________________________________________________ 
 
Decision 2: Now I will ask you how much you would like to withdraw from the public 
bag after telling you how much the other three withdraw on average. 
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(For each row below, ask: “If your group members withdraw x birr on average from 
the public bag, how much would you like to withdraw from the public bag?” Repeat 
each question) 
 
Average withdrawal by 
other group members 
(explain average 
carefully) 
Your withdrawal 
(write answer) 
0 birr  
1 birr  
2 birr  
3 birr  
4 birr  
5 birr  
6 birr  
7 birr  
8 birr  
 
Now we are done with the decisions. I would like to ask you some additional questions. 
 
1. Think back to the first part of the experiment where you could withdraw any 
amount from 0 to 10 birr from the public bag.  
a. Please guess how many birr the other three group members have 
withdrawn from the public bag in total. Remember that the total they can 
withdraw from the public bag can be anything from 0 to 30 birr. If you 
guess the correct amount, you will get 10 birr. So, how many birr do you 
think the other three group members have withdrawn from the public bag 
in total? 
 
Answer: _________________ birr  
 
b. Each member in your group has been asked the same guessing question 
that you just answered. What do you think the other three people 
guessed? Please estimate the sum of the amounts that the other three 
group members guessed. The sum of the other three group members’ 
guessed amounts can be anything from 0 to 90 birr. If you guess the 
correct amount, you will get 10 birr.  
 
Answer:___________________ birr 
 
2. Think back to the second part of the experiment where you could withdraw from 
the public bag but had to leave at least 2 birr from the maximum 10 birr you 
could have withdrawn.  
a. Please guess how many birr the other three group members have 
withdrawn from the public bag in total. Remember that the total amount 
they can withdraw from the public bag can be anything from 0 to 24 birr. 
If you guess the correct amount, you will get 10 birr. So, how many birr 
do you think the other three group members have withdrawn from the 
public bag in total? 
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Answer: _________________ birr  
 
b. Each member in your group has been asked the same guessing question 
that you just answered. What do you think the other three people 
guessed? Please estimate the sum of the amounts that the other three 
group members guessed about the withdrawal by you and the other two 
group members. The sum of the other three group members’ guessed 
amounts can be anything from 0 to 72 birr. If you guess the correct 
amount, you will get 10 birr.  
 
Answer:___________________ birr 
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of subjects (household heads) separated by treatment. 
 GIVE TAKE H0: No difference 
between GIVE and 
TAKE (p-value*) 
 
Age 49.0  46.0  0.03  
Male 87.2% 90% 0.40  
Can read and write 51.1% 50.6% 0.92  
Farming is main 
activity 
91% 91% 0.86  
Trust Kebele 2.51  2.46  0.56  
Off-farm labor 23% 28.3% 0.23  
Household size 7.0  6.8  0.40  
Parcel size (acres) 4.56  4.17  0.38  
Has savings 19.4% 23.3% 0.37  
Remittances 7.8% 10.6% 0.36  
Observations 180 180   
Note: *Mann-Whitney U test. Trust Kebele: Kebele is the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia and the 
question is phrased, “Most people who live in your Kebele can be trusted” (1 = agree fully, 5 = disagree 
fully); Off-farm labor: at least one household member worked off the farm at least once during last year; 
Parcel size: the size of the household’s land used for own cultivation; Remittances: the household 
received a remittance during last year. 
 
Table 2. Effect of framing on unconditional contributions in the baseline. 
 Average Contributes 
nothing 
Contributes 
everything 
GIVE (n = 180) 5.02 (2.15) 2.2% 7.8% 
TAKE (n = 180) 4.00 (2.44) 19.4% 1.1% 
p-value < 0.01a < 0.01b < 0.01b 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. n = number of subjects. a Mann-Whitney U test. b Kruskal-
Wallis test. 
 
Table 3. Effect of a minimum level on unconditional contributions (separated by 
treatment). 
 Baseline MCL Difference p-value 
GIVE (n = 180) 5.02 (2.15) 4.46 (1.98) -0.56 < 0.01b 
TAKE (n = 177) 4.03 (2.44) 4.74 (2.06) +0.71 < 0.01b 
p-value < 0.01a 0.08a < 0.01a  
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. n = number of subjects. a Mann-Whitney U test. b Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test (H0: Difference = 0). Three subjects in the TAKE treatment report unfeasible 
contributions in MCL and we thus exclude them from the analysis. 
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Table 4. Disaggregation of the effect on unconditional contributions. 
Contribution 
profile GIVE  TAKE 
        
(Baseline, MCL) Share of 
subjects 
Baseline 
contr. 
MCL 
contr. 
 Share of 
subjects 
Baseline 
contr. 
MCL 
contr. 
(<2, =2) (2%) 0.33 2.00  (12%) 0.14 2.00 
(<2, >2) (2%) 0.50 3.75  (10%) 0.06 5.71 
        
(=2, =2) (4%) 2.00 2.00  (2%) 2.00 2.00 
(=2, >2) (3%) 2.00 4.50  (2%) 2.00 6.00 
        
(>2, =2) (8%) 4.90 2.00  (10%) 5.82 2.00 
(>2, >2) (81%) 5.60 4.90  (64%) 5.21 5.56 
Note: The share-of-subjects columns show the frequency of subjects who contributed according to the 
profile described in column one. The cells show the average contribution to the public good in the 
baseline and in MCL among subjects who behave according to this pattern, for GIVE and TAKE, 
respectively. 
 
Table 5. Effect of framing and minimum level on cooperative preferences (OLS 
regression). 
Dependent variable: 
conditional contribution 
Baseline 
(1) 
MCL 
(2) 
Full sample 
(3) 
Constant 2.68 (0.16)*** 2.45 (0.15)*** 2.70 (0.17)*** 
Others 0.52 (0.03)*** 0.58 (0.03)*** 0.53 (0.03)*** 
TAKE -1.01 (0.25)*** -0.30 (0.24) -1.02 (0.26)*** 
TAKE × Others 0.06 (0.04)*** -0.03 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) 
MCL   -0.26 (0.16) 
MCL × Others   0.05 (0.02)** 
TAKE ×MCL   0.74 (0.22)*** 
TAKE ×MCL × Others   -0.09 (0.03)** 
Observations 3916 3096 6800 
- Clusters 356 344 340 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on individuals (in brackets). Others is the average contribution of 
the others in the group. TAKE is a treatment dummy and MCL is a dummy for the second stage public 
goods game (when the minimum level is imposed). The dependent variable is individual i’s conditional 
contribution. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance 
at the 10% level. Four subjects either did not fill out the contribution table or reported unfeasible 
contributions in the baseline and these subjects are excluded from the analysis in (1). A further sixteen 
subjects made a similar mistake after the introduction of the minimum level and thus sixteen and twenty 
subjects are excluded from the analysis in (2) and (3), respectively. 
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Table 6. Distribution of contribution types in GIVE (n = 168). 
           MCL  Min-level    
 
Baseline 
 Conditional 
cooperators 
(“free riders”) 
(=2) Hump-shaped Others Total 
 Conditional 
cooperators 
56.55% 1.19% 0.00% 9.52% 67.26% 
 Free riders 
(=0) 
0.00% 0.60% 0.00% 0.00% 0.60% 
 Hump-
shaped 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.19% 1.19% 
 Others 0.60% 0.60% 1.79% 19.05% 30.95% 
 Total 66.07% 2.38% 1.79% 29.76% 100% 
Note: Type definition follows Fischbacher et al. (2001). Conditional cooperators: increasing schedule or 
positive Spearman’s rho (correlation with others’ average contribution) at 1%; Free riders: contribute the 
lowest amount allowed; Hump-shaped: positive (negative) Spearman correlation at 1% up to (beyond) 
their highest contribution. Twelve subjects in this treatment report unfeasible conditional contributions 
after the introduction of the minimum level and are therefore excluded from the analysis. 
 
Table 7. Distribution of contribution types in TAKE (n = 172). 
           MCL  Min-level    
 
Baseline 
 Conditional 
cooperators 
(“free riders”) 
(=2) Hump-shaped Others Total 
 Conditional 
cooperators 
47.09% 0.00% 0.00% 13.37% 60.47% 
 Free riders 
(=0) 
1.16% 1.74% 0.00% 0.00% 2.91% 
 Hump-
shaped 
1.74% 0.00% 0.00% 2.33% 4.07% 
 Others 5.23% 0.58% 1.16% 25.58% 32.56% 
 Total 55.23% 2.33% 1.16% 41.28% 100% 
Note: Type definition follows Fischbacher et al. (2001). Conditional cooperators: increasing schedule or 
positive Spearman’s rho (correlation with others’ average contribution) at 1%; Free riders: contribute the 
lowest amount allowed; Hump-shaped: positive (negative) Spearman correlation at 1% up to (beyond) 
their highest contribution. Eight subjects in this treatment report unfeasible conditional contributions after 
the introduction of the minimum level and are therefore excluded from the analysis. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Average conditional contributions in the baseline (separated by treatment). 
 
Note: One subject in the GIVE treatment and three subjects in the TAKE treatment either did not 
complete the contribution table or reported unfeasible numbers. These four subjects are excluded from the 
analysis. 
 
Figure 2. Average conditional contributions in GIVE (n = 168). 
 
Note: Twelve subjects in this treatment reported unfeasible conditional contributions after the 
introduction of the minimum level and are therefore excluded from the analysis.  
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Figure 3. Average conditional contributions in TAKE (n = 172). 
 
Note: Eight subjects in this treatment reported unfeasible conditional contributions after the introduction 
of the minimum level and are therefore excluded from the analysis. 
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Abstract
Anger can be a strong behavioral force, with important consequences for human
interaction. For example, angry individuals may become hostile in their dealings
with others, and this has strategic consequences. Battigalli, Dufwenberg, and Smith
(2015; BDS) develop a formal framework where frustration and anger affect inter-
action and shape economic outcomes. This paper designs an experiment testing
the predictions based on central concepts of their theory. The focus is on situations
where other-responsibility is weak or nonexistent, and in this specific context I find
only limited support for the theory: While unfulfilled expectations about mate-
rial payoffs seem to generate negative emotions in subjects, which is in line with
BDS’ conceptualization of frustration, behavior is generally not affected by these
emotions to the extent predicted by the theory.
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1 Introduction
Anger can be a strong behavioral force, with important consequences for human interac-
tion. For example, angry individuals may become hostile in their dealings with others,
which could shape interaction and outcomes in, for example, situations involving negoti-
ation and bargaining, contractual holdup, delegated decision making, conflict, and social
dilemmas.1
Although it seems important to understand the sources of anger, as well as its conse-
quences for strategic interaction, this topic has received relatively little attention in the
development of behavioral theory.2 Battigalli, Dufwenberg, and Smith (2015; henceforth,
BDS) contribute to fill this gap in the literature by developing a theory where frustration
and anger affect interaction and outcomes, using the framework of psychological game
theory (Geanakoplos et al., 1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009). The objective of
my paper is to investigate the empirical relevance of BDS, and to this end I design an
experiment that tests the predictions based on central concepts of their theory. This
constitutes the first empirical test of BDS.
In BDS, anger is anchored in frustration, which is the result of unfulfilled expectations
about material payoffs.3 Frustration sometimes makes players hostile toward their co-
players. When frustrated, a player may go after other players, but his desire to do
so depends on his evaluation of the other players’ part in the outcome that frustrates
him. BDS develop three different versions of how this evaluation process shapes the
actions of frustrated players: With simple anger, frustrated players are angry with anyone,
regardless of the source of frustration; with anger from blaming behavior, players are
targeted only if they caused frustration; and with anger from blaming intentions, players
are targeted only if they intended to cause frustration.
With this paper I develop empirical tests for two key features of the theory: sim-
ple anger and anger from blaming behavior. Simple anger (BDS’ first anger hypothesis)
formalizes a version of the classical Dollard et al. frustration-aggression-displacement hy-
pothesis, where aggression through a displacement effect is directed at substitute targets
(Dollard et al., 1939; Berkowitz, 1989). Such displaced aggression could be relevant when
the source of frustration is intangible, as in the case of an unexpected loss suffered by
a local soccer team, which has been associated with substantial increases in domestic
violence and violent crime (Card and Dahl, 2011; Munyo and Rossi, 2013). Dramatic
1For empirical accounts of negative emotions and anger in similar situations, see e.g., Pillutla and
Murnighan (1996), Sanfey et al. (2003), Bosman and van Winden (2002), Bolle et al. (2014), Hopfensitz
and Reuben (2009), and Drouvelis and Grosskopf (2014).
2This is especially true for the analysis of immediate (as opposed to anticipated) emotions, which
focuses on the “action tendency” of emotions experienced by the decision maker (e.g., Elster, 1998;
Loewenstein, 2000).
3This is based on the notion of frustration as an obstruction to reaching a desired outcome, which is
a common conceptualization in psychology; see, e.g., BDS or Potegal and Stemmler (2010) for details
and discussion.
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changes in weather and climate could have a similar effect, for instance through strong
and correlated income shocks as a source of frustration and anger.4 With anger from
blaming behavior (BDS’ second anger hypothesis), frustrated individuals are angry with
those who caused frustration through their behavior. Vis-a`-vis simple anger, a key in-
gredient for anger from blaming behavior is the importance of blame attribution and
other-responsibility;5 and vis-a`-vis anger from blaming intentions, anger from blaming
behavior is more relevant if people focus more on what they can observe (and expect to
observe) rather than on intentions, which in many situations are more difficult to discern.
BDS create a rich framework for theoretical analysis. It is, however, quite challenging
to develop convincing empirical tests of the theory, partly because people’s behavior
is shaped both by the emotions they experience themselves and by their anticipation
of others’ behavior due to the emotions they might experience (it is a psychological
game where subjects have belief-dependent utility functions), and partly also because
the different versions of the theory may predict similar behavioral patterns in a given
situation of interest. Therefore, the empirical strategy in the present paper is to lift up,
focus on, and compare key features of the theory in a condensed and specific setting, as
simply as possible. The experimental treatments are built around the following situation:
A player who had a good chance to earn 100 Swedish kronor (about 12 US dollars at the
time of writing) finds himself with only 10 kronor. Is he frustrated? Theory suggests
he might be, since he has been obstructed from reaching a desired outcome. Would he
punish a passive co-player, who had no chance at all to prevent the misfortune? Simple
anger suggests he might. Would he punish an active co-player, who made a “bad” choice
in a binary lottery and thereby caused the misfortune? Anger from blaming behavior
suggests he might.
I develop specific empirical tests for simple anger and anger from blaming behavior.
The tests are quite extreme in that they focus on relatively unsophisticated behavior,
such as Pareto-damaging punishment of passive co-players. Theoretically, simple anger
is widely applicable to situations involving sophisticated strategic interaction, but the
conceptual basis is quite rudimentary: I hit my head on the kitchen shelf and therefore
I punish you; I hit my thumb with a hammer and therefore I punish you; or you bring
me bad news and therefore I punish you (Frijda, 1993). Focusing on this aspect seems
natural for a first empirical test of the theory. Moreover, while anger from blaming
behavior admits more sophisticated reasoning (about co-players’ blameworthiness), it
too can be quite rudimentary. For example, it admits punishment for mistakes or bad
luck. Gurdal et al. (2013) document behavior that is consistent with this aspect of anger
from blaming behavior. In their experiment, an agent invests money on behalf of a
4See, e.g., Burke et al. (2015) and Ranson (2014) for a discussion and empirical evidence on climate
and interpersonal violence.
5See, e.g., Averill (1983), Smith and Ellsworth (1985), and Wranik and Scherer (2010) for a discussion
on the role of blame attribution in anger.
3
principal. The agent chooses between a safe and a risky prospect, and the principal
subsequently decides on remuneration for the agent and a dummy player. Interestingly
and in line with anger from blaming behavior, Gurdal et al. find that agents are paid less
(relative to the dummy player) following bad realizations of the risky prospect, i.e., they
are punished for bad uncontrollable luck.6 Building on these insights, I specifically test
whether aspects of blame, frustration, and punishment in BDS are relevant in situations
where other-responsibly is weak or nonexistent. The focus of the paper is thus on emotion
and behavior at one end of a spectrum, where there is complete payoff symmetry between
players (i.e., no economic inequality) and where frustration is caused by chance moves or
bad luck rather than harmful actions with blameworthy intent.
Results from the experiment indicate that unfulfilled expectations about material pay-
offs generate negative emotions in subjects, which is in line with BDS’ conceptualization
of frustration. However, these negative emotions do not generally affect subjects’ behav-
ior to the extent predicted by the theory. The experiment focuses on situations where
other-responsibility is weak or nonexistent, and in this specific context I do not find much
support for the simple anger hypothesis or the anger from blaming behavior hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes relevant aspects of
BDS’ theory and illustrates the concepts of simple anger and anger from blaming behavior
using two examples. Section 3 describes and motivates the experimental design, which is
based on operationalized versions of these two examples, and derives hypotheses for the
experiment. The results are presented in Section 4, and in the final section I discuss the
findings and conclude the paper.
2 Frustration and anger
This section describes BDS’ theory (short version) using two examples to illustrate the
concepts of simple anger (Section 2.1) and anger from blaming behavior (Section 2.2).
Later on, these examples will be operationalized and implemented as the two main treat-
ments in the experiment (Section 3).
There are two players and two stages. Actions are represented by a sequence (at)t=1,2,
where at = (ati, a
t
j) and i 6= j. For instance, a1 represents the actions taken in the first
stage such that h = a1 is a history of length one, and a2i represents player i’s action in the
second stage. Conditional on a history of actions, i’s belief about his own action (which
6On punishment for mistakes or bad luck, see also Cushman et al. (2009), Gino et al. (2010), and
Bartling and Fischbacher (2012); but cf. Rand et al. (2015). Furthermore, Mollerstrom et al. (2015) and
Cappelen et al. (2015) find that irrelevant or forced decisions affect how third-party spectators are willing
to compensate people for bad luck. In particular, Cappelen et al. (2015) implement an experiment where
subjects are allocated money based on a procedure that is very similar to the one used in the present
paper, and they find strong effects on redistribution decisions ex post. There is also a related literature
on “outcome bias,” which examines how negative uncontrollable outcomes affect how other persons are
evaluated (e.g., Baron and Hershey, 1988; Tan and Lipe, 1997).
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is interpreted as his plan) and i’s belief about j’s action are given by αi. The material
end-game payoff for i depends on actions taken during the course of the game (a1 and
a2) and is denoted pii.
Anger is anchored in frustration, which is a key aspect of the theory. It is the result
of unfulfilled expectations, i.e., when the best attainable outcome falls short of a per-
son’s expectation ex ante (which means that he was obstructed from reaching a desired
outcome). At t = 2, i’s frustration is given by
Fi(a
1;αi) =
[
E [pii;αi]−max
a2i
E
[
pii | (a1, a2i );αi
]]+
, (1)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}. That is, it is the difference between the end-game payoff i
expected at t = 1 (first term) and the maximal end-game payoff i realizes that he can
secure for himself at t = 2 (second term). Frustration is thus the result of unexpected
bad outcomes beyond i’s control.
Frustration sometimes makes players hostile toward their co-player. When i is frus-
trated, he may go after j, but his desire to do so depends on his evaluation of j’s part in
the outcome that frustrates him. BDS develop three different versions of how this eval-
uation process shapes the actions of frustrated players: With simple anger (SA), player
i is angry with j regardless of the source of frustration; in contrast, with anger from
blaming behavior (ABB), player j will be targeted only if he caused i’s frustration, and
with anger from blaming intentions (ABI), player j will be targeted only if his intention
was to frustrate i. The behavior of player i moving at history h is determined by the
following general utility function:
Ui(h, ai;αi) = E [pii | (h, ai);αi]− θiBij(h;αi)E [pij | (h, ai);αi] , (2)
where θi ≥ 0 is a sensitivity parameter. When i is frustrated and under the impression
it is j’s fault (which is governed by the blame function Bij ∈ [0, Fi]), he will consider
forgoing own material payoff (pii) in order to reduce j’s payoff (pij). The formula in (2)
thus implements punishment as the action tendency of frustration. The three versions
of anger are separated by the blame function Bij(h;αi), which determines what amount
of frustration i attributes to j, i.e., to what extent i blames j for his frustration. This
function is always less than or equal to i’s frustration, Fi(h;αi).
For simple anger, blame always equals frustration:
BSAij (h;αi) = Fi(h;αi). (3)
For anger from blaming behavior, i’s blame of j depends on j’s behavior. BDS
consider two different functional forms of the blame function for anger from blaming
5
behavior: With could-have-been blame, player i considers what “could have been” (at
most) had j chosen a different action, and with blaming unexpected deviations, player i
considers instead the material payoff he would have obtained had j behaved as i expected
him to. The blame function for the former, could-have-been blame, is:
BABBij (h;αi) = min
{[
max
h′≺h,a′j∈Aj(h′)
E
[
pii | (h′, a′j);αi
]− E [pii | h;αi]]+ , Fi(h;αi)} , (4)
thus capturing the difference between the maximal expected payoff j could have given i
through his action a′j (choosing from all possible actions Aj) at history h
′ (which precedes
h) and the payoff that i currently (at h) expects to secure for himself at the end of the
game. Turning to the latter functional form of the blame function for anger from blaming
behavior, blaming unexpected deviations, the blame function is instead:
BABBij (h;αi) = min

 ∑
h′≺h,a′j∈Aj(h′)
αij(a
′
j)E
[
pii | (h′, a′j);αi
]− E [pii | h;αi]
+ , Fi(h;αi)
 ,
(5)
such that i considers his expected payoff had j behaved as i expected (aij(a
′
j) is the
marginal probability with which i thinks that j chooses action a′j), and compares it with
his current expected payoff (second term).7
2.1 A game with a correlated income shock
BDS illustrate the difference between blame modulated through simple anger and anger
from blaming behavior (and anger from blaming intentions) with an example (Figure 1).
A carpenter (Andy) and his co-worker (passive player Bob) are at work. On a good
day (G), they both earn a high wage of 2 and thus everything is fine. However, on the
occasional bad day (B) Andy accidentally hits his thumb with a hammer. He becomes
frustrated and may turn on his co-worker Bob (T ) even though he did not cause the
upset, or, alternatively, he accepts things as they are (N) and they can move on with
their production. Chance determines whether B or G prevails, with probability p and
(1− p), respectively.
The bad day thus comes with a correlated income shock, which frustrates Andy if
the maximal payoff at t = 2 (which is 1) is less than the payoff Andy expected at t = 1.
Frustration thus depends on p and on Andy’s belief at t = 1 about his own action in the
event of B, i.e., how he plans to react when frustrated due to B. In formal terms, Andy
7With BDS’ third version of blame, anger from blaming intentions, i takes j’s intentions to frustrate
i into account: he compares the material payoff resulting from j’s action with the material payoff he
thinks that j thought would result from his action (blame thus depends on i’s belief about j’s belief
about i’s action). I don’t test this aspect of BDS’ theory and thus the interested reader is referred to
BDS for formal treatment and further discussion.
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B (p)G (1− p)
2, 2
c
T
0, 0
N
1, 1
a
Figure 1: The simple anger game (“Hammering one’s thumb”)
initially expected to earn a material payoff of E [pia;αa] = 2(1 − p) + αa(N |B)p, where
αa(N |B) ∈ [0, 1] is Andy’s plan for the bad day B, i.e., the probability with which he
expects to choose N should B occur. On the bad day B, the maximal payoff Andy can
secure for himself (by choosing a2a = N) is 1. Thus, using (1), his frustration at t = 2 is
given by:
Fa(B;αa) = 2(1− p) + αa(N |B)p− 1 (6)
and it is increasing in αa(N |B) and also in −p, since this increases the payoff Andy
initially expects.
With simple anger, Andy might punish Bob for the frustrating outcome B. This
is Pareto damaging in terms of material payoffs but still preferable to Andy if he is
sufficiently “prone to anger” (which is determined by the sensitivity parameter θa in the
utility function). Using (2), Andy’s utility from N is 1− θa [2(1− p) + αa(N |B)p− 1] · 1,
and his utility from T is 0. Thus, Andy will punish Bob (by choosing T ) if θa is sufficiently
large, since then Ua(T ) ≥ Ua(N). In contrast, neither with anger from blaming behavior
nor with anger from blaming intentions does Andy blame Bob for B (so Bab = 0), because
Bob had no possibility to affect the outcome in the game. Hence, Andy will not punish
Bob under these two versions of the theory.
2.1.1 Equilibrium
BDS employ the notion of sequential equilibrium (SE) adapted to psychological games
by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009).8 The SE concept requires that action profiles are
sequentially rational, such that no gains can be made by deviating from planned actions,
and that beliefs are correct. In the game between Andy and Bob above, there are three
8They explore a second solution concept, “polymorphic sequential equilibrium,” in order to develop
a different conceptualization of players’ intentions. A discussion of this concept is therefore beyond the
scope of this paper.
7
types of equilibria when frustration is modulated through simple anger (and p < 1/2):9
(i) If θa is large enough, Andy cares a lot about frustration and thus he will punish
Bob after B (a2a = T ). There is an SE with αa(N |B) = 0 and Ua(B, T ;αa) ≥
Ua(B,N ;αa), such that θa ≥ 11−2p .
(ii) If θa is small enough, Andy does not care much about frustration and thus he
will not punish Bob after B (a2a = N). There is an SE with αa(N |B) = 1 and
Ua(B, T ;αa) ≤ Ua(B,N ;αa), such that θa ≤ 11−p .
(iii) For a small intermediate interval of θa, Andy’s belief that he will punish Bob after
B is increasing in θa (i.e, in the extent to which he cares about frustration). There
is an SE with αa(N |B) = 1pθa −
1−2p
p
and Ua(B, T ;αa) = Ua(B,N ;αa), such that
θa ∈ ( 11−p , 11−2p).
2.2 A game with a correlated income shock and some blame
In order to bring anger from blaming behavior into play and make it comparable with
simple anger, consider the following modification of the simple anger game displayed in
Figure 1: Chance moves L or R with probability (1−p) and p, respectively, and thereafter
Bob chooses between l and r without having observed the chance move. Bob’s choice
leads to states identical to B and G in the simple anger game, but whether l or r is the
“good” choice that leads to G depends on chance: l leads to G and r to B after L, and
vice versa after R. The game is displayed in Figure 2.
R (p)L (1− p)
c
rl
2, 2
r
2, 2
l
b
T
0, 0
N
1, 1
a
T
0, 0
N
1, 1
a
Figure 2: The blame-behavior game
For ease of comparison with the simple anger game, we restrict attention to situations
where p < 1/2. Andy’s frustration depends on his belief (at the root of the game)
9We consider p < 1/2 since it may generate frustration. (When p ≥ 1/2, Andy will not be frustrated
after B and thus he will always choose N in this case.)
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about Bob’s plan, and we let αa(l) denote the probability with which Andy expects
Bob to choose l. If αa(l) = 1, Andy expects l with certainty and his plan for the bad
day B is given by αa(N |(R, l)), i.e., the probability with which he expects to choose N
in the event of B. Andy’s frustration on the bad day is thus given by Fa((R, l);αa) =
2(1−p)+αa(N |(R, l))p−1 and it is similar to frustration in the simple anger game, given
by (6) above. The equation says that if Andy expects l with certainty, his frustration
after B is increasing in the probability of L, i.e. the probability with which l leads to the
good day G since this increases his ex-ante expected payoff. With simple anger, there are
then equilibria where αa(l) = 1 and, as in the simple anger game above, (i) Andy with
θa ≥ 11−2p punishes Bob after B, (ii) Andy with θa ≤ 11−p does not punish Bob after B,
and (iii) Andy with θa ∈ ( 11−p , 11−2p) is indifferent between punishing and not punishing
Bob after B.10
Bob moves before Andy and this opens for the possibility of Andy blaming and punish-
ing Bob in accordance with anger from blaming behavior. With could-have-been blame
(first version of anger from blaming behavior), predictions coincide with simple anger
predictions. The reason is that Andy blames Bob for frustrating him, since whenever the
bad day occurs it would have been avoided had Bob chosen differently. For example, if
the bad day is due to (R, l), it would have been avoided had Bob chosen r instead of l.
Even though Bob from an ex-ante perspective could not prevent the income shock (be-
yond choosing the action that maximizes their chance of the good day G, which is l when
p < 1/2), by (4) Andy fully blames Bob for his frustration. In contrast, with blaming un-
expected deviations (second version of anger from blaming behavior), by (5) Andy would
not blame Bob and therefore not punish him after (R, l) if l is what he expected at the
root of the game, and vice versa for (L, r) if r is what he initially expected.11 This illus-
trates the difference between could-have-been blame and blaming unexpected deviations,
since only with the former is there an SE where Bob is punished in the blame-behavior
game.
In general, Andy is as frustrated on the bad day in the simple anger game (Figure 1)
as in the blame-behavior game (Figure 2). Since Bob is always blamed for the bad day in
the latter game using could-have-been blame, comparing across games we have exogenous
variation in the extent to which Bob can be blamed for a given level of frustration. Simple
anger is relevant in both games but anger from blaming behavior is relevant in only one
of them, and this constitutes the basic idea for the empirical strategy used in the present
paper.
10For Bob, l is optimal when p < 1/2 since it maximizes the chance of the good day G with the high
payoff (and, given Andy’s plan, Bob deviating would not affect Andy’s aggression on the bad day B).
11Of course, if Andy initially expected r but Bob deviated by choosing l, Andy would blame Bob for
the bad day occurring due to (R, l) since it would have been avoided had Bob behaved as Andy expected.
This is the basis for an SE where Andy expects r and Bob chooses r in order to deflect blame, even
though l would maximize the chance of the good day G when p < 1/2.
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3 Experiment
3.1 Design
The main objective of this paper is to test condensed versions of simple anger and anger
from blaming behavior (could-have-been blame). To this end, I operationalize the simple
anger game (Figure 1) and the blame-behavior game (Figure 2) in two separate between-
subject treatments: a Simple treatment (Figure 3, p. 11) and a Blame-behavior treatment
(Figure 4, p. 12).
Henceforth, Andy is called player a and Bob player b. Two important modifications
are made when operationalizing the games: First, since frustration in the bad state B
originates in a low p, I increase the outside payoff and set p = 1/2 in order to be able to
implement the games using the direct-response method rather than the strategy method
(with a low p the direct-response method would consume an unreasonable amount of
observations). Therefore, frustration in the experimental treatments originates in a high
outside payoff rather than in a low p. The choice of p at exactly 1/2 makes it as easy as
possible for subjects to understand and calculate their expected and counterfactual payoffs
in each game. It also makes a’s frustration in the blame-behavior game independent of
his belief about b’s behavior, since the bad state B is equally likely whether he chooses l
or r (and conversely for the good state G). This removes a potential source of bias in the
comparison across the treatments, since otherwise we would have to elicit and condition
on a’s belief about b’s behavior in the Blame-behavior treatment. A second modification
is that the choice set of a is expanded to allow for gradual punishment decisions. It is an
implication of BDS that a sufficiently frustrated player i will punish j as much as possible
if he blames j for his frustration, and this is due to the linearity of the utility function
in (2). Interestingly, Bosman and van Winden (2002) emphasize this aspect of emotional
punishment in the context of their power-to-take game, and with the modified choice
set of a the experimental treatments admit investigation of this aspect in the context of
BDS’ theory.12
A third treatment, Simple-strategy, implements the Simple treatment using the strat-
egy method, such that a decides on punishment in the event of the bad state, i.e., before
knowing whether B or G obtains (if B occurs the choice is implemented). An interesting
aspect of BDS is that preferences are own-plan dependent. In the simple anger game
(Figure 1), this means that a’s decision utility (2) at t = 2 depends on how he planned
at t = 1 that he would choose at t = 2. That is, a’s decision utility t = 2 depends
on the probability with which he expects (at t = 1) to choose N should B occur. If a
12In the power-to-take game, the first mover can appropriate part of the responder’s income but the
responder can retaliate by destroying some or all of his or her income. There seems to be a strong link
between negative emotions and appropriation and destruction behavior in this game, and also between
unfulfilled expectations and punishment, which is in line with BDS’ conceptualization of frustration
(Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007).
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Figure 3: The Simple treatment
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Figure 4: The Blame-behavior treatment
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plans to choose N , he becomes more frustrated after B (since he plans to avoid costly
punishment and thus expects a higher material payoff) and thus more likely to choose T
than had he instead planned to choose T from the beginning. Thus, there is a potential
conflict between a’s plan at t = 1 and his action at t = 2, since at t = 1 he is not
frustrated and thus wants to plan for N , which maximizes his material end-game payoff,
but at t = 2 he is frustrated and thus wants to punish b if sufficiently prone to anger. In
equilibrium, a takes this plan dependence into account, making a plan that is consistent
with him maximizing utility function (2) when frustrated due to B.13 In light of this,
the Simple-strategy treatment variation tests whether a at the root of the game (in the
Simple-strategy treatment) seems to have the same goal as a has after the frustrating
outcome B (in the Simple treatment).14
In a fourth and final treatment, Control, subjects participate in an experiment con-
sisting only of the subgame after B in the Simple treatment. The test of the theory
(simple anger) is not particularly strong based only on the Simple treatment since it
rests on rejecting a point prediction at the corner of the choice set, i.e., no punishment.
One worry is that some subjects could be influenced by experimenter-demand effects,
especially since the game is rather special. With a between-subjects comparison across
Simple and Control, this potential confound is avoided and the test of the theory becomes
stronger.
3.2 Procedural details
Subjects are welcomed to the lab and randomly assigned a cubicle workstation. They
are given plenty of time to read the instructions (see Appendix) and ask questions (in
private) before the beginning of the experiment. They are matched in pairs but decisions
are made in private and they never learn the identity of the person they are matched
with.
The end-game payoffs in the treatments are as follows (see also Figures 3 and 4): In
the good situation G, a and b receive 100 Swedish kronor each (around 12 US dollars),
and in the bad situation B, they receive 10 Swedish kronor each and a decides whether
to accept the low payoff or punish b at a 1:1 cost. Thus, (pia, pib) = (100, 100) in G, and
(pia, pib) = (10− T, 10− T ) with a choosing T ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 10} in B.
In the Simple treatment, the public toss of a six-sided die determines whether the good
situation G (with the high income) or bad situation B (with the low income) obtains for
any pair of subjects. Each subject-pair is given a group number at the beginning of the
13This can for example be illustrated with the third SE mentioned on p. 8, where a plans for N after
B (with probability αa(N | B) = 1pθa −
1−2p
p ) so as to keep himself indifferent between N and T when
frustrated due to B.
14The between-subject test is in the spirit of BDS’ multi-self approach, with one “self” of i moving at
each history h of the game. See BDS and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009, pp. 28) for details.
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experiment, and if there is an even-even or odd-odd match between the number shown on
the die and the group number, the subject-pair is assigned the good situation (with the
high income); in case of an even-odd or odd-even mismatch, the subject-pair is assigned
the bad situation (with the low income). For example, a subject-pair with group number
2 will be assigned the good situation if the die shows 2, 4, or 6, and the bad situation for
numbers 1, 3, and 5. In contrast, in the Blame-behavior treatment, b will guess whether
the die will show an even or an odd number and if the guess is correct (an even-even or
odd-odd match with the number on the die), the good situation is assigned, and if the
guess is wrong the bad situation is assigned. Beyond this, everything is identical across
the two treatments. In the Simple-strategy treatment, subjects first make their decision
(in the event of the bad situation) and then the die toss determines what situation will be
payoff relevant. In the Control treatment, subjects immediately face a situation identical
to the low-income situation in the other three treatments.15
In the bad situation and in the Control treatment, b is asked for her belief about
a’s decision. If correct, b is monetarily rewarded. As a measure of frustration, subjects
are asked in a post-experimental questionnaire to describe the intensity of emotions felt
when learning whether they would end up in the good situation (with the high income)
or in the bad situation (with the low income).16 They answered this question approxi-
mately five minutes after they had learned what outcome would be relevant for them.17
The experiment was computerized with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and participants were
recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Sessions lasted around 30 minutes and subjects
were on average paid 107 Swedish kronor (around 12.50 US dollars at the time of the
experiment).
3.3 Hypotheses
The first hypothesis concerns frustration. By (1), a is frustrated when the bad state B
obtains since he realizes that his maximal payoff is less than the payoff he expected at the
root of the game. Therefore, I investigate whether the correlated income shock generates
negative emotions in subjects; i.e., whether those who end up in the bad situation with
the low income in the Simple, Blame-behavior, and Simple-strategy treatments on average
experience a higher intensity of negative emotions than subjects in the good situation
(with the high income):
15In order to keep the expected hourly wage as close as possible across the treatments, subjects in the
Control treatment were paid for answering an additional survey at the end of the session.
16I follow Bosman and van Winden (2002) and let subjects report on a range of emotions and not
just the few (negative) emotions of interest in this study. For a discussion on self-reports as an emotion
elicitation method, see, e.g., Robinson and Clore (2002).
17The exact formulation read as follows: “We will now ask you to describe how you felt at the moment
when you found out which situation would be assigned your group (i.e., right after the experimenter
had tossed the die). Please indicate the intensity of each of the emotions listed below. Please note
that there is no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answer.”
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Hypothesis 1. Frustration: Subjects who end up in the bad situation (with the
low income) will report a stronger intensity of negative emotions than subjects who
end up in the good situation (with the high income).
The second hypothesis concerns simple anger, and thus the comparison between the
Simple treatment and the Control treatment. In the Simple treatment, simple anger
predicts full punishment (T = 10) if a is sufficiently prone to anger (θa ≥ 140) whereas
anger from blaming behavior predicts zero punishment.18 In the Control treatment, both
simple anger and anger from blaming behavior predict zero punishment since there is no
frustration.
Hypothesis 2. Simple anger : A larger fraction of players a will punish their
co-player b in the Simple treatment than in the Control treatment.
The third hypothesis concerns anger from blaming behavior (could-have-been blame)
and thus comparisons across the Blame-behavior, Simple, and Control treatments. In the
Blame-behavior treatment, simple anger and anger from blaming behavior predictions
coincide (full punishment if sufficiently prone to anger; T = 10),19 whereas only simple
anger predicts punishment in the Simple treatment, and neither simple anger nor anger
from blaming behavior predicts punishment in the Control treatment.
Hypothesis 3. Anger from blaming behavior : A larger fraction of players a will
punish their co-player b in the Blame-behavior treatment than in the Simple treat-
ment, AND the same fraction of players a will punish their co-player b in the Simple
treatment and the Control treatment.
The fourth hypothesis concerns a’s plan (at the root of the game) to punish b, should
the frustrating state B occur. Preferences are own-plan dependent and this creates a
potential conflict between a’s plan at the root of the game and his action when poten-
tially frustrated due to B. In equilibrium, a takes this plan dependence into account (as
described on p. 11) and we expect players a at the root of the game in the Simple-strategy
treatment to have the same goal as a has after the frustrating outcome B in the Simple
treatment:
Hypothesis 4. Consistent planning : The same fraction of players a will punish
their co-player b in the Simple treatment and the Simple-strategy treatment.
18There is a simple-anger SE where a chooses full punishment at t = 2 (and at t = 1 he is certain that
he will do so), since by (1) his frustration is Fa = 0.5 · 100 + 0.5 · 0 − 10 = 40 and thus by (2) we have
U(T = 0) ≤ U(T = 10) when 10− θa · 40 · 10 ≤ 0, i.e. when θa ≥ 140 .
19They are identical to the simple-anger prediction in the Simple treatment (punish if θa ≥ 140 ), since
(i) the level of frustration in the bad state B is the same in both treatments, and (ii) with could-have-been
blame a fully blames b for his frustration, since the good state G would have obtained had b made a
different choice.
14
The fifth and final hypothesis concerns b’s belief about a’s punishment decision, in
each of the four treatments. It is an equilibrium requirement in BDS that players are, at
least on average, correct in their beliefs about other players’ behavior, and this is what
we expect to observe in the experiment:
Hypothesis 5. Belief about others’ punishment : There is no difference between
the fraction of players a who punish and the fraction of players b who expect to be
punished in any of the four treatments.
4 Results
A total of 342 students participated in the experiment. Table 1 displays their participa-
tion in the different parts of the experiment (good or bad situation), which depends on
the chance move and on b’s decision in the Blame-behavior treatment. We can see that
Table 1: Participation in the different parts of the experiment.
Treatment Sessions Participants Situation Players a who can
Good Bad make a punishment decision
Simple 11 98 46 52 26
Blame-behavior 17 142 84 58 29
Simple-strategy 5 54 26 28 27
Control 7 48 – – 24
Total 40 342 156 138 106
Note: In Simple and Blame-behavior, one player a for every subject-pair (i.e., one a and
one b) who experience the bad situation B can make a punishment decision. For instance,
in Simple, 52 subjects experience the bad situation and out of these, 26 are a player a and
another 26 are a player b. In Simple-strategy, decisions are made before chance determines
whether situation B or G obtains, and thus 27 of the 54 participants will decide as a.
52 subjects in Simple and 58 subjects in Blame-behavior experience the correlated income
shock, and thus subsequently make decisions in the bad situation (players a decide on
punishment and players b report their expectation). Additionally, in the Simple-strategy
treatment, 54 subjects decide in the same situation but before the chance move, and a
further 48 subjects make decisions in the Control treatment (which is identical except
for the income shock). As can be seen in the table, we have 26, 29, 27, and 24 punish-
ment decisions and an equal amount of reported expectations in Simple, Blame-behavior,
Simple-strategy, and Control, respectively, and we have 156 subjects who end up in the
good situation (with the high income) and 138 subjects who instead experience the bad
situation (with the low income).
First we will analyze subjects’ emotional reactions. In line with Hypothesis 1, we
can see in Table 2 that subjects are more angry and more irritated when hit by the
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income shock (the bad situation). The strongest impact is on irritation, with an average
intensity of 3.10 within the full sample on a scale ranging from 1 (no emotion at all) to 7
(high intensity of emotion). This finding is in line with Bosman and van Winden (2002),
who also document substantial irritation (average intensity of 4.05) following a positive
take rate in the power-to-take game.20 This result supports BDS’ conceptualization of
frustration as unfulfilled expectations about material payoffs.
Result 1: The bad situation, where subjects’ maximal income from the experi-
ment is substantially lower than the ex-ante expected income, generates negative
emotions.
Table 2: Average intensity of negative emotions (by situation, G or B).
Anger Irritation
Good Bad P-value Good Bad P-value
Simple (N = 74) 1.29 1.95 < 0.01 1.26 2.73 < 0.01
Blame-behavior (N = 142) 1.12 2.07 < 0.01 1.23 3.21 < 0.01
Simple-strategy (N = 54) 1.04 2.07 < 0.01 1.12 3.43 < 0.01
Note: I use two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests. After the experiment, subjects
were asked to describe the intensity of eleven different emotions (both positive and
negative) felt when learning whether the situation with the high income (good)
or the situation with the low income (bad) would obtain (1 = no emotion at all;
7 = high intensity of emotion). Due to technical problems, 24 subjects could not
answer the question in Simple and thus N = 74.
The correlated income shock thus generates negative emotions and the question is
whether this has a significant effect on subjects’ actions and beliefs, following Hypotheses
2–5. Table 3 displays the fraction of subjects who punish (a) and expect to be punished
(b), respectively, for each of the four treatments.21 We can see that the results are similar
across the treatments: 15%–17% of players a chose to punish their co-player, and 24%–
37% of players b expected to be punished. The similarity in behavior across all four
treatments indicates the absence of treatment effects and we verify this in panel A of
Table 4. The results for Hypotheses 2–4 are formulated as follows:
Result 2: Subjects do not seem to act in accordance with the simple anger hy-
pothesis in the context of the experiment. (We cannot reject the null hypothesis of
no difference in behavior between the two treatments Simple and Control.)
20Calculated from Table 2 in Bosman and van Winden (2002) as the average irritation intensity
reported by all 39 responders in the experiment (the take rate was positive for 36 of them).
21The raw data for punishment decisions made by all players a who participated in the experiment
can be found in the Appendix, Table 5.
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Result 3: Subjects do not seem to act in accordance with the anger from blaming
behavior hypothesis in the context of the experiment. (We cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no difference in behavior between the two treatments Blame-behavior
and Simple.)
Result 4: There is no difference between decisions made at the root of the game
(about punishment, should the bad situation occur) and decisions made when the
bad situation has occurred. (We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference
in behavior between the two treatments Simple and Simple-strategy.)
The fifth and final hypothesis concerned subjects’ beliefs about others’ punishment
decisions. This issue is investigated by comparing the fraction of players a who punish
with the fraction of players b who expect to be punished. Comparing across columns in
Table 3, we can see that there is a tendency for players b to overshoot in their beliefs
about the extent to which their matched player a will punish them. For instance, in
the Simple treatment, 35% of players b thought that they would be punished after the
correlated income shock, but only 15% of players a did so. Looking at the bottom panel
of Table 4 we can see that the difference between punishment behavior and expected
punishment behavior is significant at the 1% level within the full sample (Mann-Whitney
U test; p < 0.01, N = 212).
Result 5: Subjects in the experiment do not seem to hold correct beliefs about
other players’ punishment decisions.
Taken together, subjects who end up in the bad situation (with the low income)
experience negative emotions, but this does not seem to affect their behavior to the
extent predicted by the theory. In the context of the experiment, using a minimalistic
design and a deliberatively weak form of blame attribution, I do not find much support
for the simple anger or the anger from blaming behavior hypothesis.
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Table 3: Fraction of subjects who punish and expect to be
punished, respectively.
Punishment Expected
(player a) (player b)
No Yes No Yes
Simple 22 (85%) 4 (15%) 17 (65%) 9 (35%)
Blame-behavior 24 (83%) 5 (17%) 22 (76%) 7 (24%)
Simple-strategy 23 (85%) 4 (15%) 17 (63%) 10 (37%)
Control 20 (83%) 4 (17%) 15 (63%) 9 (37%)
Note: The table displays the fraction of players a who chose
not to punish (T = 0) and punish (T > 0), respectively, and
the fraction of players b who expected their assigned player a
to choose not to punish and punish, respectively.
Table 4: Testing Hypotheses 2–5.
Panel A: Punishment
Null hypothesis P-values
Punish in Simple = Punish in Control 0.90 (N = 50)
Punish in Blame-behavior = Punish in Simple 0.85 (N = 55)
Punish in Simple = Punish in Simple-strategy 0.95 (N = 53)
Panel B: Expectations vs. punishment
Null hypothesis P-values
Punish = Expected, in Simple 0.11 (N = 52)
Punish = Expected, in Blame-behavior 0.52 (N = 58)
Punish = Expected, in Simple-strategy 0.06 (N = 54)
Punish = Expected, in Control 0.11 (N = 48)
Punish = Expected, in all treatments < 0.01 (N = 212)
Note: I use two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests based on proportions
displayed in Table 3.
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5 Conclusion
Anger can be a strong behavioral force, and this has important consequences for human
interaction. I design an experiment that tests the predictions based on central concepts
in a theory of anger developed by Battigalli, Dufwenberg, and Smith (2015; BDS). Specif-
ically, I test condensed versions of their simple anger and anger from blaming behavior
hypotheses in two-player settings, and I investigate aspects of beliefs and compare sub-
jects’ planned choices at different stages of the game. The experiment implements a
strong and correlated income shock and subsequently tests whether it generates negative
emotions in subjects, whether it makes them punish their co-players, and whether they
punish their co-players when they can be blamed for the correlated income shock.
The results from the experiment show that the income shock generates negative emo-
tions in subjects; it makes them angry and irritated. This is in line with BDS, who model
frustration as a result of unfulfilled expectations about material payoffs. However, these
negative emotions do not generally affect punishment decisions to the extent predicted by
the theory: Subjects who experience the correlated income shock (the bad situation) do
not punish their co-player more than subjects who do not experience the income shock,
not even when the co-player can be blamed for the income shock. Thus, in this specific
context there is not much support for the notions of simple anger and anger from blaming
behavior.
The focus of the paper is on situations where other-responsibility is weak or nonex-
istent, and where there is complete payoff symmetry between the players. Frustration
is caused by chance moves or bad luck rather than harmful actions with blameworthy
intent. Focusing on these aspects seems natural for a first empirical test of the theory,
since it isolates the relatively unsophisticated punishment behavior that is the essence
of simple anger and that also seems to be relevant for anger from blaming behavior, as
indicated by data from experiments in Gurdal et al. (2013).
The difference between the results in this study and in Gurdal et al. is interesting.
In their experiment, an agent invests money on behalf of a principal. The agent chooses
between a safe and a risky prospect, and the principal subsequently decides on remuner-
ation for the agent and a dummy player. They find that agents are blamed and punished
for bad uncontrollable outcomes, since they are paid less (relative to the dummy player)
following bad realizations of the risky prospect. One important contextual difference be-
tween Gurdal et al. and the Blame-behavior treatment in the present paper is that the
agents in Gurdal et al. do have some ex-ante control over the outcome, in their choice
between the safe and the risky prospect, even though they are punished for the bad re-
alization of the risky prospect, which they cannot control. This makes the agent’s role
in the bad outcome more salient and perhaps this is why anger from blaming behavior
seems to be more relevant in this context. Having some form of choice, even if irrelevant,
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possibly affects how one’s responsibility for a bad outcome is evaluated.22
Another important aspect of the design is that payoffs are symmetric, which allows for
testing the theory in isolation of distributional concerns. However, maybe the influence
of frustration and anger would be stronger in contexts with asymmetric payoffs. For
example, disastrous income shocks caused by catastrophic events such as extreme weather
or natural disasters might well make people angry, but maybe they are more likely to
be angry with people who had the means and economic privileges to prevent or limit
personal damage rather than with people who also were badly affected by these events.
An interesting extension is thus to test the theory in a context where there is payoff
inequality, implemented by chance or by other players in the experiment.
Anger and frustration may shape economic outcomes in profound ways. Angry indi-
viduals become hostile in their dealings with others and this has strategic consequences.
BDS provide a rich framework for theoretical analysis and I have provided a first test of
empirical relevance. There are several interesting avenues for future research.
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Appendix A: Additional data
Table 5: All punishment decisions in the experiment (by treatment).
Punishment Simple Blame-behavior Simple-strategy Control
(player a) (Frequency) (Frequency) (Frequency) (Frequency)
0 22 24 23 20
1 0 1 0 1
2 3 0 2 0
3 0 1 0 1
4 0 1 0 1
5 0 2 0 0
6 0 0 1 0
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 1
9 0 0 0 0
10 1 0 1 0
Total (N) 26 29 27 24
Average punishment 0.62 0.62 0.74 0.67
Appendix B: Instructions for the Simple treatment
General instructions for participant A
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating!
Please do not talk to other participants.
You are about to take part in an economics experiment. If you read the following in-
structions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn money in addition to
the SEK 50 you will receive for being part of the experiment. The amount of money
that you earn with your decisions will be added up and paid to you in cash at the end
of the experiment. These instructions are solely for your private information. You are
not allowed to communicate during the experiment. Violation of this rule will lead to
exclusion from the experiment and all payments. If you have questions, please raise your
hand and we will come to you. We will only answer your questions in private.
We will not speak in terms of Swedish kronor during the experiment, but rather of points.
Your income will first be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, the total
amount of points earned will be converted to kronor at the following rate: 1 point = 1
SEK.
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We will explain the exact experimental procedure on the next few pages.
The experiment
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly matched with one
other participant in the experiment. You will never find out the identity of this
person, not even after the experiment. In the same way, the person matched with you
will never find out your identity.
There are two types of participants in this experiment: participants A and B. You are
a participant A. The person matched with you is a participant B. We will refer to you
and your participant B as a group and each group will be assigned a specific number (a
group number).
There are two possible situations in the experiment:
• In situation 1, you receive 100 points and participant B receives 100 points.
• In situation 2, you receive 10 points and participant B receives 10 points.
At the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter will randomly assign
your group either situation 1 or situation 2 by tossing a 6-sided die.
• If your group number is an even number (2, 4, 6, 8 etc.): situation 1 will be assigned
if the thrown number is also an even number (2, 4 or 6) and situation 2 will be
assigned if the thrown number is an odd number (1, 3 or 5).
• If your group number is an odd number (1, 3, 5, 7 etc.): situation 1 will be assigned
if the thrown number is also an odd number (1, 3 or 5) and situation 2 will be as-
signed if the thrown number is an even number (2, 4 or 6).
This means that situation 1 and situation 2 are equally likely to be assigned (each situa-
tion will be assigned with a probability of 50%).
Example 1: If your group number is 8 (an even number) and the number on the die is 4
(also an even number), then situation 1 is assigned.
Example 2: If your group number is 4 (an even number) and the number on the die is 3
(an odd number), then situation 2 is assigned.
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Example 3: If your group number is 3 (an odd number) and the number on the die is 1
(also an odd number), then situation 1 is assigned.
If situation 1 is assigned, the experiment is over. Your income is 100 points
and participant B’ income is 100 points.
If situation 2 is assigned, as participant A you have the possibility to deduct
up to a total of 10 points from your participant B. Each point deducted will
cost you one point. When you have made your choice, the experiment is over.
Example 1: Situation 2 is assigned and you (as participant A) give up 4 points to deduct
4 points from your participant B. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 10− 4 = 6.
• Participant B’s points: 10− 4 = 6.
Example 2: Situation 2 is assigned and you (as participant A) give up 0 points to deduct
0 points from your participant B. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 10− 0 = 10.
• Participant B’s points: 10− 0 = 10.
[Only in the instructions for participant B: In situation 2 you will be asked to esti-
mate the number of points your participant A will deduct from you. You will
be paid for the accuracy of your estimate: If your estimate is exactly right,
you will get 5 points in addition to your other income from the experiment.
If your estimate is not exactly right, you will not get any additional points.
Example 1: You estimate that your participant A will deduct 4 points from you and this
estimate is correct. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant B): 10− 4 + 5 = 11.
• Participant A’s points: 10− 4 = 6.]
Procedures in chronological order
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1. The experiment begins. Your group is randomly assigned situation 1 or situation 2.
The experimenter will toss the die and one randomly selected participant will verify the
outcome. Together they will enter the number on this participant’s computer screen.
2a. If situation 1 is assigned, the experiment is over. Your income is 100 points and
participant B’s income is 100 points. You will receive payment for the points earned plus
your show-up fee in cash.
2b. If situation 2 is assigned, as participant A you have the possibility to deduct up to
a total of 10 points from your participant B. Each point you deduct will cost you one
point. Once you have made your decision, the experiment is over. Your income is 10
points minus the amount (if anything) you deducted from participant B, and participant
B’s income is 10 points minus the amount (if anything) you deducted from him or her.
You will receive payment for the points earned plus your show-up fee in cash.
[In the instructions for participant B, 2b instead reads: If situation 2 is assigned, partic-
ipant A has the possibility to deduct up to a total of 10 points from you. Each point
deducted will cost him or her one point. You will estimate the number of points he or
she will deduct from you. Once you have made your decision (and your participant A has
made his or her decision), the experiment is over. Your income is 10 points minus the
amount (if anything) participant A deducted from you plus 5 points if you estimated this
amount correctly, and participant A’s income is 10 points minus the amount (if anything)
he or she deducted from you. You will receive payment for the points earned plus your
show-up fee in cash.]
Do you have any questions?
Appendix C: Instructions for the Blame-behavior treat-
ment
General instructions for participant A
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating!
Please do not talk to other participants.
You are about to take part in an economics experiment. If you read the following in-
structions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn money in addition to
the SEK 50 you will receive for being part of the experiment. The amount of money
that you earn with your decisions will be added up and paid to you in cash at the end
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of the experiment. These instructions are solely for your private information. You are
not allowed to communicate during the experiment. Violation of this rule will lead to
exclusion from the experiment and all payments. If you have questions, please raise your
hand and we will come to you. We will only answer your questions in private.
We will not speak in terms of Swedish kronor during the experiment, but rather of points.
Your income will first be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, the total
amount of points earned will be converted to kronor at the following rate: 1 point = 1
SEK.
We will explain the exact experimental procedure on the next few pages.
The experiment
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly matched with one
other participant in the experiment. You will never find out the identity of this
person, not even after the experiment. In the same way, the person matched with you
will never find out your identity.
There are two types of participants in this experiment: participants A and B. You are
a participant A. The person matched with you is a participant B. We will refer to you
and your participant B as a group and each group will be assigned a specific number (a
group number).
There are two possible situations in the experiment:
• In situation 1, you receive 100 points and participant B receives 100 points.
• In situation 2, you receive 10 points and participant B receives 10 points.
At the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter will randomly assign
your group either situation 1 or situation 2 by tossing a 6-sided die. Before the
experimenter tosses the die, your participant B will guess whether the thrown number
will be even (2, 4 or 6) or odd (1, 3 or 5).
• If the guess is correct, situation 1 will be assigned.
• If the guess is wrong, situation 2 will be assigned.
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This means that situation 1 and situation 2 are equally likely to be assigned (each situa-
tion will be assigned with a probability of 50%).
Example 1: If your participant B guessed that the thrown number would be even, and
the number on the die is 4 (also an even number so the guess was correct), then situation
1 is assigned.
Example 2: If your participant B guessed that the thrown number would be even, and
the number on the die is 3 (an odd number so the guess was wrong), then situation 2 is
assigned.
Example 3: If your participant B guessed that the thrown number would be odd, and the
number on the die is 1 (also an odd number so the guess was right), then situation 1 is
assigned.
If situation 1 is assigned, the experiment is over. Your income is 100 points
and participant B’ income is 100 points.
If situation 2 is assigned, as participant A you have the possibility to deduct
up to a total of 10 points from your participant B. Each point deducted will
cost you one point. When you have made your choice, the experiment is over.
Example 1: Situation 2 is assigned and you (as participant A) give up 4 points to deduct
4 points from your participant B. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 10− 4 = 6.
• Participant B’s points: 10− 4 = 6.
Example 2: Situation 2 is assigned and you (as participant A) give up 0 points to deduct
0 points from your participant B. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 10− 0 = 10.
• Participant B’s points: 10− 0 = 10.
[Only in the instructions for participant B: In situation 2 you will be asked to esti-
mate the number of points your participant A will deduct from you. You will
be paid for the accuracy of your estimate: If your estimate is exactly right,
you will get 5 points in addition to your other income from the experiment.
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If your estimate is not exactly right, you will not get any additional points.
Example 1: You estimate that your participant A will deduct 4 points from you and this
estimate is correct. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant B): 10− 4 + 5 = 11.
• Participant A’s points: 10− 4 = 6.]
Procedures in chronological order
1. The experiment begins. Your group is randomly assigned situation 1 or situation 2.
Your participant B will guess whether the thrown number will be even or odd and the
guess will be reported to you (on your computer screen). Then the experimenter will toss
the die and one randomly selected participant will verify the outcome. Together they will
enter the number on this participant’s computer screen.
2a. If situation 1 is assigned, the experiment is over. Your income is 100 points and
participant B’s income is 100 points. You will receive payment for the points earned plus
your show-up fee in cash.
2b. If situation 2 is assigned, as participant A you have the possibility to deduct up to
a total of 10 points from your participant B. Each point you deduct will cost you one
point. Once you have made your decision, the experiment is over. Your income is 10
points minus the amount (if anything) you deducted from participant B, and participant
B’s income is 10 points minus the amount (if anything) you deducted from him or her.
You will receive payment for the points earned plus your show-up fee in cash.
[In the instructions for participant B, 2b instead reads: If situation 2 is assigned, partic-
ipant A has the possibility to deduct up to a total of 10 points from you. Each point
deducted will cost him or her one point. You will estimate the number of points he or
she will deduct from you. Once you have made your decision (and your participant A has
made his or her decision), the experiment is over. Your income is 10 points minus the
amount (if anything) participant A deducted from you plus 5 points if you estimated this
amount correctly, and participant A’s income is 10 points minus the amount (if anything)
he or she deducted from you. You will receive payment for the points earned plus your
show-up fee in cash.]
Do you have any questions?
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Appendix D: Instructions for the Simple-strategy treat-
ment
General instructions for participant A
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating!
Please do not talk to other participants.
You are about to take part in an economics experiment. If you read the following in-
structions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn money in addition to
the SEK 50 you will receive for being part of the experiment. The amount of money
that you earn with your decisions will be added up and paid to you in cash at the end
of the experiment. These instructions are solely for your private information. You are
not allowed to communicate during the experiment. Violation of this rule will lead to
exclusion from the experiment and all payments. If you have questions, please raise your
hand and we will come to you. We will only answer your questions in private.
We will not speak in terms of Swedish kronor during the experiment, but rather of points.
Your income will first be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, the total
amount of points earned will be converted to kronor at the following rate: 1 point = 1
SEK.
We will explain the exact experimental procedure on the next few pages.
The experiment
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly matched with one
other participant in the experiment. You will never find out the identity of this
person, not even after the experiment. In the same way, the person matched with you
will never find out your identity.
There are two types of participants in this experiment: participants A and B. You are
a participant A. The person matched with you is a participant B. We will refer to you
and your participant B as a group and each group will be assigned a specific number (a
group number).
There are two possible situations in the experiment:
• In situation 1, you receive 100 points and participant B receives 100 points.
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• In situation 2, you receive 10 points and participant B receives 10 points.
At the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter will randomly assign
your group either situation 1 or situation 2 by tossing a 6-sided die.
• If your group number is an even number (2, 4, 6, 8 etc.): situation 1 will be assigned
if the thrown number is also an even number (2, 4 or 6) and situation 2 will be
assigned if the thrown number is an odd number (1, 3 or 5).
• If your group number is an odd number (1, 3, 5, 7 etc.): situation 1 will be assigned
if the thrown number is also an odd number (1, 3 or 5) and situation 2 will be as-
signed if the thrown number is an even number (2, 4 or 6).
This means that situation 1 and situation 2 are equally likely to be assigned (each situa-
tion will be assigned with a probability of 50%).
Example 1: If your group number is 8 (an even number) and the number on the die is 4
(also an even number), then situation 1 is assigned.
Example 2: If your group number is 4 (an even number) and the number on the die is 3
(an odd number), then situation 2 is assigned.
Example 3: If your group number is 3 (an odd number) and the number on the die is 1
(also an odd number), then situation 1 is assigned.
If situation 1 is assigned, the experiment is over. Your income is 100 points
and participant B’ income is 100 points.
If situation 2 is assigned, as participant A you have the possibility to deduct
up to a total of 10 points from your participant B. Each point deducted will
cost you one point. When you have made your choice, the experiment is over.
Example 1: Situation 2 is assigned and you (as participant A) give up 4 points to deduct
4 points from your participant B. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 10− 4 = 6.
• Participant B’s points: 10− 4 = 6.
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Example 2: Situation 2 is assigned and you (as participant A) give up 0 points to deduct
0 points from your participant B. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 10− 0 = 10.
• Participant B’s points: 10− 0 = 10.
[Only in the instructions for participant B: In situation 2 you will be asked to esti-
mate the number of points your participant A will deduct from you. You will
be paid for the accuracy of your estimate: If your estimate is exactly right,
you will get 5 points in addition to your other income from the experiment.
If your estimate is not exactly right, you will not get any additional points.
Example 1: You estimate that your participant A will deduct 4 points from you and this
estimate is correct. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant B): 10− 4 + 5 = 11.
• Participant A’s points: 10− 4 = 6.]
We will ask you to make your choice (how many points to deduct if situation
2 is assigned) before your group is randomly assigned situation 1 or situa-
tion 2 (by the experimenter tossing the die). If situation 2 is assigned, your
choice will be implemented (and if situation 1 is assigned your income will be
100 points and participant B’s income 100 points regardless of the choice you
made).
Example 1: You (as participant A) give up 4 points to deduct 4 points from your partic-
ipant B in case situation 2 is assigned. It is then randomly determined that situation 1
will apply (your choice is not implemented). The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 100.
• Participant B’s points: 100.
Example 2: You (as participant A) give up 4 points to deduct 4 points from your partic-
ipant B in case situation 2 is assigned. It is then randomly determined that situation 2
will apply (your choice is implemented). The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 10− 4 = 6.
• Participant B’s points: 10− 4 = 6.
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Procedures in chronological order
1. The experiment begins. As participant A you have the possibility to deduct up to a
total of 10 points from your participant B if situation 2 is assigned. Each point you deduct
will cost you one point. You will make your choice now and it will be implemented if it
is randomly determined that situation 2 will apply.
2. Your group is randomly assigned situation 1 or situation 2. The experimenter will toss
the die and one randomly selected participant will verify the outcome. Together they will
enter the number on this participant’s computer screen.
3a. If situation 1 is assigned, your income is 100 points and participant B’s income is 100
points. You will receive payment for the points earned plus your show-up fee in cash.
3b. If situation 2 is assigned, your choice will be implemented. Your income is 10 points
minus the amount (if anything) you deducted from participant B, and participant B’s
income is 10 points minus the amount (if anything) you deducted from him or her. You
will receive payment for the points earned plus your show-up fee in cash.
[In the instructions for participant B, 3b instead reads: If situation 2 is assigned, your
choice will be implemented. Your income is 10 points minus the amount (if anything)
participant A deducted from you plus 5 points if you estimated this amount correctly, and
participant A’s income is 10 points minus the amount (if anything) he or she deducted
from you. You will receive payment for the points earned plus your show-up fee in cash.]
Do you have any questions?
Appendix E: Instructions for the Control treatment
General instructions for participant A
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating!
Please do not talk to other participants.
You are about to take part in an economics experiment. If you read the following in-
structions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn money in addition to
the SEK 50 you will receive for being part of the experiment. The amount of money
that you earn with your decisions will be added up and paid to you in cash at the end
of the experiment. These instructions are solely for your private information. You are
not allowed to communicate during the experiment. Violation of this rule will lead to
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exclusion from the experiment and all payments. If you have questions, please raise your
hand and we will come to you. We will only answer your questions in private.
We will not speak in terms of Swedish kronor during the experiment, but rather of points.
Your income will first be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, the total
amount of points earned will be converted to kronor at the following rate: 1 point = 1
SEK.
We will explain the exact experimental procedure on the next few pages.
The experiment
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly matched with one
other participant in the experiment. You will never find out the identity of this
person, not even after the experiment. In the same way, the person matched with you
will never find out your identity.
There are two types of participants in this experiment: participants A and B. You are
a participant A. The person matched with you is a participant B.
At the beginning of the experiment, you receive 10 points and participant B
receives 10 points.
As participant A you have the possibility to deduct up to a total of 10 points
from your participant B. Each point deducted will cost you one point. When
you have made your choice, the experiment is over.
Example 1: You (as participant A) give up 4 points to deduct 4 points from your partic-
ipant B. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 10− 4 = 6.
• Participant B’s points: 10− 4 = 6.
Example 2: You (as participant A) give up 0 points to deduct 0 points from your partic-
ipant B. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 10− 0 = 10.
• Participant B’s points: 10− 0 = 10.
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[Only in the instructions for participant B: You will be asked to estimate the num-
ber of points your participant A will deduct from you. You will be paid for
the accuracy of your estimate: If your estimate is exactly right, you will get 5
points in addition to your other income from the experiment. If your estimate
is not exactly right, you will not get any additional points.
Example 1: You estimate that your participant A will deduct 4 points from you and this
estimate is correct. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant B): 10− 4 + 5 = 11.
• Participant A’s points: 10− 4 = 6.]
Procedures in chronological order
The experiment begins. You receive 10 points and participant B receives 10 points. As
participant A you have the possibility to deduct up to a total of 10 points from your
participant B. Each point you deduct will cost you one point. Once you have made your
decision, the experiment is over. Your income is 10 points minus the amount (if any-
thing) you deducted from participant B, and participant B’s income is 10 points minus
the amount (if anything) you deducted from him or her. You will receive payment for
the points earned plus your show-up fee in cash.
[In the instructions for participant B, the above paragraph is replaced by the following:
The experiment begins. You receive 10 points and participant A receives 10 points. Par-
ticipant A has the possibility to deduct up to a total of 10 points from you. Each point
deducted will cost him or her one point. You will estimate the number of points he or
she will deduct from you. Once you have made your decision (and your participant A has
made his or her decision), the experiment is over. Your income is 10 points minus the
amount (if anything) participant A deducted from you plus 5 points if you estimated this
amount correctly, and participant A’s income is 10 points minus the amount (if anything)
he or she deducted from you. You will receive payment for the points earned plus your
show-up fee in cash.]
Do you have any questions?
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Abstract 
This paper studies physician behavior using laboratory experiments. The focus is on the 
effect of the payment system (fee-for-service vs. capitation) on physicians’ treatment 
decisions. More specifically, I investigate the altruistic behavior of physicians and 
whether this behavior is affected by payment system and uncertainty in health outcome. 
The experiment shows that many physicians are altruistic toward their patients but also 
that the degree of altruism varies across patients with different medical needs, indicating 
that physicians condition their altruism on certain patient characteristics. Moreover, 
patients are overtreated in fee-for-service payment systems to the same extent as they 
are undertreated in capitation systems, and this result extends into domains of risk and 
uncertainty in patient health. Interestingly, the type classification of physicians based on 
conditional altruism is generally unaffected by payment system; the common 
categorization is that physician altruism is guided by severity of illness, both under 
capitation and fee-for-service. 
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1. Introduction 
Uncertainty in health and altruistic behavior by doctors are two fundamental aspects in 
the organization of health care (Arrow, 1963). Individuals are uncertain about the 
incidence of and recovery from diseases and illnesses, and also about the availability of 
treatments and their effectiveness for health improvements. Naturally, physicians have 
greater knowledge about the alternative treatments and their consequences for recovery. 
This information asymmetry between patients and physicians is a traditional principal-
agent problem. Thus, the physicians will to a large extent, if not fully, influence the 
quantity and quality of the health care provided. Their effort is influenced by their 
preferences for own income as well as altruism1 toward the patient, which are together 
affected by the prevailing payment (remuneration) system (see, e.g., McGuire, 2000 for 
a general overview of payment systems). Due to budget constraints, a central issue in 
the provision of health care is allocation. Thus, many countries implement prioritization 
rules based on general ethical principles (e.g., Sabik and Lie, 2008; Shah, 2009), and 
physicians are incentivized to provide medical treatment that is in each patient’s best 
interest given these rules. As physicians are the gate keepers to the health care system, it 
is important for policy makers to understand how physicians trade off own income and 
altruism and how their behavior in this way corresponds to general principles for 
priority setting when deciding about quality and quantity of health care provided. It is 
particularly important that the policy makers understand how the physicians’ behavior is 
affected by the payment system and the presence of uncertainty in the effectiveness of 
medical treatment. The objective of the present paper is to investigate the altruistic 
behavior of doctors and whether their behavior is affected by the payment system and 
uncertainty in health outcome. To this end, I conduct an experiment exploring the causal 
effect of payment system and health outcome, which in this paper is assumed to depend 
on the quantity of treatment provided by the physician.  
The experiment shows that many physicians are altruistic toward their patients but also 
that the degree of altruism varies across patients with different medical needs: 
physicians provide more adequate treatment to patients in greater need of medical care, 
i.e., they provide further away from own payoff maximization in treating patients with 
more urgent medical conditions (e.g., patients with worse no-treatment profiles). This 
indicates that physicians condition their altruism on certain characteristics of the 
                                                 
1 Physician altruism relates to the broader concept of intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation generally 
refers to actions from which individuals derive internal rewards, whereas extrinsic motivation concerns 
behavior motivated by external rewards, such as monetary compensation (e.g., Deci, 1971; Deci and 
Ryan, 1985; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 2001; Bénabou and Tirole, 2003). 
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patients. Interestingly, the type classification of physicians based on such conditional 
altruism is generally unaffected by payment system; the common categorization is that 
physician altruism is guided by severity of illness, both under capitation and fee-for-
service. The results also show a strong effect of payment system on physicians’ 
provision behavior in general. Consistent with previous studies, patients are 
undertreated in capitation payment systems and overtreated in fee-for-service systems. 
With the present study, this result is extended into the domains of risk and uncertainty 
in the outcome of medical treatment for the patient. While the overall pattern of 
provision behavior is consistent across domains, detailed analysis using subjects’ 
generic risk and uncertainty preferences reveals individual heterogeneity in their 
reactions to the introduction of risk and uncertainty in patient health.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related literature, 
Section 3 describes the experimental design, Section 4 provides the experimental 
results, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Background 
Medical costs are increasing substantially, and this is to a large extent driven by an 
ageing population and rapid technological growth in the health care sector (e.g., 
Newhouse, 1992; Cutler, 2002). This poses a challenge for health care systems around 
the world and raises important questions regarding how to organize the health care 
system, with efficiency and priority setting often being the most important issues to 
consider. Monetary incentives have become an important component in the design of 
the health care system, since policy makers must rely on the agency of physicians in 
implementing their goals and preferred outcomes in health care. A central element in the 
quality of medical care is that physicians provide medical treatment that is in patients’ 
best interest, given existing rules and regulations for the health care sector. In other 
words, the health system depends on altruistic physicians who provide good and 
appropriate medical care for the patients. An important question is therefore how to 
design physician payment systems in order to achieve the best possible outcome along 
this dimension.  
Despite the increased reliance on monetary incentives in the form of different types of 
payment systems for providers of health care, relatively little is known empirically 
about the effects of these systems on physicians’ decision making at patient level. A key 
reason for this is that it is notoriously difficult to find exogenous variation in physician 
payment system using naturally occurring data. In other words, I would like to 
investigate the causal effects and not only correlation between two factors, for example 
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between payment system and quantity of treatment for patients.2 This is also the most 
relevant type of information for policy makers. However, it is very challenging to 
conduct field experiments, not least from an ethical perspective since the physical health 
of the participants would be affected (without their consent), and only a few studies 
exist (e.g., Krasnik et al., 1990; Gaynor and Gertler, 1995; Devlin and Sarma, 2008; 
Shigeoka and Fushimi, 2014). An emerging literature in behavioral and experimental 
health economics has used economic experiments in order to circumvent these problems 
of identification. Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011) introduced a novel experimental 
framework facilitating detailed investigation of the causal impact of payment system on 
physician behavior. In their experiment, subjects take on the role of physicians and 
decide on the provision of medical care for different types of patients who are identical 
in all respects other than the degree to which a given level of medical treatment affects 
their health. One of the key benefits of using a lab experiment is that there exists a 
theoretically known and in my case unique optimal quantity of medical care that 
maximizes the health benefit in each patient.  
One common way to model the physician’s behavior is based on Ellis and McGuire 
(1986). In their model, the utility function of a physician consists of two components, 
own income and health outcome for the patient, which capture the physician’s 
preference for own income and altruism toward the patient, respectively. In a capitation 
remuneration system, the physician receives a fixed payment related to the people she is 
assumed to be responsible to care for, and then makes an effort to improve their health. 
Thus, in the capitation system the emphasis is on the patient’s health and the physician’s 
altruism as expressed by giving up own income to improve the health of the patient. In 
contrast, in a fee-for-service remuneration system, physicians are paid for each amount 
of health care provided. As can easily be seen, these two systems consider the 
physician’s preference for own income differently. In the extreme case of a physician 
motivated exclusively by own income maximization, the two systems provide 
completely different amounts of treatment. Under capitation, there will not be any 
treatment and hence the patient will be undertreated, while under fee-for-service the 
patient will receive the maximum treatment, or until the point where the marginal utility 
of effort equals the utility of income provided by that unit of effort for the physician. In 
a fee-for-service system, this could result in treatment levels that might be both harmful 
and a waste of resources, which relates to what has been coined supplier-induced 
demand (e.g., Fuchs, 1978; Dranove and Wehner, 1994; Gruber and Owings, 1996; 
                                                 
2 For a general discussion on causality and experimental and survey methods, see Falk and Heckman 
(2009).  
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Shigeoka and Fushimi, 2014). In the other extreme case, where the physician is only 
affected by altruism,3 both payment systems result in optimal provision of health care 
for the patient. More likely, however, is that we have intermediate cases where the 
physician derives utility both from own income and altruism, in line with the discussion 
already in Arrow (1963). The relative degree of physicians’ preference for own income 
in relation to their altruism influences which of the two remuneration systems is 
preferred from a societal perspective.  
A robust finding in the experimental literature on physician behavior is that physicians 
provide significantly more medical care under fee-for-service payment systems than 
under capitation payment systems, to the extent that patients are overtreated under fee-
for-service and undertreated under capitation (Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011; Brosig-
Koch et al., 2013; Keser et al, 2014; Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen, 2014; Brosig-Koch et 
al., 2015a,b). Among these studies, the experimental designs in Brosig-Koch et al. 
(2013) and Brosig-Koch et al. (2015a,b) facilitate analysis of whether physicians 
provide better medical treatment under one payment system or the other, and capitation 
seems to be the marginally better system in this respect. In a re-analysis of the data from 
Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011), Godager and Wiesen (2013) focus on estimating the 
relative weight attached to own income and altruism. Their results confirm that most 
subjects assign a weight to both components, but there is large heterogeneity in the 
weights assigned.  
An interesting possibility concerning physician altruism is that it might vary across 
different types of patients. For example, physicians might be more altruistic toward 
patients with more severe illnesses, or they might be more altruistic toward patients 
with a high capacity to benefit from treatment. These are two different principles for 
allocation of health care, and they can be traced back to priority-setting principles based 
on medical need: The capacity-to-benefit principle implies a goal to maximize the 
overall level of health in the population (e.g., maximize the total number of quality-
adjusted life years, QALYs), whereas the severity-of-illness principle implies that 
health maximization should be weighted by medical condition (e.g., Dolan and Olsen, 
2001; Dolan et al., 2005). In practice, capacity to benefit has been the overarching goal 
in for example the UK, using QALY maximization as an explicit criterion, whereas 
severity of illness has been important in Norwegian, Swedish, and German health policy 
(Shah, 2009). 
                                                 
3 One example of this is Doctors Without Borders. 
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How physicians’ behavior corresponds to different principles for priority setting 
therefore has implications for how well the quality and quantity of health care provided 
correspond with existing rules and guidelines established for the health care sector. 
Different principles for allocation according to medical need yield different behavior, 
which can be traced back to different rules for priority setting (Culyer and Wagstaff, 
1993; Olsen, 1997; Cookson and Dolan, 2000). Based on the taxonomy in Williams and 
Cookson (2000), we can identify three general principles for provision according to 
medical need (two of which have already been mentioned). First, a principle to 
prioritize based on severity of illness gives precedence to the patient with the worst no-
treatment profile, i.e., the one with the worst outlook in the absence of treatment. This 
principle has been justified on grounds of equality (e.g., Williams, 1962), and, for 
urgent health problems (such as risk of death), based on a “rule of rescue” (Cookson and 
Dolan, 2000). Second, a capacity-to-benefit principle places the greatest weight on 
patients who will benefit the most from treatment and it is thus justified on grounds of 
maximizing the overall level of population health. Finally, one could provide health 
care with an aim to equalize ex-post health, a principle that can be justified by for 
example the “fair innings” argument, which stresses everyone’s right to a similarly 
normal span of life years in good health (Williams, 1997). 
For a systematic and detailed investigation of the influence of patients’ medical need on 
physician decision making, an experimental approach is suitable since it facilitates 
controlled ceteris paribus variation in patient characteristics and medical conditions, 
something that would be extremely difficult to accomplish using naturally occurring 
data. Based on an extension of the design in Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011), the present 
paper introduces a type classification of physicians in terms of conditional altruism, 
capturing how well their treatment decisions in the experiment align with the different 
principles for priority setting discussed above: severity of illness, capacity to benefit, 
and equalization of ex-post health (Williams and Cookson, 2000).  
There is often uncertainty about patients’ recovery from illness as well as the 
effectiveness of medical treatment, and this could affect physician behavior and altruism 
toward the patient. For example, in the event of uncertainty, some physicians might 
focus on the worst possible outcomes and thus become more cautious in their decisions 
compared with when there is little or no uncertainty regarding the effect of treatment for 
the patient. Generally speaking, assuming risk aversion we expect physicians in the 
experiment to on average provide medical treatment closer to patients’ optimal 
treatment levels when the treatment outcome is risky or uncertain than when it is 
certain. Since previous experimental research based on the framework introduced by 
Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011) has focused exclusively on situations when the outcome 
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of medical treatment is known for sure (it is deterministic), introducing the realistic 
aspects of risk and uncertainty in patient health seems very important for the analysis of 
physician response to payment system. 
In summary, I implement two novel extensions to the experimental framework 
introduced by Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011) and extended by Brosig-Koch et al. 
(2015c). This contributes to fill important gaps in the literature seeking to understand 
the impact of payment systems and the effect of risk and uncertainty in health benefits 
of treatments on physician behavior. 
3. Experiment 
3.1 Design 
The focus of the paper is on the effect of payment system (fee-for-service vs. capitation) 
on physicians’ treatment decisions. More specifically, I investigate the altruistic 
behavior of physicians and whether their behavior is affected by payment system, 
uncertainty in health outcome, and differences in patients’ medical needs. In the 
experiment, physicians are paid either through capitation or fee-for-service, and they 
meet patients who differ systematically from each other (i) in how certain their health 
benefits from treatment are (deterministic, risky, or uncertain) and (ii) in their medical 
needs. 
The experimental design builds on the framework introduced by Hennig-Schmidt et al. 
(2011) and extended by Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, Kairies-Schwarz, and Wiesen in 
a series of recent papers, e.g., Brosig-Koch et al. (2015c). I stay as close as possible to 
the latter version both in terms of experimental instructions and choice of parameters. In 
their (and my) experiment, subjects in the role of physicians decide on the quantity of 
medical treatment q ∈ {0,1, … , 10} for different types of patients.4 In treating the 
patients, physicians incur costs following a convex cost function and they also receive a 
payment as either a fixed sum up front (capitation) or a sum that varies with the level of 
medical treatment they provide (fee-for-service).  
In the experiment, each physician met patients with five different health profiles (A, B, 
C, D, and E). Each patient in the experiment is characterized by a health benefit 
                                                 
4 In reality, the treatment decision is ultimately made by the patient after trusting that the physician has 
provided accurate information about treatment possibilities and outcomes. However, since the 
information given is based on the physician’s assessments and decisions, in the experiment I assume that 
the physician is the actual decision maker. 
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function mapping the amount of medical treatment (q) into health benefit expressed in 
monetary terms. Figure 1 displays the benefit functions for the health profiles used in 
the experiment. For instance, if the physician gives a patient with health profile A five 
units of medical treatment (q=5), the resulting patient health benefit is 8 taler (the 
experimental currency used, later translated into euros), and the highest health benefit is 
received if q=7. The other health profiles are interpreted in a similar way. 
Figure 1 about here 
For each patient there is a unique interior level of medical treatment where the health 
benefit is maximized, and in either payment system the physician is faced with a 
tradeoff between patient health and own payoff maximization. Parameters for 
physicians’ cost of treatment and the payment they receive are set such that a purely 
selfish physician would choose q=0 (provide no medical treatment) under capitation. If 
the physician is not purely selfish but instead to some degree motivated by altruism 
toward the patient, he or she would choose q>0, and if sufficiently altruistic the 
physician would provide the level of medical treatment where the patient’s health 
benefit is maximized. For health profile A, this entails q=7. Under fee-for-service, a 
purely selfish physician would choose q=10 (i.e., would provide maximal medical 
treatment in order to maximize her own monetary payoff) whereas an altruistic 
physician would choose q<10 and if sufficiently altruistic would provide the medical 
treatment that is optimal for the patient. In order to facilitate comparison of the two 
different payment systems, the absolute values of marginal profits as well as the 
maximum profits are equivalent under both payment systems.5 The benefit functions are 
symmetric as well, such that a deviation from optimal treatment is equally bad in terms 
of health benefits whether caused by, say, a two-unit overtreatment or a two-unit 
undertreatment; in other words, the absolute deviation from optimal treatment is what 
influences the realized health benefits from the treatments. This is a simplification of 
reality but allows for clean comparison of different payment systems since the marginal 
effects (for the patient) of undertreatment and overtreatment are identical (Brosig-Koch 
et al., 2015a). 
There are no real patients present in the lab, but the amounts resulting from physicians’ 
decisions are transferred to a charity that funds certain medical treatments (described 
further below). These design features were key parts in the novel design introduced by 
                                                 
5 Experiment parameters: The cost function is 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞) = 𝑞𝑞2/10 and it is the same for all patients; the 
capitation payment is 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 10 for each patient; the fee-for-service payment is 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 2𝑞𝑞 for each 
patient. 
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Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011) and have since then been adopted by subsequent studies 
that build on the Hennig-Schmidt et al. design. The donation is crucial in creating a 
frame where decisions in the lab are made in a medical context. It means that 
physicians’ decisions in the experiment have consequences for real patients outside the 
lab and thereby they are explicitly incentivized to carefully consider the consequences 
for each (abstract) patient in the experiment when making their treatment decisions. The 
charity used was Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V., an organization that 
funds treatment of patients with eye cataracts, and the same organization was used as a 
recipient in previous studies using this design. In order to ensure participants that the 
donations would in fact be made after the experiment, the experiment instructions 
informed them that receipts of each transfer would be published on the experimental 
laboratory’s blackboard on a given date (see instructions in the Appendix). This allowed 
them to verify that the transferred amount corresponded to the specific amount (in euro) 
resulting from the payoff-relevant decisions made by all participants. This is standard 
procedure at MELESSA at the University of Munich, where all sessions of the 
experiment were conducted. 
In order to meet my research goals, I extend the design in Brosig-Koch et al. (2015c) in 
two dimensions. First, I allow for risk and uncertainty in the outcome of medical 
treatment. This is an extension compared with Brosig-Koch et al. and other previous 
studies, which only considered deterministic outcomes. Risk relates to situations with 
objectively known probabilities of outcomes whereas uncertainty concerns situations 
with vague or unknown probabilities. It is important to consider both risk and 
uncertainty, since previous research has shown that individuals make different choices 
under risk than under uncertainty, and that they tend to prefer situations characterized 
by risk rather than uncertainty even when one takes their subjective beliefs about 
probabilities into account (Ellsberg, 1961; for a review see, e.g., Camerer and Weber, 
1992). Uncertainty is especially relevant in the context of health care since in many 
situations involving clinical decision making, it is difficult to pin down the exact 
probability of a successful treatment outcome due to for example the complexity of 
many illnesses and expert disagreement regarding the effect of many treatments (for a 
discussion, see, e.g., Berger et al., 2013). 
I introduced risk in the deterministic design as follows: For each deterministic health 
benefit function (corresponding to each of the five health profiles mentioned earlier), a 
given level of medical treatment (q) yields a good outcome for the patient in terms of 
health benefit with a 0.5 probability and a bad outcome for the patient with a 0.5 
probability. The good outcome was always one taler above the corresponding outcome 
in the deterministic case, and, conversely, the bad outcome was always one taler below 
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the corresponding deterministic outcome. For example, in terms of the deterministic 
benefit function characterizing the patient with health profile A (see Figure 1), the good 
outcome for the patient treated with q=5 units of medical care was 9 taler and the bad 
outcome 7 taler.6 Uncertainty was introduced in a similar manner, with a good outcome 
at one taler above the corresponding deterministic outcome and a bad outcome at one 
taler below; yet in contrast to risk, the probabilities of the outcomes were unknown. 
Throughout the experiment, risk was represented by an opaque bag consisting of five 
black and five white balls, and uncertainty was represented by an opaque bag consisting 
of ten black and white balls, and outcomes were based on betting correctly on one of the 
two colors. This is similar for instance to the procedure in Sutter et al. (2013). 
I also extend the design in Brosig-Koch et al. (2015c) by investigating physician 
behavior and altruism toward the patients based on a systematic pairwise comparison of 
different types of benefit functions. I employ a slightly different set of benefit functions 
compared with Brosig-Koch et al. In my experiment, physicians met patients with five 
different health profiles (A, B, C, D, and E) which were separated by the shape of the 
health benefit function. In more detail, the health profiles differ with respect to: (i) the 
severity of patients’ health problems (the intercept of the benefit function), (ii) patients’ 
capacity to benefit from medical treatment (the slope), and (iii) the optimal level of 
medical treatment (where the health benefit is maximized). Figure 1 shows the benefit 
functions. In the spirit of Brosig-Koch et al. (2015c), the benefit functions are carefully 
designed so as to facilitate comparison across the two different payment systems used in 
the experiment (capitation and fee-for-service). For example, Figure 1 shows that the 
benefit function for health profile A is the mirror image of the one for profile B. This 
means that the marginal effect of undertreating A-patients, which is more likely under 
capitation, is identical to the marginal effect of overtreating B-patients, which is more 
likely under fee-for-service. A similar relationship between under- and overtreatment 
exists for benefit functions C, D, and E, since all of them are symmetric around q=5, 
which is the point where they reach their maximum value. 
The analysis of how physician behavior and altruism vary across patients with different 
                                                 
6 This implementation of risk in patient health resembles a situation where the variation in health outcome 
for the patient can differ across conditions and interventions even when the expected health gain for a 
single patient is quite similar. In the experiment, the outcome for the patient in the deterministic treatment 
is known for sure but in the risk treatment there is some variation in that the outcome is either better or 
worse compared with the deterministic treatment. This is realistic since there is often a varying degree of 
knowledge about various conditions, and some medical treatments have been more tested than others. The 
choice of probability at exactly 50-50 is made to facilitate understanding. Other combinations would be 
interesting as well and also plausible from a real-world perspective, such as a 0.9 probability of a modest 
gain (relative to the deterministic treatment) and a 0.1 probability of a very serious outcome. 
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medical needs is based on a comparison of patients with health profiles C and E, which 
are similar in that their health benefit is maximized at the same level of medical 
treatment (five units) and that their functions have the same intercept, but different in 
that the slope of the benefit function is steeper for E than for C. This allows for the 
following classification of physicians in terms of how well their treatment decisions in 
the experiment align with the different principles for priority setting according to 
medical need: First, physicians’ behavior corresponds to the equality principle if they 
provide better (i.e., closer to optimal) medical care to C-patients. These patients’ benefit 
function is flatter compared with E patients, which means that their capacity to benefit 
from medical care is lower and, thus, better medical care should be provided to C if the 
goal is to equalize health benefit ex post. For instance, four units to C and two units to E 
would achieve this goal. Second, physicians’ behavior corresponds to the principle of 
capacity to benefit if they provide worse medical care to C, since according to this 
principle medical care should be allocated in order to produce maximal health benefit. 
When this is the goal, C is at a disadvantage since the marginal increase in health 
benefit is lower for C than E due to the flatter slope of the benefit function. Third, 
physicians’ behavior corresponds to the severity-of-illness principle if they provide 
equal amounts of medical care to C and E, since both patients’ benefit functions have 
the same intercept and therefore the same no-treatment profile, i.e., their health benefit 
is identical without medical treatment. In addition, physicians who are purely self-
interested would maximize their own income and thus provide maximal medical 
treatment to both C and E in a fee-for-service payment system but not provide any 
medical treatment to either C or E in a capitation payment system. Physicians who are 
sufficiently altruistic toward their patients would give both C and E the optimal medical 
treatment, i.e., five units. 
Two types of sessions were conducted. The only difference between them is whether a 
capitation payment system (CAP sessions) or a fee-for-service payment system (FFS 
sessions) was used. In each session, physicians first made five treatment decisions in the 
case of deterministic patient health and each patient belonged to a different health 
profile A–E; then followed another five treatment decisions in the case of risky patient 
health; and the last five treatment decisions concerned patients with uncertain outcomes 
of medical treatment. This first part of the experiment is summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1 about here 
In the second part of the experiment, subjects’ individual risk and uncertainty 
preferences were elicited in a generic setting. I followed Sutter et al. (2013) and used 
incentivized choice lists where subjects decided between a fixed prospect and a sure 
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amount of money. The fixed prospect consists of a 50-50 lottery where the outcome is 
either 0 or 5 taler. The subject is asked to make repeated choices between a sure amount 
and the fixed prospect. The sure amount in the first choice is 0.25 taler and it is then 
increased by increments of 0.25 taler until it reaches 5 taler. For example, a risk-neutral 
subject would choose the fixed prospect when the sure amount is below 2.50 taler, 
which corresponds to the expected value of the lottery, and the sure amount when this 
amount is 2.50 taler or higher. Similarly, a risk-averse subject would choose the fixed 
prospect fewer times than a risk-neutral subject, while the opposite is true for a risk-
loving individual. Subjects completed two lists in total: the first concerning a risky 
prospect (known probabilities) and the second an uncertain prospect (unknown 
probabilities). Risk was represented by an opaque bag consisting of five black and five 
white balls and uncertainty was represented by an opaque bag consisting of ten black 
and white balls, exactly as in part one of the experiment. The money won added to the 
subjects’ total earnings in the experiment. In order to facilitate a gradual transition 
between physician decision making (first part of the experiment) and elicitation of 
individual risk and uncertainty preferences in the generic domain (second part of the 
experiment), subjects answered a few general questions related to health care and 
medical decision making upon completion of the first part of the experiment.7 
3.2 Procedural details 
The experiment was conducted at MELESSA, University of Munich. It was 
computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and participants were recruited from the 
existing student subject pool using the ORSEE online recruitment system (Greiner, 
2015). When subjects arrived, they were welcomed to the lab and randomized into 
cubicle workstations. They were told that the experiment consisted of several unrelated 
parts and received written instructions prior to each part (see Appendix). They were 
given plenty of time to read the instructions and ask questions (in private) before each 
part began. Before the first part of the experiment, they had to answer several control 
questions, and the experiment did not start until everyone had answered all questions 
correctly. 
There was no feedback between the different parts of the experiment. At the end of the 
experiment, subjects were paid for one randomly drawn decision in part one of the 
experiment, which concerned physician decision making, and for one randomly drawn 
                                                 
7 Additionally, there was a third part with another type of risk experiment. This part is not used in the 
current study. It was conducted after completion of the other two parts of the experiment and therefore 
does not affect the results in this paper. 
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decision in part two of the experiment, which concerned subjects’ individual risk and 
uncertainty preferences in a generic setting. Throughout the experiment, risk was 
represented by an opaque bag consisting of five black and five white balls and 
uncertainty was represented by an opaque bag consisting of ten black and white balls. 
There was one bag for risk and another bag for uncertainty for each of the different parts 
of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, one randomly selected individual drew 
a ball from each bag (and another individual announced the outcome). Before the 
drawing, all subjects had to guess (in private) the color of the ball drawn from each bag 
and a correct guess resulted in a good outcome and an incorrect guess resulted in a bad 
outcome for the corresponding decision of that particular individual. In order to ensure a 
credible process, subjects were told that they could verify the results from the public 
drawing (and check the composition of each of the different bags) at the end of the 
experiment. 
An experimental session lasted around 75 minutes and a total of 130 students 
participated in the experiment, 64 in FFS sessions and 66 in CAP sessions. 
4. Results 
I begin with a description of the average quantities of medical treatment chosen for each 
patient under FFS and CAP, respectively. These are displayed in Figure 2, together with 
the optimal quantity of medical treatment required by each patient (dotted line). The 
figure provides a summary of the experimental results, and two main findings stand out. 
First, there is a strong effect of payment system on the quantity of medical treatment 
provided by physicians in the experiment. For example, patient 1 is on average provided 
8.03 units of medical treatment in FFS and 2.73 units of medical treatment in CAP. 
Averaged over all patients, 66% less medical treatment was provided in CAP compared 
with FFS, and we can see in the figure that patients are on average undertreated in CAP 
and overtreated in FFS. These results are in line with previous experimental results 
(e.g., Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011; Brosig-Koch et al., 2015c). Second, this pattern 
prevails under risk and uncertainty in the effect of medical treatment on patient health. 
For example, patients with health profile A (patients 1, 6, and 11) are provided close to 
8 units of medical care by FFS physicians in all three health benefit categories, i.e., 
deterministic, risky and uncertain health benefits. On average, physicians seem to 
neither increase nor decrease their level of medical treatment compared with the 
baseline case of treating the same types of patients with deterministic benefit functions. 
Figure 2 about here 
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Table 2 shows in detail the effect of payment system on the average deviation from 
optimal medical treatment. Patients are overtreated by an average of 2.48 units of 
medical treatment in FFS and undertreated by an average of 2.46 units in CAP. The 
difference between FFS and CAP is significant at the 1% level (Mann-Whitney U test; p 
< 0.01, N = 130). Since the benefit functions are symmetric such that the marginal 
effects (for the patient) of undertreatment and overtreatment are identical, the absolute 
deviation from optimal treatment is what influences the realized health benefit for the 
patient. We can see that the average absolute deviation from optimal treatment is not 
significantly different between CAP and FFS (Mann-Whitney U test; p = 0.82, N = 
130). The final two columns of Table 2 show the proportion of purely selfish decisions 
(q=0 in CAP and q=10 in FFS) and the proportion of decisions that were optimal for the 
patient, respectively. Interestingly, there seem to be more selfish physicians but also 
more physicians who are purely altruistic in FFS than in CAP, but neither difference is 
significant in this case. Overall, patients are treated equally well (or badly) in either 
payment system; i.e., the problems of undertreatment (in CAP) and overtreatment (in 
FFS) are approximately similar in terms of magnitude, resulting in the same health 
levels for the patients.8 
Table 2 about here 
Table 3 shows the effect of for sure, risky, and uncertain outcome in health on the 
choices of quantity of medical treatment measured as the absolute deviation from 
optimal treatment of patients.9 In general, there is a small increase in the absolute 
deviation from optimal treatment when the outcome in patient health is risky or 
uncertain instead of sure. Since it is a within-subject comparison, I use a signed rank 
test. The comparisons with the baseline, i.e., deterministic health benefit, are generally 
insignificant apart from the case of CAP, where there is a difference between uncertain 
and deterministic health benefits. By and large, the introduction of risk and uncertainty 
in the effect of medical treatment on patient health does not seem to affect physicians’ 
provision behavior in the experiment.  
Table 3 about here 
Tables 4 and 5 offer a more detailed analysis of treatment decisions. The tables present 
the share of subjects providing optimal medical treatment, for each health profile in the 
                                                 
8 The results are similar when disaggregated by health profile (A and B vs. C, D, and E), and this can be 
seen in the Appendix, Table A1. 
9 See Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix for a disaggregation by health profile, which yields similar 
results.  
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case of deterministic, risky, and uncertain health benefit functions, respectively. To 
begin with, we can see a difference in the first two health profiles, A and B. This is 
expected since they are mirror images of each other, with A requiring a larger quantity 
of medical treatment (for optimal health benefit) than B, thereby making it more costly 
in terms of foregone income to treat A than B in CAP but less costly in FFS. For 
example, in deterministic FFS, 43.8% of subjects provide optimal treatment to the 
patient with health profile A but only 14.1% of subjects do so for health profile B; by 
contrast, only 4.5% of subjects treat A optimally in CAP but 50% of subjects do so for 
B. Health profiles C–E are similar to each other in that the patient health benefit is 
maximized at five units of medical care for all three profiles, and the differences across 
FFS and CAP are less pronounced as expected since it is equally costly for physicians to 
provide optimal medical treatment under either payment system. Turning to the effect of 
risk and uncertainty, we can see that, in FFS, there is a significant difference at the 10% 
level using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests only for health profiles B and D and only when 
comparing deterministic and risky health benefit functions. In CAP, there is a 
significant difference at the 10% level using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for health 
profiles B and D when comparing deterministic and uncertain health benefit functions, 
and there is also a significant difference at the 5% level using a Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test between deterministic and risky health benefit functions for health profile D. 
Overall, the share of subjects who provide optimal medical care seems little affected by 
risk and uncertainty in patient health under both payment systems. 
Tables 4 and 5 about here 
The main results regarding the effects of payment system and of risk and uncertainty in 
the effect of medical treatment on patient health are formulated as follows. 
Result 1. There is a strong effect of payment system on physician provision behavior. 
Patients are undertreated under capitation and overtreated under fee-for-service. 
Moreover, they are undertreated under capitation to approximately the same degree as 
they are overtreated under fee-for-service. Patients are thus on average equally well off 
under both systems. 
Result 2. The overall pattern of provision behavior is unaffected by the introduction of 
risk and uncertainty in the effect of medical treatment on patient health. 
The effects of risk and uncertainty are investigated in more detail by using subjects’ 
generic risk and uncertainty preferences, which were elicited in a later (second) part of 
the experiment. Table 6 compares deterministic and risky health benefits: medical 
treatment measured as the absolute deviation from optimal treatment is regressed on a 
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dummy for the five patients with risky benefit functions (Risk), on the measure of 
individual risk preference (Risk for self), and on the interaction between these two 
variables and several control variables (including age, gender, and health status). 
Standard errors in the regressions are clustered on individuals. Risk for self was elicited 
using incentivized choice lists where subjects decided between a fixed prospect and a 
sure amount of money that increased along the list. In FFS (columns 1 and 2), there is a 
small effect (significant at the 10% level) of the introduction of risk, such that 
physicians on average increase their overtreatment by 0.105 units of medical care; yet 
there is no effect of subjects’ risk preferences. In contrast, in CAP, subjects’ risk 
preferences are correlated with both how well they treat their patients on average 
(column 3) and how they change their behavior when patient health is risky rather than 
deterministic (column 4). As indicated by the positive and significant interaction term, 
introducing risk in the effect of medical treatment on patient health makes subjects who 
are more risk averse provide medical treatment closer to patients’ optimal treatment 
levels.10 This effect is partly explained by the fact that these subjects seem to provide 
worse medical care in the first place, i.e., when patient health is deterministic. 
Table 6 about here 
Table 7 shows the results from the corresponding analysis of uncertainty in the effect of 
medical treatment on patient health.11 The uncertainty treatment is identical to the risk 
treatment except that the probabilities of the outcome of medical treatment for the 
patients were unknown. There is an overall and marginally significant effect of 
uncertainty on physicians’ provision behavior in FFS (columns 1 and 2), similar to the 
effect of risk investigated in Table 6. In CAP, the effect is correlated with individuals’ 
generic uncertainty preferences (column 4): More uncertainty-averse subjects become 
better doctors and this effect is similar to the one observed when patient health is risky. 
However, unlike their risk preferences, subjects’ uncertainty preferences are not 
                                                 
10 For instance, when the expression in column 4 of Table 6 is evaluated at Risk for self = 6, the marginal 
effect of Risk on the absolute deviation from optimal treatment is -0.22 (p = 0.02). This would implies 
that physicians on average provide 0.22 units of medical care closer to patients’ optimum when patient 
health is risky. At Risk for self = 4, the marginal effect is -0.38 (p = 0.02). (Risk for self = 6 means that 
that subjects switch to the certain amount of money at row 6 in the individual choice task, consistent with 
risk aversion. In CAP, 20% of the subjects switch here or earlier. Risk-neutral individuals would switch at 
10.) 
11 The results for both risk and uncertainty are similar when disaggregated by health profile (A and B vs. 
C, D, and E) and this can be seen in the Appendix, Tables A4 and A5. Using the level of medical 
treatment (q) as a dependent variable instead of the absolute deviation from optimal treatment (as in 
Tables 6 and 7) produces similar results, except that the correlation between the effect of risk 
(uncertainty) and individuals’ generic risk (uncertainty) preferences is somewhat weaker. The effect is 
similar when using Tobit instead of OLS; these regressions are available upon request. 
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correlated with the level of medical treatment they provide when patient health is 
deterministic (column 3). 
Table 7 about here 
Result 3. Physicians’ generic risk and uncertainty preferences affect their reactions to 
risk and uncertainty in the effect of medical treatment on patient health under CAP. In 
particular, more risk-averse subjects provide treatment closer to patients’ optimal 
treatment levels following the introduction of risk in patient health; and more 
uncertainty-averse individuals provide treatment closer to patient optimum following 
the introduction of uncertainty in patient health. 
Next, we turn to the analysis of altruism and conditional altruism of physicians. 
Physician behavior is assumed to be influenced by two key components: their altruism 
toward the patient and preference for own income. Physicians who are purely selfish 
choose q=0 and q=10 under CAP and FFS, respectively. Table 8 displays the proportion 
of subjects who made a selfish decision at least once and also the proportion who were 
selfish in all their treatment decisions. We restrict attention to the case of deterministic 
benefit functions. For example, in FFS, 20.3% of the physicians always made a purely 
selfish decision and 31.3% did so at least once. By comparison, in CAP, 10.6% of the 
physicians were always selfish and 27.3% were selfish at least once. It is interesting that 
physicians who were always selfish when deciding for patients with profiles C, D, or E 
were also selfish in their decisions for patients with profiles A and B, even though it is 
comparatively less costly to provide one of these patients with optimal medical 
treatment.12 The table also shows a similar analysis for the proportion of physicians who 
made optimal decisions for their patients. For example, 46.9% in FFS and 53.0% in 
CAP decided optimally at least once, whereas 10.9% in FFS and 3.0% in CAP provided 
optimal medical treatment for all of their patients. This indicates that many physicians 
are altruistic but also that the degree of altruism varies across different types of patients. 
This is further investigated in Table 9, where physicians’ provision of medical care to 
patients from health profiles C and D are compared. The comparison is interesting since 
based on the discussion about different principles of medical need (equality, capacity to 
benefit, and severity of illness), we know that C patients are in equal or greater need 
than D patients: While their capacity to benefit from medical care is identical, they are 
worse off without treatment (severity-of-illness principle) and also require better 
                                                 
12 Optimal medical treatment is 7 units for patients from A, 3 units for patients from B, and 5 units for 
patients from C, D, or E. Thus, in CAP it is less costly to provide B with optimal treatment than C, D, or 
E; and vice versa for FFS where it is less costly to provide A with optimal medical treatment. 
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treatment in order to equalize health ex post (equality principle). In the table, we can see 
that patients with health profile C do receive better medical treatment than patients with 
health profile D. The difference is most pronounced under the fee-for-service payment 
system, in particular when there is risk or uncertainty in the effect of medical treatment 
on patient health. For example, with uncertainty in patient health, FFS physicians 
provided 0.42 units of medical care closer to patient optimum when treating patients 
with profile C than when treating patients with profile D. 
Tables 8 and 9 about here 
Result 4. Many physicians are altruistic toward their patients. The degree of altruism 
depends on the medical need of the patient: Patients with health profile C are provided 
better medical care than patients with profile D; the effect is stronger under FFS and 
increases with risk and uncertainty in the effect of medical treatment on patient health. 
The type classification of physicians based on how their behavior and altruism vary 
across patients with different medical needs is based on a comparison of medical 
treatment provided to patients with health profiles C and E. We can identify three broad 
categories of physicians: (1) purely selfish physicians who always choose so as to 
maximize own income, (2) purely altruistic physicians who always choose so as to 
maximize patient health benefit, and (3) physicians who take both of these two 
perspectives into account, choosing a mix between full altruism and own income 
maximization. Table 10 shows the distribution of physicians over these three categories 
based on their decisions in the case of deterministic benefit functions. Interestingly, 
there are more purely selfish physicians but also more purely altruistic physicians in 
FFS than in CAP, which thus has a greater share of physicians in the third category, i.e., 
who seem to be motivated both by own income and altruism. Based on these three 
categories, the type distribution is significantly different between the two payment 
systems (Kruskal-Wallis test; p = 0.05, N = 130). 
The only difference between C and E is that the slope of the benefit function is steeper 
in the latter and this allows for the following more detailed classification of physicians 
within the mix-category (see Section 3 for details): Physicians’ behavior corresponds to 
the priority principle of equality ex post if they provide better (i.e., closer to optimal) 
medical care to C; physicians’ behavior corresponds to the capacity-to-benefit principle 
if they provide worse medical care to C; and, finally, physicians’ behavior corresponds 
to the severity-of-illness principle if they provide equal amounts of medical care to C 
and E. This more detailed information about the distribution of physician types is also 
displayed in Table 10. Overall, we can see that among those who choose a mix between 
full altruism and own income maximization, the altruistic part is mostly described by 
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concerns for severity of illness (38.5% and 47.1% of FFS and CAP subjects, 
respectively). In general, this principle implies that patients with worse no-treatment 
profiles should be given priority, even if their capacity to benefit from medical 
treatment is comparatively low. The capacity-to-benefit principle follows quite closely, 
with the behavior of 35.9% of FFS subjects and 39.2% of CAP subjects corresponding 
to this principle. A minority of subjects behave in accordance with the principle of ex-
post equality. Moreover, we can see that there are some differences in the distribution of 
physician types between the two payment systems. In FFS, the distribution is fairly 
balanced across the different types: 25.6%, 35.9%, and 38.5% of subjects provide 
treatment corresponding to equality ex-post, capacity to benefit, and severity of illness, 
respectively. In contrast, in CAP, only a small minority of physicians, i.e., 13.7%, 
provide treatment corresponding to the equality-ex-post principle, whereas 47.1% make 
decisions consistent with the severity-of-illness principle. However, these differences in 
distribution are not statistically significant in a Kruskal-Wallis test, neither when 
comparing within the full sample (p = 0.32, N = 130) nor when comparing within the 
subsample of physicians who belong to the mix-category (p = 0.23, N = 89). Thus, taken 
together, physician altruism seems fairly robust to the choice of payment system in the 
experiment. 
Table 10 about here 
Result 5. There are more pure altruists but also more pure selfish physicians in FFS 
than in CAP, but the more detailed distribution of physician types according to how 
well their treatment decisions correspond to the different principles for priority setting 
is not affected by payment system. In both CAP and FFS, altruistic behavior toward the 
patients is mostly guided by severity of illness.  
5. Discussion and conclusion 
As already discussed by Arrow (1963), two key issues for the health care sector are 
uncertainty in health and altruistic behavior by physicians. In this paper, I use a lab 
experiment to investigate the altruistic behavior of physicians and whether this behavior 
is affected by payment system and risk and uncertainty in health outcome. In order to 
contain increasing medical costs in health care systems around the world, there is a 
growing focus on using monetary incentives in the provision of health care. The aim is 
to incentivize physicians to provide medical treatment that is in each patient’s best 
interest, given existing rules and regulations for the health care sector. However, there is 
limited empirical evidence regarding the direct impact of such incentives on clinical 
decision making, and thus on the ability of policy makers to use different types of 
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physician reimbursement schemes in order to implement their goals and preferred 
outcomes in health care. A key issue is that it is difficult to find exogenous variation in 
physician payment systems using naturally occurring data, for example in the form of 
natural experiments or field experiments where the payment systems are varied, which 
would be needed in order to make causal inference. 
This paper uses a lab experiment to circumvent problems of identification and 
furthermore to provide detailed analysis of individual-level decision making, thereby 
contributing to the existing literature on effects of payment system on the provision of 
health care. Building on the experimental framework introduced by Hennig-Schmidt et 
al. (2011) and used and extended by many researchers, most notably by Brosig-Koch et 
al. (2015c), I implement two novel extensions, thus investigating (i) how physician 
altruism is affected by payment system (capitation vs. fee-for-service) and patients’ 
medical needs and (ii) how physicians’ response to payment system is affected by risk 
and uncertainty in the outcome of medical treatment for the patient, which is a 
fundamental aspect of physicians’ decision environment in the real world. This 
contributes to fill important gaps in the literature seeking to understand the detailed 
effects of different payment systems on physicians’ treatment decisions, where their 
utility is assumed to consist of two key elements: concern for own income and altruism 
toward the patient. Altruism among physicians was discussed by Arrow (1963) and then 
prominently developed by Ellis and McGuire (1986).13 Godager and Wiesen (2013) 
analyze physician altruism based on Ellis and McGuire (1986) using the data in Hennig-
Schmidt et al. (2011) and find a large degree of altruism but also substantial 
heterogeneity across physicians. With my experiment, I extend the analysis of 
heterogeneity in physician behavior and the results suggest that physician altruism 
varies not only between physicians but also systematically within them. This is in line 
with the concept of conditional altruism, i.e., that the degree of altruism toward the 
patient varies across patients with different medical needs.  
Data from the experiment show that many physicians behave altruistically toward their 
patients but also that the degree of altruism varies across patient type, which indicates 
that physicians condition their altruism on certain characteristics of the patients. This 
variation across patients is mostly described by concerns for severity of illness, i.e., 
patients with more severe illnesses are given better medical care than otherwise 
identical patients with less urgent medical conditions. There are more selfish physicians 
                                                 
13 See also, e.g., Woodward and Warren-Boulton (1984), Chalkley and Malcomson (1998), and Ma and 
Riordan (2002). Galizzi et al. (2015) provides a recent overview. 
21 
but also more purely altruistic physicians under fee-for-service than under capitation. 
Interestingly, even though the overall level of medical treatment differs substantially 
between capitation and fee-for-service payment, there is no significant difference in the 
distribution of physician types based on conditional altruism. The results also show a 
strong effect of payment system on physicians’ provision behavior in general, consistent 
with previous studies using a similar design. The present paper is the first to show that 
the results extend into the domains of risk and uncertainty in the effect of medical 
treatment on patient health. While the overall pattern of provision behavior is consistent 
across domains, detailed analysis using subjects’ generic risk and uncertainty 
preferences reveals individual heterogeneity in their reactions to the introduction of risk 
and uncertainty in patient health. This heterogeneity seems to depend on the payment 
system: There is a significant correlation between degree of risk aversion and response 
to patient risk and uncertainty under capitation but not under fee-for-service.  
At a broader level, this paper relates to the discussion about using more detailed and 
fine-grained incentives in health care, such as performance-based payments targeting 
best practices and health outcomes for specific types of illnesses. Along these lines, a 
natural development would be to consider risk-differentiated payment systems in health 
care. For example, if physicians making decisions about risky treatments become overly 
cautious under certain types of payment systems, these types of incentives should be 
avoided in such situations. In the experiment, fee-for-service seems to be the marginally 
better payment system in this respect, since there is less heterogeneity in the effect of 
patient risk on physician behavior compared with the capitation payment system. One 
interpretation of this is that the monetary incentives under fee-for-service are stronger 
(perhaps they are more salient) than under capitation, thus leaving less room for 
decision making modulated by individual risk preference and other factors. However, 
since the magnitude of the difference in the effect of risk and uncertainty between 
capitation and fee-for-service is quite small, the overall implication for the organization 
of health care is that there is probably not much to gain from involving aspects of 
patient risk in the design of physician payment systems. Along these lines, an 
interesting aspect to consider in future research is the effect of the payment system on 
physician behavior in situations where more serious health outcomes are possible but 
also relatively unlikely to occur.  
Medical need is a key aspect in selecting socially preferred allocations of scarce medical 
resources, in normative analysis and also in health policy. In discussing how physician 
behavior and altruism toward the patients correspond to different principles for priority 
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setting based on medical need, the capacity-to-benefit principle can be seen as the 
benchmark since it is directly connected to the marginal health benefit of the patient.14 
In light of this, it is interesting to note that a majority of physicians in the experiment do 
not behave in accordance with this ethical principle, but rather seem to factor in other 
aspects of medical need as well, such as the severity of illness. The popularity of this 
principle is in line with the public view in many countries, including France, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK, that health improvements are more valuable 
for people with more severe illnesses (e.g., Dolan et al., 2005; Shah, 2009; Nord and 
Johansen, 2014). This is also reflected in health policy. For example, in the UK, the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) Citizen Council reached 
the conclusion that the severity of illness should be taken into account when making 
decisions, alongside the already established criteria based on cost and clinical 
effectiveness (NICE, 2008).15 Similarly, in the early 1990s the State of Oregon 
increased the coverage of the publicly funded Medicaid health program, and the 
expansion included an explicit focus on health care prioritization based strictly on cost 
effectiveness in order to contain costs. However, the public reactions were negative and 
the policy was later adjusted so that other factors, including the severity of illness, were 
allowed to influence prioritization as well (Ham, 1998; Tinghög, 2011). 
For health policy, the main takeaway from the experiment is that payment systems seem 
to affect neither the distribution of medical care nor physician response to risk and 
uncertainty in the outcome of medical treatment for the patient. One aspect in favor of 
the capitation payment system is that it seems to result in fewer cases of physicians only 
interested in own income. This payment system also generated a greater proportion of 
physicians motivated by a mixture of own income and altruism, and these physicians 
were generally responsive to patients’ medical need in their treatment decisions. The 
heterogeneity within each payment system regarding how physicians’ behavior 
corresponds to general principles for priority setting calls for careful consideration when 
designing payment systems in the future. An important aspect in this respect could be to 
develop clearer clinical guidelines, something that has been emphasized, e.g., in the UK. 
Another suggestion is to test mixed or performance-based payment systems in health 
care (e.g., Brosig-Koch et al., 2013, 2015a), and this could be further investigated in 
                                                 
14 For example, in Ellis and McGuire (1986), the marginal rate of substitution between own income and 
health benefit for the patient determines how much medical treatment the physician wants to provide. 
15 NICE provides advice and guidance for clinical and public health professionals in the UK. A citizen 
council was established by NICE in 2002 in order to “provide advice about the social values that should 
underpin the Institute’s guidance” (NICE, 2008). The council has met and discussed several different 
issues and in 2008 they met to discuss the case of severity of illness. 
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future research.  
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful to Peter Martinsson, Gustav Kjellsson, Martin Kocher, and Olof 
Johansson-Stenman for valuable comments and suggestions. I wish to thank seminar 
and conference participants at the University of Gothenburg for helpful comments and 
discussion. Financial support from Formas through the program Human Cooperation to 
Manage Natural Resources (COMMONS) is gratefully acknowledged, and I kindly 
thank MELESSA at the University of Munich for providing laboratory resources. 
  
24 
References 
Arrow, K.J., 1963. Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American 
Economic Review 53 (5), 941–973. 
Bénabou, R., Tirole, J., 2003. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Review of Economic 
Studies 70 (3), 489–520. 
Berger, L., Bleichrodt, H., Eeckhoudt, L., 2013. Treatment decisions under ambiguity. 
Journal of Health Economics 32 (3), 559–569. 
Brosig-Koch, J., Hennig-Schmidt, H., Kairies, N., Wiesen, D., 2013. How effective are 
pay-for-performance incentives for physicians? A laboratory experiment. Ruhr 
Economic Papers 413. 
Brosig-Koch, J., Hennig-Schmidt, H., Kairies-Schwarz, N., Wiesen, D., 2015a. The 
effects of introducing mixed payment systems for physicians – experimental evidence. 
Health Economics, forthcoming. 
Brosig-Koch, J., Kairies-Schwarz, N., Kokot, J., 2015b. Sorting into physician payment 
schemes – a laboratory experiment. Ruhr Economic Papers 529. 
Brosig-Koch, J., Hennig-Schmidt, H., Kairies-Schwarz, N., Wiesen, D., 2015c. Using 
artefactual field and lab experiments to investigate how fee-for-service and capitation 
affect medical service provision. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 
forthcoming. 
Camerer, C., Weber, M., 1992. Recent developments in modeling preferences: 
uncertainty and ambiguity. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5 (4), 325–370. 
Chalkley, M., Malcomson, J., 1998. Contracting for health services when patient 
demand does not reflect quality. Journal of Health Economics 17 (1), 1–19. 
Cookson, R., Dolan, P., 2000. Principles of justice in health care rationing. Journal of 
Medical Ethics 26 (5), 323–329. 
Culyer, A.J., Wagstaff, A., 1993. Equity and equality in health and health care. Journal 
of Health Economics 12 (4), 431–457 
Cutler, D., 2002. Equality, efficiency, and market fundamentals: the dynamics of 
international medical-care reform. Journal of Economic Literature 40 (3), 881–906. 
Deci, E.L., 1971. Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation. Journal 
25 
of Personality and Social Psychology 18 (1), 105–115. 
Deci, E. L., Ryan, R. M., 1985. Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human 
Behavior, Plenum, New York. 
Devlin, R.A., Sarma, S., 2008. Do physician remuneration schemes matter? The case of 
Canadian family physicians. Journal of Health Economics 27 (5), 1168–1181. 
Dolan, P., Olsen, J.A., 2001. Equity in health: the importance of different health 
streams. Journal of Health Economics 20 (5), 823–834. 
Dolan, P., Shaw, R., Tsuchiya, A., Williams, A., 2005. QALY maximization and 
people’s preferences: a methodological review of the literature. Health Economics 14 
(2), 197–208. 
Dranove, D., Wehner, P., 1994. Physician-induced demand for childbirths. Journal of 
Health Economics 13 (1), 61–73. 
Ellsberg, D., 1961. Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 75 (4), 643–669. 
Ellis, R., McGuire, T., 1986. Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement: cost 
sharing and supply. Journal of Health Economics 5 (2), 129–151. 
Falk, A., Heckman, J., 2009. Lab experiments are a major source of knowledge in the 
social sciences. Science 326, 535–538. 
Fischbacher, U., 2007. z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. 
Experimental Economics 10 (2), 171–178. 
Frey, B.S., Oberholzer-Gee, F., 1997. The cost of price incentives: an empirical analysis 
of motivation crowding-out. American Economic Review, 87 (4): 746–755. 
Fuchs, V., 1978. The supply of surgeons and the demand for operations. Journal of 
Human Resources 13, 35–56. 
Galizzi, M., Tammi, T., Godager, G., Linnosmaa, I., Wiesen, D., 2015. Provider 
altruism in health economics. National Institute for Health and Welfare Discussion 
Paper 4/2015. 
Gaynor, M., Gertler, P., 1995. Moral hazard and risk spreading in partnerships. RAND 
Journal of Economics 26 (4), 591–613. 
26 
Godager, G., Wiesen, D., 2013. Profit or patients’ health benefit? Exploring the 
heterogeneity in physician altruism. Journal of Health Economics 32 (6), 1105–1116. 
Greiner, B., 2015. Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with 
ORSEE. Journal of the Economic Science Association 1 (1), 114–125. 
Gruber, J., Owings, M., 1996. Physician financial incentives and cesarean section 
delivery. RAND Journal of Economics 27 (1), 99–123. 
Ham, C., 1998. Retracing the Oregon trail: the experience of rationing and the Oregon 
health plan. British Medical Journal 316, 1965–1969. 
Hennig-Schmidt, H., Selten, R., Wiesen, D., 2011. How payment systems affect 
physicians’ provision behavior–an experimental investigation. Journal of Health 
Economics 30 (4), 637–646. 
Hennig-Schmidt, H., Wiesen, D., 2014. Other-regarding behavior and motivation in 
health care provision: an experiment with medical and non-medical students. Social 
Science and Medicine 108, 156–165. 
Keser, C., Peterle, E., Schnitzler, C., 2014. Money talks: paying physicians for 
performance. Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research 
Discussion Paper 173. 
Krasnik, A., Groenewegen, P.P., Pedersen, P.A., Scholten, P., Mooney, G., Gottschau, 
A., Flierman, H.A., Damsgaard, M., 1990. Changing remuneration systems: effects on 
activity in general practice. British Medical Journal 300, 1698-1701. 
Ma, C.A., Riordan, M.H., 2002. Health insurance, moral hazard and managed care. 
Journal of Health Economics and Management Strategy 11 (1), 81–107. 
McGuire, T., 2000. Physician agency, in: Culyer, A., Newhouse, J. (Eds.), Handbook of 
Health Economics. North Holland, Amsterdam. 
Newhouse, J., 1992. Medical care costs: how much welfare loss? Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 6 (3), 3–21. 
NICE, 2008. Quality adjusted life years (QALYs) and the severity of illness. NICE 
Citizens Council Meeting Report 10, http://www.nice.org.uk/Media/Default/Get-
involved/Citizens-Council/Reports/CCReport10QALYSeverity.pdf 
Nord, E., Johansen, R., 2014. Concerns for severity in priority setting in health care: a 
27 
review of trade-off data in preference studies and implications for societal willingness to 
pay for a QALY. Health Policy 116 (2–3), 281–288. 
Olsen, J.A., 1997. Theories of justice and their implications for priority setting in health 
care. Journal of Health Economics 16 (6), 625–639. 
Sabik, L.M., Lie, R.K., 2008. Priority setting in health care: lessons from the experience 
of eight countries. International Journal for Equity in Health 7: 4. 
Shah, K.K, 2009. Severity of illness and priority setting in healthcare: a review of the 
literature. Health Policy 93 (2–3), 77–84. 
Shigeoka, H., Fushimi, K., 2014. Supplier-induced demand for newborn treatment: 
evidence from Japan. Journal of Health Economics 35, 162–178. 
Sutter, M., Kocher, M.G., Glätzle-Rützler, D., Trautmann, S.T., 2013. Impatience and 
uncertainty: experimental decisions predict adolescents’ field behavior. American 
Economic Review 103 (1), 510–531. 
Tinghög, G., 2011. The Art of Saying No: The Economics and Ethics of Health Care 
Rationing. PhD thesis, Linköping University. 
Williams, A., 1997. Intergenerational equity: an exploration of the ‘fair innings’ 
argument. Health Economics 6 (2), 117–132. 
Williams, B., 1962. The idea of equality, in: Laslett, P., Runciman, W.G. (Eds.), 
Philosophy, Politics and Society. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
Williams, A., Cookson, R., 2000. Equity in health, in: Culyer, A., Newhouse, J. (Eds.), 
Handbook of Health Economics. North Holland, Amsterdam. 
Woodward, R., Warren-Boulton, F., 1984. Considering the effect of financial incentives 
and professional ethics on ‘appropriate’ medical care. Journal of Health Economics 3 
(3), 223–237. 
  
28 
Appendix A: Disaggregation of results by health profile 
Insert Tables A1–A5 about here 
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Appendix B: Instructions for the experiment 
[Included below are the original instructions for the CAP treatment. Whenever there is 
a difference between the CAP and FFS treatments, this is noted in the text.] 
 
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating! 
 
You are participating in an economic experiment on decision behavior. Please read the 
instructions carefully before the experiment starts. These instructions are solely for your 
private information. It is prohibited to communicate with others taking part in this 
experiment during the course of the session. Should you have any questions, please ask 
us by raising your hand and you questions will be answered privately. If you violate this 
rule, we will have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.  
 
You and the other participants will be asked to make decisions for which you can earn 
money in addition to the 4 euros you will receive for participating in the experiment. 
Your payoff will depend on the decisions you make. At the end of the experiment, your 
payoff will be converted to euros and paid to you in cash. During the experiment, all 
amounts are presented in the experimental currency Taler. 
 
1 Taler = 1 euro. 
 
The experiment will take about 90 minutes and consists of three parts. You will receive 
detailed instructions prior to each part. The parts of the experiment are completely 
unrelated, which means that the decisions made in one part will not affect your earnings 
in the other parts. The sum of earnings from the different parts will constitute your total 
earnings from the experiment (together with the 4 euro show-up fee). 
 
Part One 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully. We will approach you in about 10 
minutes to answer any questions you may have. If you have questions at any time 
during the experiment, please raise your hand and we will come to you. Part one of the 
experiment consists of 15 rounds of decision situations (and at the end of part one we 
will ask you to answer a few general questions related to health care and medical 
decision making). 
 
Decision situations 
 
In each round, you will take on the role of a physician and decide on the quantity of 
medical treatment for a given illness in a patient. That is, you will determine the 
quantity of medical services you wish to provide to the patient for a given illness. 
  
The illnesses differ in two dimensions: (i) the relationship between the quantity of 
medical treatment and the resulting health benefit and (ii) the certainty in health benefit 
resulting from medical treatment. 
 
 For illnesses in category 1, there is no risk or uncertainty involved in the 
treatment. This means that you will always know the exact health benefit 
resulting from the provided medical treatment. Below is a screenshot of the 
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information provided about the quantity of the medical treatment and the patient 
benefit (for the time being please focus only on the white columns). For 
example, if you provide the patient with a quantity of 2 medical services, the 
resulting health benefit is 7, and if you provide the patient with a quantity of 4 
medical services, the resulting health benefit is 9.  
 
 
Example patient 
Illness in category 1 (no risk or uncertainty) 
 
 
 
 
 
Quantity of 
medical 
treatment 
Your 
capitation 
[fee-for-
service] 
payment 
(in Taler) 
Your costs 
(in Taler) 
Your profit 
(in Taler) 
Patient 
benefit 
(in Taler) 
Your selected 
quantity of 
medical treatment 
0    5  Provide 0  
1    6  Provide 1  
2    7  Provide 2  
3    8  Provide 3  
4    9  Provide 4  
5    10  Provide 5  
6    9  Provide 6  
7    8  Provide 7  
8    7  Provide 8  
9    6  Provide 9  
10    5  Provide 10  
 
                                  You are a physician. 
                                  Which quantity of medical treatment do you want to provide? 
   
   
 Confirm  
   
 
 For illnesses in category 2, there is risk involved in the treatment. More 
precisely, there is a 50% probability the medical treatment you provide will 
result in a good outcome, i.e., a high health benefit, but there is also a 50% 
probability of a bad outcome, i.e., a low health benefit. Below is a screenshot of 
the information provided about the quantity of medical treatment and the patient 
benefit (for the time being please focus only on the white columns). For 
example, if you provide the patient with a quantity of 2 medical services, the 
resulting health benefit is 8 if good outcome and 6 if bad outcome. Thus, the 
outcome of the treatment is risky. To characterize this, think of a bag containing 
10 balls where 5 balls are white and 5 balls are black (we will call it bag A). The 
good outcome is realized if you guess correctly the color of a ball that will be 
drawn from the bag. If you guess that a white ball will be drawn randomly from 
the bag and this is what happens, then there is a good outcome for the patient, 
and consequently, if you provide the patient with a quantity of 2 medical 
services, the resulting health benefit will be 8. If you guess a white ball but a 
black ball is drawn, then there is a bad outcome for the patient, and 
consequently, if you provide the patient with a quantity of 2 medical services, 
the resulting health benefit will be 6. Similarly, if you provide the patient with a 
quantity of 4 medical services, the resulting health benefit will be 10 if good 
outcome and 8 if bad outcome. 
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Example patient 
Illness in category 2 (risk) 
 
 
 
 
 
Quantity of 
medical 
treatment 
Your 
capitation 
[fee-for-
service] 
payment 
(in Taler) 
Your costs 
(in Taler) 
Your profit 
(in Taler) 
Patient 
benefit 
(in Taler) 
Your selected 
quantity of 
medical treatment 
    Good Bad    
0    6 4  Provide 0  
1    7 5  Provide 1  
2    8 6  Provide 2  
3    9 7  Provide 3  
4    10 8  Provide 4  
5    11 9  Provide 5  
6    10 8  Provide 6  
7    9 7  Provide 7  
8    8 6  Provide 8  
9    7 5  Provide 9  
10    6 4  Provide 10  
 
                                  You are a physician. 
                                  Which quantity of medical treatment do you want to provide? 
   
   
 Confirm  
   
-Help- 
Risk is involved in the medical treatment. 
There will be a draw from a bag (A) of 10 balls where 5 balls are white and 5 balls are black. 
- There is a good outcome for the patient if you guess correctly the color of the drawn ball. 
- There is a bad outcome for the patient if you guess incorrectly the color of the drawn ball. 
   
    
 
 For illnesses in category 3, there is uncertainty involved in the treatment. More 
specifically, there is an unknown probability that the medical treatment you 
provide will result in a good outcome, i.e., a high health benefit, but there is also 
an unknown  probability that the treatment will result in a bad outcome, i.e., a 
low health benefit. Below is a screenshot of the information provided about the 
quantity of medical treatment and the patient benefit (for the time being please 
focus only on the white columns). For example, if you provide the patient with a 
quantity of 2 medical services, the resulting health benefit is 8 if good outcome 
and 6 if bad outcome. Thus, the outcome of the treatment is uncertain. To 
characterize this, think of a bag containing 10 balls. You know there are both 
white and black balls in the bag, but not how many of each (we will call it bag 
B). The good outcome is realized if you guess correctly the color of a ball drawn 
from the bag. If you guess that a white ball will be drawn randomly from the bag 
and this is what happens, then there is a good outcome for the patient, and 
consequently, if you provide the patient with a quantity of 2 medical services, 
the resulting health benefit will be 8. If you guess a white ball but a black ball is 
drawn, then there is a bad outcome for the patient, and consequently, if you 
provide the patient with a quantity of 2 medical services, the resulting health 
benefit will be 6. Similarly, if you provide the patient with a quantity of 4 
medical services, the resulting health benefit will be 10 if good outcome and 8 if 
bad outcome. 
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Example patient 
Illness in category 3 (uncertainty) 
 
 
 
 
 
Quantity of 
medical 
treatment 
Your 
capitation 
[fee-for-
service] 
payment 
(in Taler) 
Your costs 
(in Taler) 
Your profit 
(in Taler) 
Patient 
benefit 
(in Taler) 
Your selected 
quantity of 
medical treatment 
    Good Bad    
0    6 4  Provide 0  
1    7 5  Provide 1  
2    8 6  Provide 2  
3    9 7  Provide 3  
4    10 8  Provide 4  
5    11 9  Provide 5  
6    10 8  Provide 6  
7    9 7  Provide 7  
8    8 6  Provide 8  
9    7 5  Provide 9  
10    6 4  Provide 10  
 
                                  You are a physician. 
                                  Which quantity of medical treatment do you want to provide? 
   
   
 Confirm  
   
-Help- 
Uncertainty is involved in the medical treatment. 
There will be a draw from a bag (B) of 10 balls where there are white and black balls. 
You don’t know the composition of the number of white and black balls in the bag. 
- There is a good outcome for the patient if you guess correctly the color of the drawn ball. 
- There is a bad outcome for the patient if you guess incorrectly the color of the drawn ball. 
   
    
 
Profit 
 
In each round you receive a capitation [fee-for-service] remuneration for treating the 
patient. Your remuneration is irrespective of the quantity of medical treatment provided. 
[Your remuneration increases with the quantity of medical treatment provided.] You 
also incur costs for treating the patient and they depend on the quantity of services you 
provide. [You also incur costs for treating the patient, which also depend on the quantity 
of services provided.] Your profit for each decision is calculated by subtracting these 
costs from the capitation [fee-for-service] remuneration. 
 
Every possible treatment quantity yields a benefit for the patient – contingent on illness. 
Hence, when deciding on medical services, you will determine not only your own profit 
but also the patient’s benefit. 
 
In each round, you will receive detailed information on your screen (see below) for the 
respective patient. The information will show your capitation [fee-for-service] 
remuneration, your costs and your profit, as well as the patient benefit, for each possible 
quantity of medical treatment. Below is a screenshot of the information provided. For 
example, let’s say you are about to decide what quantity of medical treatment to provide 
for an illness with a risky outcome. If you provide the patient with a quantity of 2 [8] 
medical services, you profit will be 9.6 and the patient’s health benefit 8 if good 
outcome and 6 if bad outcome. If you instead provide the patient with a quantity of 4 [6] 
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medical services, your profit will be 8.4 and the patient’s health benefit 10 if good 
outcome and 8 if bad outcome.  
 
 
Example patient 
Illness in category 2 (risk) 
 
 
 
 
 
Quantity of 
medical 
treatment 
Your 
capitation 
[fee-for-
service] 
payment 
(in Taler) 
Your costs 
(in Taler) 
Your profit 
(in Taler) 
Patient 
benefit 
(in Taler) 
Your selected 
quantity of 
medical treatment 
    Good Bad    
0 10 [0] 0.0 10.0 [0.0] 6 4  Provide 0  
1 10 [2] 0.1 9.9 [1.9] 7 5  Provide 1  
2 10 [4] 0.4 9.6 [3.6] 8 6  Provide 2  
3 10 [6] 0.9 9.1 [5.1] 9 7  Provide 3  
4 10 [8] 1.6 8.4 [6.4] 10 8  Provide 4  
5 10 [10] 2.5 7.5 [7.5] 11 9  Provide 5  
6 10 [12] 3.6 6.4 [8.4] 10 8  Provide 6  
7 10 [14] 4.9 5.1 [9.1] 9 7  Provide 7  
8 10 [16] 6.4 3.6 [9.6] 8 6  Provide 8  
9 10 [18] 8.1 1.9 [9.9] 7 5  Provide 9  
10 10 [20] 10.0 0.0 [10.0] 6 4  Provide 10  
 
                                  You are a physician. 
                                  Which quantity of medical treatment do you want to provide? 
   
   
 Confirm  
   
-Help- 
Risk is involved in the medical treatment. 
There will be a draw from a bag (A) of 10 balls where 5 balls are white and 5 balls are black. 
- There is a good outcome for the patient if you guess correctly the color of the drawn ball. 
- There is a bad outcome for the patient if you guess incorrectly the color of the drawn ball. 
   
    
 
At the end of the experiment, one of the 15 rounds in the first part of the experiment 
will be chosen randomly. Your profit in this round will be paid to you in cash. If the 
selected round involves a risky or uncertain outcome, a draw of balls will determine 
whether the outcome for the patient is good or bad, as explained. In case of the risky 
outcome, you will select a color, either black or white, and then one randomly selected 
participant will draw a ball from a bag containing 5 black and 5 white balls (bag A). In 
case of the uncertain outcome, you will select a color, either black or white, and then 
one randomly selected participant will draw a ball from a bag containing 10 balls with 
unknown proportions of black and white balls (bag B). 
 
In this part of the experiment, no patients will be physically present in the laboratory. 
Yet, the patient benefit does accrue to a real patient, since the amount resulting from 
your decision will be transferred to Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V., an 
organization funding treatment of patients with eye cataracts. 
 
The transfer of money to Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. will be made 
after the experiment by the experimenter. An official note of confirmation will be 
published on the experimental laboratory’s blackboard on July 6. You will be able to 
verify that the transferred amount is exactly the same as the total patient benefit (in 
euro) resulting from the decisions made by all participants in the randomly chosen 
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situation. 
 
Comprehension questions 
 
Prior to the decision rounds, we kindly ask you to answer a few comprehension 
questions. They are intended to help familiarize you with the decision situations. If you 
have any questions about this, please raise your hand. Part one of the experiment will 
begin once all participants have answered the comprehension questions correctly. 
 
Part Two [handed out after the completion of part one] 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully. We will approach you in about 5 
minutes to answer any questions you may have. If you have questions at any time 
during the experiment, please raise your hand and we will come to you. Please 
remember that 1 Taler = 1 euro. 
 
Decisions 
 
Part 2 is composed of 2 × 20 individual decision situations. In the first set of decision 
situation, you will choose between either receiving a certain amount of money for sure 
or drawing a ball from bag C with a chance to win 5 Taler. An example is shown below. 
As you can see, you will be asked to make repeated choices between receiving a certain 
amount of money for sure and drawing a ball from bag C. You can also see that the 
guaranteed amount you can choose increases in each row. If you choose to draw a ball 
from bag C, the drawing will be conducted as follows. We will fill the bag with 5 black 
and 5 white balls. One randomly selected person will be chosen to draw a ball from the 
bag. Before this person draws the ball, you will pick a color, black or white. If your 
chosen color matches the randomly drawn ball, you will win 5 Taler (otherwise zero). 
You will be asked to make 20 choices. For example, for the first choice situation, you 
will decide whether to draw a ball from bag C and have the possibility of winning 5 
Taler or receive 0.25 Taler for sure. If you prefer to draw from the bag, then check the 
box on the left; if you would rather receive 0.25 Taler for sure, then check the box on 
the right. As you can see, the amount in Taler increases in the right column. Once you 
have chosen the guaranteed amount, you should repeat this decision throughout the 
remaining choice situations. For example, if you choose to receive 0.25 Taler for sure in 
the first choice situation, instead of drawing a ball from bag C, then you will obviously 
also choose 0.5 Taler for sure over drawing a ball from bag C in the next choice 
situation. 
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In the second set of decision situations, you will make similar decisions between 
receiving a certain amount of money for sure and drawing a ball from a bag – but now 
from bag D. Bag D will consist of 10 balls, but the number of black and white balls will 
be a secret; otherwise the choice situations are similar to those in the first set (the 
amount in Taler increases in the right column). 
 
Payoffs 
 
When you have made all 40 choices, one of the choices will be randomly selected to 
determine your payoff. If you chose to draw from the bag in the randomly selected 
choice, you will need to select a color. First you will be asked to indicate whether you 
select a black ball or a white ball in case the randomly selected choice involves a draw 
from bag C. Then you will be asked to do the same in case the randomly selected choice 
involves a draw from bag D. In the end of the experiment, one randomly selected person 
will draw one ball from bag C and one ball from bag D. The randomly selected choice 
that will determine your payoff will be shown on your screen. 
 
Part Three [handed out after the completion of part two] 
 
[This part is not used in the current paper] 
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Tables 
Table 1. First part of the experiment (timeline of physician decision making). 
 
Health benefit is 
Deterministic 
Health benefit is 
Risky 
Health benefit is 
Uncertain 
Patient: 1,2,3,4,5 6,7,8,9,10 11,12,13,14,15 
 (A–E) (A–E) (A–E) 
Note: Health profile in parentheses (Patient 1 has health profile A, Patient 2 has profile B, and so on). 
 
 
Table 2. Effect of payment system on medical treatment. 
 
Average 
deviation 
from optimal 
treatment 
 
Average 
absolute 
deviation from 
optimal 
treatment 
Proportion 
selfish 
decisions 
 
 
Proportion 
optimal 
decisions 
 
 
FFS (N = 64) 2.48 (1.79) 2.53 (1.73) 26.3% 24.7% 
CAP (N = 66) -2.46 (1.55) 2.56 (1.43) 16.3% 19.7% 
P-value < 0.01a 0.82a 0.12b 0.34b 
Note: a Mann-Whitney U test. b T-test with errors clustered on individuals. Standard deviation in 
parentheses. Deviation from optimal treatment is the difference between chosen level of medical 
treatment and the optimal level of medical treatment for each patient. For each individual, this value is 
averaged over the 15 patients in order to create 64 independent observations in FFS and 66 independent 
observations in CAP for the Mann-Whitney U tests. The proportions in the last two columns are 
calculated based on the total number of decisions and thus N = 960 in FFS and N = 990 in CAP. 
 
 
Table 3. Effect of risk and uncertainty on medical treatment. 
  Deterministic Risk Uncertainty 
Average absolute 
deviation from optimal 
treatment: 
FFS (N = 64) 2.45 (1.76) 2.55 (1.73) 2.58 (1.77) 
CAP (N = 66) 2.52 (1.52) 2.58 (1.44) 2.58 (1.46) 
     
Null hypothesis P-value* 
FFS:  Deterministic = Risk 0.15 
FFS:  Deterministic = Uncertainty 0.04 
CAP: Deterministic = Risk 0.91 
CAP: Deterministic = Uncertainty 0.79 
Note: *Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Standard deviation in parentheses. Absolute deviation from optimal 
treatment is the absolute difference between chosen level of medical treatment and the optimal level of 
medical treatment for each patient. For each individual, this value is averaged over the five patients 
within each treatment (Deterministic, Risk, and Uncertainty) in order to create 64 independent 
observations in FFS and 66 independent observations in CAP for the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. 
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Table 4. Share of subjects providing optimal treatment in FFS. 
 
 
Treatment 
 
Health profile 
 
Deterministic 
 
Risk 
 
Uncertainty 
A 43.8% 40.1% 39.1% 
B 14.1% 9.4%* 10.9% 
C 25.0% 22.0% 25.0% 
D 18.8% 23.4%* 23.4% 
E 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 
Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the difference from Deterministic 
for each health profile and treatment (Risk and Uncertainty). 
 
 
Table 5. Share of subjects providing optimal treatment in CAP. 
 
 
Treatment 
 
Health profile 
 
Deterministic 
 
Risk 
 
Uncertainty 
A 4.5% 6.1% 6.1% 
B 50.0% 42.4% 39.4%* 
C 12.1% 13.6% 13.6% 
D 24.2% 13.6%** 16.7%* 
E 21.2% 15.2% 16.7% 
Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the difference from Deterministic 
for each health profile and treatment (Risk and Uncertainty). 
 
 
Table 6. Generic risk preference and medical treatment (linear regression). 
Dependent variable: 
Absolute deviation 
from optimal 
treatment 
 
 
FFS 
 
 
CAP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Risk treatment 0.105 (0.058)* 0.258 (0.214) 0.013 (0.079) -0.719 (0.307)** 
Risk for self -0.089 (0.087) -0.081 (0.089) -0.127 (0.055)** -0.169 (0.057)*** 
Risk treatment 
× Risk for self - -0.02 (0.023) - 0.083 (0.039)
** 
     
Control variables YES YES YES YES 
Observations 630 630 640 640 
- Clusters 63 63 64 64 
Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Errors are clustered on individuals (within parentheses). Risk 
treatment is a dummy for patients for whom the outcome of medical treatment is risky (and the base 
category is patients for whom the outcome of medical treatment is deterministic). Risk for self is the first 
row where the subject chose the certain amount of money (over the risky lottery) in the individual choice 
task (10 = risk neutrality). Control variables: age, gender, whether the subject smokes, tries to keep a 
healthy diet, number of visits to the doctor in the last three and twelve months, health status and political 
views on a scale from left to right. A total of three subjects (in FFS) switched multiple times in at least 
one of the two individual choice tasks and are therefore removed from the analysis. 
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Table 7. Generic uncertainty preference and medical treatment (linear regression). 
Dependent variable: 
Absolute deviation 
from optimal 
treatment 
 
 
FFS 
 
 
CAP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Uncertainty treatment 0.143 (0.075)* -0.067 (0.260) 0.05 (0.091) -0.345 (0.184)* 
Uncertainty for self -0.091 (0.067) -0.096 (0.067) -0.036 (0.073) -0.060 (0.078) 
Uncertainty treatment 
× Uncertainty for self - 0.009 (0.032) - 0.048 (0.022)
** 
     
Control variables YES YES YES YES 
Observations 630 630 640 640 
- Clusters 63 63 64 64 
Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Errors are clustered on individuals (in parentheses). Uncertainty 
treatment is a dummy for patients for whom the outcome of medical treatment is uncertain (and the base 
category is patients for whom the outcome of medical treatment is deterministic). Uncertainty for self is 
the first row where the subject chose the certain amount of money (over the uncertain lottery) in the 
individual choice task (10 = uncertainty neutrality). Control variables: age, gender, whether the subject 
smokes, tries to keep a healthy diet, number of visits to the doctor in the last three and twelve months, 
health status and political views on a scale from left to right. A total of three subjects (in FFS) switched 
multiple times in at least one of the two individual choice tasks and are therefore removed from the 
analysis. 
 
 
Table 8. Proportion of selfish and altruistic physicians when patient health is 
deterministic, by treatment and health profile. 
 
 
Selfish 
decision at 
least once 
 
Selfish 
decision 
always 
 
Optimal 
decision at 
least once 
 
Optimal 
decision 
always 
     
FFS (N = 64)     
Profiles: A,B,C,D,E 31.3% 20.3% 46.9% 10.9% 
- Profiles: A,B 31.3% 21.9% 45.3% 12.5% 
- Profiles: C,D,E 29.7% 20.3% 32.8% 17.2% 
     
CAP (N = 66)     
Profiles: A,B,C,D,E 27.3% 10.6% 53.0% 3.0% 
- Profiles: A,B 24.2% 15.2% 51.5% 3.0% 
- Profiles: C,D,E 22.7% 10.6% 27.2% 10.6% 
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Table 9. Provision of medical care to patients from health profiles C and D. 
Dependent variable: 
Absolute deviation from 
optimal treatment. 
 
Profile C 
 
Profile D 
 
P-value* 
    
FFS (N = 64)    
Deterministic 2.39 (1.93) 2.59 (1.85) 0.05 
Risk 2.41 (1.87) 2.75 (1.98) < 0.01 
Uncertainty 2.41 (1.95) 2.83 (1.97) < 0.01 
    
CAP (N = 66)    
Deterministic 2.45 (1.63) 2.56 (1.80) 0.22 
Risk 2.45 (1.59) 2.68 (1.67) 0.05 
Uncertainty 2.55 (1.69) 2.53 (1.60) 0.82 
Note: *Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Standard deviation in parentheses. The absolute deviation from 
optimal treatment is the absolute difference between chosen level of medical treatment and optimal level 
of medical treatment for the patient. 
 
 
Table 10. Distribution of physician types. 
 Full sample Only mix 
 
 
FFS 
(N = 64) 
CAP 
(N = 66) 
FFS 
(N = 39) 
CAP 
(N = 50) 
1. Selfish 20.3% 12.1% - - 
2. Altruistic (optimal C and E) 18.8% 10.6% - - 
3. Mix     
    Principle     
    - Equality ex-post 15.6% 10.6% 25.6% 13.7% 
    - Capacity to benefit 21.9% 30.3% 35.9% 39.2% 
    - Severity of illness 23.4% 36.4% 38.5% 47.1% 
P-value* 0.32 0.23 
Note: *Kruskal-Wallis test of equality of proportions between FFS and CAP. The type distribution is 
based on physician decisions for patients with deterministic benefit functions from health profiles C and 
E: selfish = always income-maximizing choice (q=0 in CAP and q=10 in FFS), altruistic = optimal care 
to both C and E, equality ex-post = better care to C than E, capacity to benefit = worse care to C than E, 
and severity of illness = provide C and E with equal amounts of care. 
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Table A1. Effect of payment system on medical treatment (by health profiles). 
 
Average 
deviation 
from optimal 
treatment 
 
Average 
absolute 
deviation from 
optimal 
treatment 
Proportion 
selfish 
decisions 
 
 
Proportion 
optimal 
decisions 
 
 
     
Profile: A, B     
FFS (N = 64) 2.48 (1.76) 2.56 (1.69) 26.3% 26.3% 
CAP (N = 66) -2.55 (1.51) 2.64 (1.40) 17.4% 24.8% 
P-value < 0.01a 0.59a 0.18b 0.76b 
     
Profile: C, D, E     
FFS (N = 64) 2.48 (1.83) 2.51 (1.79) 26.2% 23.6% 
CAP (N = 66) -2.40 (1.64) 2.50 (1.49) 15.5% 16.3% 
P-value < 0.01a 0.99a 0.09b 0.22b 
Note: a Mann-Whitney U test. b T-test with errors clustered on individuals. Standard deviation in 
parentheses. Deviation from optimal treatment is the difference between chosen level of medical 
treatment and optimal level of medical treatment for each patient. For each individual, this value is 
averaged over the 15 patients in order to create 64 independent observations in FFS and 66 independent 
observations in CAP for the Mann-Whitney U tests. The proportions in the last two columns are 
calculated based on the total number of decisions and thus N = 384 in FFS and N = 396 in CAP in the top 
panel and N = 576 in FFS and N = 594 in CAP in the bottom panel. 
 
 
Table A2. Effect of risk and uncertainty on medical treatment in FFS (by health 
profile). 
  Treatment 
 
Health profile 
 
Deterministic 
 
Risk 
 
Uncertainty 
A 1.22 (1.29) 1.30 (1.26) 1.30 (1.24) 
B 3.75 (2.41) 3.92 (2.40) 3.86 (2.45) 
C 2.39 (1.93) 2.41 (1.87) 2.41 (1.95) 
D 2.59 (1.85) 2.75 (1.98) 2.83 (1.97)* 
E 2.30 (1.82) 2.38 (1.86) 2.50 (1.87)* 
Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the difference from Deterministic 
for each health profile and treatment (Risk and Uncertainty). Standard deviation in parentheses. 
Dependent variable is the absolute deviation from optimal treatment (the absolute difference between 
chosen level of medical treatment and the optimal level of medical treatment for each patient). 
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Table A3. Effect of risk and uncertainty on medical treatment in CAP (by health 
profile). 
  Treatment 
 
Health profile 
 
Deterministic 
 
Risk 
 
Uncertainty 
A 4.27 (2.10) 4.06 (2.04) 4.12 (1.93)* 
B 1.05 (1.21) 1.17 (1.22) 1.21 (1.20) 
C 2.45 (1.63) 2.45 (1.59) 2.55 (1.69) 
D 2.56 (1.80) 2.68 (1.67) 2.53 (1.60) 
E 2.24 (1.64) 2.55 (1.67)** 2.49 (1.60)* 
Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the difference from Deterministic 
for each health profile and treatment (Risk and Uncertainty). Standard deviation in parentheses. 
Dependent variable is the absolute deviation from optimal treatment (the absolute difference between 
chosen level of medical treatment and the optimal level of medical treatment for each patient). 
 
 
Table A4. Generic risk preference and medical treatment (by health profile). 
 
 
AB 
(1) 
 
AB 
(2) 
 
CDE 
(3) 
 
CDE 
(4) 
     
FFS     
Risk 0.119 (0.098) 0.357 (0.316) 0.095 (0.058) 0.192 (0.268) 
Risk for self -0.086 (0.083) -0.073 (0.087) -0.091 (0.091) -0.086 (0.093) 
Risk × Risk 
for self  -0.025 (0.033)  -0.010 (0.028) 
     
CAP     
Risk -0.078 (0.104) -1.187 (0.478)** 0.073 (0.093) -0.407 (0.385) 
Risk for self -0.114 (0.056)** -0.177 (0.063)*** -0.136 (0.058)** -0.163 (0.058)*** 
Risk × Risk 
for self  0.126 (0.055)**  0.055 (0.046) 
Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Linear regression, dependent variable is the absolute deviation 
from optimal treatment in deciding on the quantity of medical treatment for a patient. Errors are clustered 
on individuals (in parentheses). Risk is a dummy for patients for whom the outcome of medical treatment 
is risky (and the base category is patients for whom the outcome of medical treatment is deterministic). 
Risk for self is the first row where the subject chose the certain amount of money (over the risky lottery) 
in the individual choice task (10 = risk neutrality). Control variables: age, gender, whether the subject 
smokes, tries to keep a healthy diet, number of visits to the doctor within the last three and twelve months, 
health status and political views on a scale from left to right. 
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Table A5. Generic uncertainty preference and medical treatment (by health profile). 
  
AB 
(1) 
 
AB 
(2) 
 
CDE 
(3) 
 
CDE 
(4) 
     
FFS     
Unc. 0.095 (0.074) 0.122 (0.209) 0.175 (0.095) 0.030 (0.372) 
Unc. for self -0.098 (0.067) -0.010 (0.066) -0.087 (0.071) -0.095 (0.070) 
Unc. × Unc. 
for self 
 -0.003 (0.022)  0.017 (0.047) 
     
CAP     
Unc. -0.016 (0.110) -0.195 (0.389) 0.093 (0.109) -0.445 (0.144)*** 
Unc. for self -0.039 (0.073) -0.050 (0.089) -0.034 (0.075) -0.067 (0.074) 
Unc. × Unc. 
for self 
 0.022 (0.047)  0.066 (0.018)*** 
Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Linear regression; dependent variable is the absolute deviation 
from optimal treatment in deciding on the quantity of medical treatment for a patient. Errors are clustered 
on individuals (in parentheses). Unc. is a dummy for patients for whom the outcome of medical treatment 
is uncertain (and the base category is patients for whom the outcome of medical treatment is 
deterministic). Unc. for self is the first row where the subject chose the certain amount of money (over the 
uncertain lottery) in the individual choice task (10 = uncertain neutrality). Control variables: age, gender, 
whether the subject smokes, tries to keep a healthy diet, number of visits to the doctor within the last three 
and twelve months, health status and political views on a scale from left to right. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Patient benefit functions (medical treatment (q) on the horizontal axes and 
health benefit on the vertical axes). 
   
  
 
 
Figure 2. Average quantity of medical treatment per patient. 
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